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This thesis is work of Christian systematic theology that also engages with insights from other 
academic disciplines in order to better understand why believing is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity. In other words, it asks why is it the case that believing, rather than something else, is 
centrally significant for Christians? By critically engaging the rich theological descriptions of faith 
alongside various philosophical reflections related to the phenomenology of believing it seeks to 
show that this central significance becomes more intelligible when we pay attention to the various 
aspects of Christian believing that are not always immediately perceivable. In order to do this this 
thesis explores what two twentieth century Protestant theologians (Karl Barth and Rudolf 
Bultmann) have to say about the nature of Christian faith. It then moves on to bring in other 
theological and philosophical voices to further articulate those aspects of a Christian’s believing that 


































This thesis is first and foremost a work of Christian systematic theology that brings in 
interdisciplinary resources as is deemed fit for its inquiry into why believing is centrally significant in 
and for Christianity (that is, why is it the case that believing, rather than something else, is so closely 
tied to the various salvific motifs found in Christianity?). By critically engaging the rich theological 
descriptions of faith alongside various philosophical reflections on the holistic character of believing 
it seeks to show that this central significance becomes more intelligible when we attend to the 
implicit dimensions of explicit faith and to the holistic character of Christian believing. In order to 
pursue this line of inquiry the thesis begins by presenting what Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann 
have to say about the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian 
believing as they describe the self-involving nature of faith in Christ. It then moves on to bring in 
other theological and philosophical voices in in order to further articulate an understanding of the 
holistic character of Christian believing in a manner that supplements and contributes to what Barth 
and Bultmann offer as well as provide further intelligibility to why belief is centrally significant in 
and for Christianity. It moves on to focus on a non-reductive dispositional account of believing and 
on non-reductive accounts of the cognitive/linguistic dimensions of belief as well as on the 
unavoidable social dimensions of an individual’s belief acquisition, formation, and manifestation. It 
does so in order to add further intelligibility to how we might see the various implicit dimensions of 
explicit faith holding together. In doing so the thesis describes and argues for an understanding of 
believing in Christ as not merely one thing among other aspects of a Christian’s human existence, 
but as something that is embedded and enmeshed within all the various aspects of a Christian’s 
human existence (it is a phenomenon that is wholly self-involving in the fact that it involves the 
entirety of the believer’s being and is holistically constituted in the sense that the character of 
Christian believing is intimately and integrally (not secondarily) dependent on the wider 
particularities and possibilities of the believer’s concrete reality in the world with others). In 
recognizing the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing 
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Introduction: Why is it that “believing” is centrally significant in and for Christianity? 
 
“But it must be said just as definitely that there is no venture in faith that is not simultaneously a 
venture of faith. For otherwise one would come out with exactly as abstract and general a faith as 
before. What would it mean to say that I might venture something in faith if I did not in so doing 
venture to believe? It would mean that here, too, faith was understood as a conviction or a state of 
feeling that lies behind my actual life instead of being at work in it. It would mean that faith was 
thought of as a possession of my ‘inner life’ at which I could look and from which I could then look 
away to my ‘tasks and duties, exigencies and temptations.’ No, I ‘have’ faith only when I have it ever 
anew in my duties and exigencies.”1 
“Of Course, the knowing of faith and its recognition can never be an abstract knowing.”2 
 “If faith concerns man’s personal being, if it decides who I am before God (that is, one with whom 
God is), then it includes all that I am, and is related to it all. This is the great thing to be learned, that 
faith has to be lived not as something in itself, but in concrete existence.”3 
“The Reformers constantly set faith as trust in God’s promise in opposition to an understanding of 
faith as mere knowledge of something that one may have at a distance and without personal 
involvement.”4 
“Yet in order to account adequately for the truth of beliefs such as ‘Jesus is Lord,’ something more 
is needed, namely, some explanation of one’s involvement in that truth.”5 
 
Faith, believing in Christ, carries central significance for Christianity. The fundamental question that 
this thesis seeks to shed light on is, why? Why is it the case that belief, believing, and faith are 
centrally significant in and for Christian theology, the Christian religion, and a Christian way of life? 
Why is it that faith (rather than something else) is so closely tied to salvation, redemption, 
forgiveness, restoration, reconciliation, and transformation? The basic argument of this thesis is that 
the central significance of belief, believing, and of faith become more intelligible when we attend to 
the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and to the holistic character of Christian believing because 
 
1 Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith: Shorter Writings of Rudolf Bultmann (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1961), 56-57. 
2 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV.1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), p. 765. As he continues to state, 
“In all the so-called truths of faith we have to do with the being and activity of the living God 
towards us, with Jesus Christ Himself, whom faith cannot encounter with a basic neutrality, but only 
in the decision of obedience. The idea of an abstract knowledge of this object—we might almost say 
the idea of a theologian abstracted from the fact that he is a Christian—is one which has no 
substance” (Barth, Church Dogmatics IV.1, p. 765). 
3 Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of Faith (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), 160. 
4 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 142. 
5 Kevin W. Hector, Theology without Metaphysics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 235. 
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by doing so we not only see the rich and dynamic aspects that make faith what it is, but we are also 
able to better see how the character of Christian believing is integrally related to everything that a 
person is, does, and feels both in their particularity and uniqueness and in their continuity and 
commonality with other Christians and other created persons in general. By attending to the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith we are better able to understand how believing is not an isolated 
phenomenon within the believer’s life and by recognizing the pervasive character of Christian 
believing we are better able to understand its central significance in and for Christianity. 
 
  It will be helpful, at the outset, to briefly clarify what is meant by a few key terms that appear 
in the title of the thesis. For the purposes of this thesis “explicit faith” refers to the common 
conception of what it means for a person to believe that highlights the intellectual or cognitive 
dimensions of the character of Christian believing. Namely, the believer’s thinking (or trusting) 
something (or someone) to be true. The “implicit dimensions of explicit” faith are the various other 
aspects of Christian believing that accompany this explicit dimension of believing that further 
constitute the character of Christian believing. In referring to the “holistic” character of Christian 
believing the thesis emphasizes that the various aspects or dimensions of the character of Christian 
believing are intimately interconnected and mutually constitutive of the nature of a Christian’s and 
the Christian faith. Furthermore, in referring to the “holistic” character of Christian believing the 
argument of this thesis also emphasizes that the whole person is involved (not merely their mind in 
an isolated manner) and that the embedded and enacted continuity and particularity of believing 
persons in time, space, and place is constitutional to the character of Christian believing rather than 
merely a secondary effect of or parallel occurrence to faith. 
 
 Christianity originates from, is oriented around, and is ordered toward the person of Christ 
and the implications that follow from commitments to his being the way, the truth, and the life 
(John 14:6).6 It is centered around the need and opportunity to receive restoration, reconciliation, 
redemption, forgiveness, salvation, and renewed opportunities, purposes, relationships, and 
meaning; in short, it’s centered around receiving and appropriating life in its intended fullness in 
 
6 Even though Christ and Christianity are furthermore rooted in the special relationship that God 
has with Israel as depicted in the Hebrew Scriptures to such an extent that the two cannot be 
separated it is still fair to say, as Karl Barth does, that Christian Faith in particular originates from 
the person of Christ (who’s particular identity as the incarnate Son is partially constituted by the 
particularity of his Jewish ethnicity and the history of God’s relationship to Israel). 
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harmony with God, others, oneself, and one’s environment. As the New Testament letter to the 
Ephesians tells us it is by grace that we are saved in order that we might be enabled to fulfill our 
purpose in being created, namely to take advantage of the opportunities given to us to do “good 
works.” But as it states, it is through faith (albeit not on our own)7 that we are saved (Ephesians 2:8-
10). As the book of Acts recounts the narrative of Paul and Silas’ miraculous escape from prison we 
read the jailor ask them, “What must I do to be saved” and they reply “believe in the Lord Jesus” 
(emphasis mine, Acts 16: 30-31). In Genesis we read that Abraham “believed the Lord and he credited 
it to him as righteousness” (emphasis mine, Genesis 15:6). Numerous examples could be drawn on, 
but the point is clearly found throughout the Christian and Hebrew scriptures and throughout the 
history of Christian theological reflection: believing and faith are centrally significant for both the 
Christian way of life and for the reflective practice of Christian theology.  
 
 While the central significance of faith for Christianity is relatively clear the many nuances of 
the character of Christian believing and the nature of the Christian faith are not always fully 
appreciated or consciously acknowledged. Terms like belief, faith, and trust are readily understood at 
face value. This, however, is what contributes to the initial puzzlement over the central significance 
of believing in Christianity. On one level we could say that the central significance of faith and belief 
is intelligibly understood by recognizing their strong connection to the reception and appropriation 
 
7 As Eberhard Jüngel nicely puts it, “Faith is, in fact, that self-definition of man in which man, on 
the basis of his being defined by God, renounces all self-grounding. But faith can renounce all self-
grounding because self-grounding has already been surpassed by trust in God. . . . If I am human in 
that I permit another to be there for me, then I am only certain of myself in that other one. 
Therefore, it is not a law but a promise when we formulate the anthropological principle: Only he who 
forsakes himself will come to himself. This promise, more than any law, constitutes the being of man as 
man” (God as the Mystery of the World [London: Bloomsbury, 1983, 2014], 181) and as Wolfhart 
Pannenberg states, “If we regard faith itself as guaranteeing the truth and reality of its contents, then 
we declare it to be in fact the sustaining basis of its contents. But that entails a radical perversion of 
its nature. The nature of faith is to rely on God as other than itself and thus to have the basis of its 
existence outside itself” (Pannenberg, Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 153). No matter how much we 
emphasize the role of human agency in faith it is always an agency in dependence and reliance on 
God, but that does not mean that we have to deny human agency in order to safeguard that 
dependence and reliance, rather, we simply need a more nuanced grammar of human agency and 
action since neither human agency nor dependence can helpfully or in good conscience be denied. 
As Kevin Hector insightfully points out,  there is “a seeming paradox at the heart of Christian belief: 
according to the New Testament’s claims about the new covenant, that which is strictly external to 
one and due solely to God’s grace, namely, the possibility of following Christ, must become one’s 
own possibility and therefore recognizable as due to one” (Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 260). 
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of salvation (with all that that entails),8 but the question that this thesis seeks to address is deeper 
than that. The question this thesis is concerned with is, why is it that faith and belief are so strongly 
connected to the reception and appropriation of salvation and restoration? In other words, why is it 
faith and belief that are centrally significant and not something else? As such the character of this 
thesis is more speculative than merely dogmatic or historical;9 sitting somewhere at a crossroads 
between philosophical, systematic, dogmatic theology, and theological ethics. Its contribution 
intends to offer an explanation that makes this centrality of faith and belief more intelligible, but it 
does not intend to be an exhaustive or fully conclusive description of every aspect of what it means 
to believe or have faith. The aim of the thesis will have been successfully achieved if the reader walks 
away with a greater appreciation for the depth and richness of the character of Christian believing 
and is persuaded that the central significance of belief and faith makes more sense once we more 
closely reflect on the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and on the holistic character of Christian 
believing. 
 
 One initial caveat is worth mentioning up front. For the purposes of this thesis the English 
words “faith” and “belief” (or “to have faith” and “to believe”) are used interchangeably. Some 
might argue that the fact that in the English language we have two separate words with differing 
connotations is an advantage that allows for greater clarity, accuracy, and precision in our thinking 
and speaking about the human phenomena that these terms refer to (as compared to other 
languages, e.g. the Greek pistis or the German Glauben, which by and large use the same word to 
speak about faith and belief).10 However, in this case it actually hinders our quest to better 
 
8 In the widest most holistic sense of that term encompassing both judicial standing before God and 
one’s eternal destiny and in the sanctifying restoration that begins in the here and now and works 
itself out in a life of repentance that consists in continual adjustment and recalibration in believing 
rightly about the wrong aspects that one encounters and participates in throughout one’s life in a still 
fallen condition. 
9 For a more recent engagement with the nature of Christian faith that remains more or less at a 
dogmatic level see B.A. Gerrish’s Christian Faith: Dogmatics in Outline (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2015). 
10 When giving a paper at the Society for the Study of Theology conference in 2018 at the University 
of Nottingham on the relationship between faith and doubt I was insightfully asked by a native 
German speaker why I did not treat the two terms (faith and belief) more distinctly since the English 
language allows one to do that. I am grateful for his question that generated further reflection on 
this point. In general “faith” is understood to carry connotations of trust that are more self-
involving whereas “belief” is often understood along the lines of a mental act of assent to 
propositions. A hard and fast distinction between the two, however, does not hold even within the 
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understand the character of Christian believing and in doing so it clouds our understanding of why 
faith and belief are centrally significant in and for Christianity for a few reasons. First, 
philosophically and anthropologically speaking the concept of belief and the phenomenology of 
believing are much richer than they are commonly taken to be (so even the common distinctions 
between faith and belief do not always hold).11 Second, English translations of the Greek pistis in its 
various grammatical forms are interchangeably translated with both faith and belief such that hard 
and fast distinctions do not obtain. Reductive and overly simplistic accounts of both faith and belief 
(reductive both theologically and anthropologically) lead not only to shortcomings in our 
understanding of what it means to believe (in Christ) but they furthermore dampen our ability to 
intelligibly appreciate the central significance of Christian faith and belief. Furthermore, this type of 
distinction between “belief” and “faith” is partly responsible for problematizing our understanding 
of the character of Christian believing and for making it initially more difficult to understand why 
faith and belief are centrally significant. Both terms are in need of careful examination and 
articulation and as such throughout the thesis reference to the character of Christian believing is also 
speaking about the nature of a Christian’s and the Christian faith.12 
 This question concerning the centrality of belief is further intensified when it is asked in an 
age and time that often acts as if what one believes does not matter, or has no bearing on others 
beyond the individual doing the believing, and is at best considered a matter of personal taste and 
 
English language as faith is often understood as “confident belief” and “believing-in” and even 
“believing-that” share similar connotations that our concepts of trust and trusting have. 
11 The Gifford lectures of H.H. Price at the University of Aberdeen in 1959 to 1961 being only one 
example in the past 60 years that has shown this and another being the work of Erich Schwitzgebel 
on the dispositional analysis of believing, more recently, being another. Anthropologically speaking 
one could also refer to Augustin Fuentes’s 2018 Gifford lectures at the University of Edinburgh for 
a richer account of belief from an evolutionary and anthropological perspective. See H.H. Price’s 
Belief: The Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Aberdeen in 1960 (London: Allen & Unwin LTD, 
1969), Erich Schwitzgebel’s “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief,” Nous 36:2 (2002), 
and Agustin Fuentes’ Why We Believe: Evolution and the Human Way of Being (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2019). Furthermore along these lines of Fuentes’s work, one could also consult 
Graham Ward’s Unbelievable: Why We Believe and Why We Don’t (London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2014). 
12 B.A. Gerrish, for example, operates with a sharp distinction between belief and faith that is liable 
to run into some of the issues mentioned above. As he states, “Faith is taken here in the sense 
defined: not as belief, but as the insight or discernment evoked by the Christian story, in particular 
by the manifestation of the gospel in Jesus Christ. . . . I have suggested that we understand faith 
rather as the reconfiguration of our existence brought about by hearing the word of the gospel” 
(Gerrish, Christian Faith, 133-134). Gerrish’s positive description of faith is welcomed, but his 
conception of the nature of believing is not nuanced enough to adequately reflect the reality of the 
phenomenon as it actually occurs in believing persons. 
11 
 
private opinion. Such sensibilities, however, exhibit a reductively simplistic understanding of what it 
means to believe. It is my contention in this thesis that, given the centrality of faith and its pervasive 
normativity for both the institutional practice of theology (in both church and academy) and for the 
Christian way of life in general, our understanding of the character of Christian believing will 
inevitably affect not only various doctrinal discussions (or lack thereof), but it will also affect how 
we understand theology’s relationship to other academic disciplines and add greater intelligibility to 
the necessary integration of theology’s various subdisciplines. If theology is about God, how God 
relates to us, and everything else as it relates to God, and if knowledge of God and knowledge of 
ourselves are mutually intertwined (which they are),13 then how we understand the character of 
Christian believing (the mode of access to God and to redemptive living) will affect not only the 
content of belief, but also how we go about pursuing, appropriating, and promoting that content in 
the various activities and relationships we are involved with in our concrete situations in the world. 
As such, the web of beliefs (holistically understood) that individuals and communities of individuals 
embody and enact (stemming from a multiform relationship to the person of Christ) will inevitably 
affect how we relate with, to, for, and against other people as well as condition and guide what 
courses of action we undertake (and which we abstain from) and how we go about understanding 
our own identities. One of the intended take-aways of the thesis is that neither beliefs nor believing 
ought to be understood in an isolated manner and in acknowledging this this thesis seeks to 
articulate some of the implications that this has for how we understand the character of Christian 
believing and its significance for how believing normatively and transformatively relates to who we 
are, what we do, and what we hope to be and see realized in ourselves, in others, and in our various 
situations in the world and the world to come. 
 
 Faith and belief are not static concepts. They cannot be fully understood apart from 
articulating our involvement or activity in them. This is demonstrated by the fact that the fides quae 
creditur (the faith which is believed) cannot be separated from the fides qua creditur (the faith by which 
 
13 You not only find theological support for this in people like John Calvin (in the opening 
statements of his Institutes of the Christian Religion) and Rudolf Bultmann in their various affirmations 
concerning the interwoven relationship between knowledge of God and knowledge of ourselves, but 
you find philosophical support for this when one is persuaded of the demise of a sharp or strong 
subject/object distinction concerning human cognition/understanding in general, which is not only 
present in the more hermeneutical traditions of philosophy but is also gaining traction in 4e 
cognitive science.  
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it is believed). In other words, to intelligibly speak about belief one must both speak about the 
content of that belief as well as the act or disposition of believing, owning, and appropriating that 
content––the content and the act can be distinguished, but not separated (they both co-constitute 
each other and together they contribute to what it means to believe). To speak of belief, then, we 
cannot avoid speaking about the believer doing something (as well as having and being something). 
Faith, therefore, cannot only be understood as some entirely passive thing (in the mind or body) that 
is given that then manifests in action, but it must be understood to include the believer’s enacted 
agency inherently from the get-go.  
 
 Consider, for example, a common Protestant way of parsing the nature of faith. Protestants 
have commonly, since the time of Reformed Scholasticism, described genuine faith as consisting of 
at least three elements: notitia, assensus, and fiducia. Notitia is best understood as cognitive or linguistic 
content. For someone to have notitia is simply for someone to be aware of some sort of information; 
without further specifying a particular mode of relation to it (in the case of Christian faith it is 
related to the person of Christ and the gospel). Given one’s awareness of the content of the gospel 
one could: enjoy it, hate it, believe it, declare it, command it, dismiss it, ridicule it, fear it, see through 
it, etc. Assensus is best understood as commitment to the truth of notitia. This means that someone 
not only is aware of particular content but is also committed to the correctness of that content. 
However, along this line of thinking, you can assent to the truth of some particular content without 
properly receiving and submitting yourself to that content. The demons mentioned in the New 
Testament book of James are a classic example: they believe “and shudder” (James 2:19). Fiducia, on 
the other hand, is best understood as trust, appropriation, or confident submission to the content 
(or to who or what the content refers to) that is believed to be true. This means that someone allows 
the content that is believed to be true to play a normative role in shaping one’s way of existing. As 
should be apparent, according to this understanding, you cannot have fiducia without assensus and 
notitia. You can have assensus without fiducia, but not without notitia and you can have notitia without 
either assensus or fiducia. If all of these are not present (latently at least) you do not have genuine faith, 
at least not as commonly understood among this prominent trajectory of Protestant thought. In 
focusing on the essential aspect of fiducia in faith we can already begin to grasp some of the 
important implicit dimensions of explicit faith and when this aspect of fiducia is understood to be 
wholly self-involving (as later theologians began to further articulate, even in their criticisms of this 
common way of parsing faith) we have a starting point for further articulating how the character of 
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Christian believing cannot be sufficiently accounted for in an entirely abstracted and disengaged 
manner (and this becomes more fully articulated in a number of key 20th century Protestant 
theologians stemming from the work of Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, and this thesis will 
attempt to further contribute to the development of this line of thought). Faith, then, ought to be 
seen as embedded, embodied, and enacted in believers and not as some sort of objectified entity. 
Hence, the content as well as the act/disposition of faith is inherently dependent on concrete 
circumstances of manifestation for both its actualization as well as its intelligibility. In this sense faith 
is a holistic concept. The believer is involved cognitively, emotionally, volitionally, and physically. It 
cannot be fully recognized as assent to an abstract idea, statement, or proposition, as a content-less 
feeling, or as just any type of action, bodily movement, or linguistic utterance. Any of these taken by 
themselves results in a reductive conception of faith and runs the risk of problematizing our 
understanding of faith’s central significance. As such, faith is not a phenomenon that can be 
adequately recognized in the abstract (nor is Christian faith something that can be responsibly 
understood apart from some sort of “real” relation to God). 
 
 We believe-that many things are true and that other things are false. We believe that some 
statements correctly orient us to, and in, reality and that others fail to do so. We believe-that some 
courses of action are right, good, and beneficial and that others are wrong, corrupting, and harmful. 
We believe-that some things are right for us and that some things are right for all. We believe-in 
various causes, other persons, sometimes in ourselves, and sometimes in God (not only that God 
“exists” or is “real” or that God has revealed and reveals Godself to us in various and specific ways, 
but we also believe in various divine acts of promise, warning, demand or command to and for us). 
Both the object of belief as well as the act/disposition of believing are dynamic. At the same time, 
we also disbelieve-that and disbelieve-in a variety of intentional objects, whether those be states of 
affairs, other persons, causes, God, etc. We believe strongly in some things and weakly in others. 
The stronger the belief the greater the informative, normative, and transformative potential for 
shaping who we are, what we do, how we think, and how we relate to and perceive others, ourselves, 
our concrete situation and that which transcends our concrete situations. Believing-in and believing-
that are related but distinct aspects of how we believe; and disbelieving some things is an 
unavoidable aspect of believing yet other things. Beliefs do not exist in isolation from other beliefs 
and believing does not take place abstracted from our concrete intentional existence in the world 
with others (even when this involves instances of more abstract and theoretical reflection and 
14 
 
articulation “pre-predicative” and intersubjective factors play a role in both constituting and enabling 
our grasp of the sense of even formal statements and objects of belief and they continue to do so 
even when we incorporate divine and transcendent dimensions, such as divine grace and revelation, 
into our understanding of the character of Christian believing, as theologians ought to do). Believing 
in Christ is pervasive, and it is holistically normative for the believer.  
 
 Within the history of theological reflection we can find various discussions over implicit and 
explicit faith and we can also find the occasional caricatures or extreme versions of both.14 This 
thesis, however, promotes a non-reductive account of the character of Christian believing that 
adequately reflects the implicit dimensions that accompany explicit Christian faith, which make 
Christian faith what it is and distinguish it from a mere awareness or even a mere assent to the 
explicit content of faith. There are various ways to relate to and appropriate the content of faith and 
these are what make up the implicit human dimensions of explicit faith. As H. Richard Niebuhr 
pointed out, there are two major trajectories of inquiry in the western intellectual traditions 
concerning the nature of faith (both theological and philosophical). The first has to do with the 
relationship between faith and sight (and within this trajectory I would include questions concerning 
the relationship between faith and reason) and the second has to do with the relationship between 
faith and action (and here this would include the relationship between faith, works, good deeds, 
vocation, and intentional existence in light of one’s faith in Christ).15 This thesis is primarily 
interested in this latter trajectory as it contends that the trajectory of inquiry concerning the 
 
14 Most revolve around the content of faith but discussions of the various implicit human and divine 
dynamics that are involved in our relationship to the content of faith can also be found, although 
they are not often referred to using the phrase “implicit faith.” Discussions of implicit and explicit 
faith are readily perceivable in classic Protestant and Roman Catholic polemics (even though both 
acknowledge the necessity of both implicit and explicit dimensions) or in more recent speculation 
about those who have, for one reason or another, never had the opportunity to explicitly hear the 
Gospel message: Such as Rahner’s notion of anonymous Christians, or yet again in proposals that 
react to simplistic and reductive emphases on the propositional nature of belief by opting for an 
equally reductive position promoting a non-cognitivist and non-linguistic understanding of the 
ontology of beliefs and the phenomenology of believing.  
15 See H. Richard Niebuhr, ed. Richard R. Niebuhr, Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into the Structure of 
Human Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 4-20. 
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relationship between faith, sight, and reason can most fruitfully be pursued when these are 
understood as being embedded within our inquiries into the relationship between faith and action.16  
 
 The “holistic character of Christian believing,” then, is a double reference to the reflexive 
relationship between the multifaceted characters who believe and to the multidimensional character 
of believing. It gestures toward the supposition that one’s understanding of (theological) 
anthropology significantly affects how one understands the phenomenon of Christian believing 
(since if we follow Barth, Bultmann, and others, Christian faith is wholly self-involving, variously 
incorporating all that makes us human). It is assumed that a Christian’s faith and the Christian faith 
are not encapsulated by or isolated as mere intellectual assent (as we are more than disinterested or 
disengaged thinkers), but neither is it assumed that faith is devoid of affirming (and variously relating 
to) a web of statements stemming from Christ and his message, which are inter-subjectively 
encountered in texts and in the community of relations that make up the church in the world.  In 
both a Christian’s faith and in the Christian faith various statements are reflected on and 
appropriated, various statements are commended and denounced, various statements are embodied 
and enacted, various statements are imbibed in various ways.17 But the question is, how ought we to 
understand the relationship between the statements believed and the peculiar mode of believing that 
is pervasively a Christian’s and the Christian faith? 
 
 The character of Christian believing is intentional, and this intentionality is variously 
mediated through language as we are embedded and embodied in the world. It is directed outward. 
Christian faith is in Christ. This intentionality has multiple dimensions to it as well. Faith is “aimed” 
at Christ cognitively and it is participated in Christ “ontologically.” Now by this I mean nothing 
more than that Christian faith is inherently constituted by an actual relationship to and encounter 
with the divine (as other than us and as other than creation, lest it be un-theological) in the 
particularity and concreteness of the actual, created world. This relationship is not merely to ideas, 
doctrines, or propositions nor can we properly reduce the intentionality of faith to merely historical 
 
16 A major portion of this contention is due to a commitment to the fact that in order to grasp the 
sense of the propositional we understand it within its pragmatic context of utterance and 
embodiment.  
17 Neither are statements the only form or genre of discourse relevant to the linguistic dimension of 
the character of Christian believing (as attested to by the polyphonic discourses, to use Ricoeur’s 
phrase, that make up the texts of the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament). 
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and sociological elements of human existence. The intentional dimension of the character of 
Christian believing is dependent on some sort of actual encounter with the divine. The “implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith” refer not only to the theological dynamics involved in faith as a holistic 
relation to God, but also to the variegated ways in which persons relate to what and/or who is 
believed in (implicitly and explicitly, fluctuating through various levels of conscious awareness and 
different forms of holistically embodied manifestation). There is implicitly more going on in the 
believer’s explicit reflection and confession and implicitly more than explicit reflection or audible 
expression. Reflective awareness (concerning the content and object of faith) is not a continuous 
phenomenon, but Christian believing is, hence the need for reflection on the implicit dimensions of 
explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing.  
 
 Reductive accounts of the nature of faith (whether they focus overwhelmingly on its 
propositional nature in an isolated and therefore unsophisticated manner, or those that hastily 
discharge the propositional altogether) lead to unsatisfactory answers (and to unnecessary debates), 
as they tend to reductively isolate aspects of human existence and of Christian faith to the detriment 
of others; whether that be some isolated form of thinking, feeling, or acting. In failing to 
satisfactorily describe the holistic character of Christian believing in its implicit and explicit 
complexity we fail to satisfactorily describe faith’s relationship to the variegated purpose of our 
being created, and in failing to do so we fail to satisfactorily reflect the importance of the dynamic 
gift of faith in Christ in all its intricacy and we problematize our understanding of the centrality of 
belief in both Christian theology and the Christian way of life.  
 
 Faith, pistis, fides, is simultaneously something that you have and something that you do. It is 
simultaneously something that you receive and something that you offer (both ‘vertically’ and 
‘horizontally’). Faith is something that is simultaneously unique to each individual and something 
that is shared in common amongst Christians.18 A Christian’s faith is part of the Christian faith and 
both a Christian’s and the Christian faith exhibit diachronic and synchronic novelty amidst continuity 
(some of which is judged to be good and some of which is judged to be bad). Faith is not some 
thing you have or some thing that you receive that can be adequately accounted for in isolation or 
abstraction, but it is only ever received and manifested continually and developmentally  in one’s 
 




intentional way of existing in light of encountering God in the world. As Gerhard Ebeling succinctly 
puts it (as referred to above), “If faith concerns man’s personal being, if it decides who I am before 
God (that is, one with whom God is), then it includes all that I am, and is related to it all. This is the 
great thing to be learned, that faith has to be lived not as something in itself, but in concrete 
existence.”19 This reality becomes more intelligible when the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and 
the holistic character of Christian believing are acknowledged and reflected on and non-reductive 
dispositional analyses of the nature of belief add further intelligibility to this.20  
 
 In this regard this thesis attempts to blend a depth of theological description through a 
critical engagement with the work of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth concerning the self-involving 
nature of faith in Christ (as well as other twentieth century theologians as they are deemed helpful) 
with various philosophical reflections on the ontology of beliefs and the phenomenology of 
believing as well as reflections on the nature of language, action, and various non-reductive 
“contextual” accounts of cognition as they helpfully relate to our understanding of the character of 
believing. The engagement with philosophy is not an attempt to ground the theology but is rather 
simply a move to critically appropriate philosophical insights for theological purposes concerning 
the already philosophical dimensions of a theological reflection on the character of Christian 
believing.21 By blending aspects of both theological and philosophical reflection concerning the 
character of believing it is hoped that a theologically rich and philosophically insightful position 
might present itself in order to offer an illuminating answer to the speculative question that is 
driving this thesis. The work of Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann are appropriate choices for the 
purpose of this thesis for a number of reasons. First, they are two of the most influential protestant 
theologians of the twentieth century and they both have a good deal to say about the nature of faith 
 
19 Gerhard Ebeling, The Nature of Faith (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1962), 160. 
20 Dispositional analyses of the nature of belief (where belief is understood to be a multiform 
disposition to act as if a statement were true differently but reliably depending on the situation) 
further help us understand the normative and holistically transformative dimension of believing as 
beliefs are seen to be that which are inherently disposed to holistically manifest themselves in 
reliable yet unique ways that are partially dependent on their contexts of appropriation and 
embodiment. 
21 Theology and philosophy can and ought to be distinguished, but the language and concepts they 
utilize cannot be fully separated or isolated. Philosophical work (even when it is done as “Christian 
philosophy”) provides insightful reflections on the ontology of beliefs and the phenomenology of 
believing but often lack a satisfactorily rich theological description of the nature of faith and 
theological descriptions of believing often lack philosophical nuances that are available. 
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and the character of Christian believing. They not only engage with the theology that came before 
them, but many theologians who came after them are dependent on their work in both their 
affirmations and in their criticisms of Barth and Bultmann. Second, Protestants are often perceived 
to have an overly intellectualist or mentalist conception of character of Christian believing when 
compared to other key Christian traditions such as Roman Catholicism or Eastern Orthodoxy and 
this can be seen to affect the forms of worship and ecclesial gathering adopted as well as the 
conception of the nature of the Christian’s place and role within wider society. There is, therefore, 
ecumenical value in showing that these Reformed and Lutheran theologians  actually hold, and can 
help further develop, a more holistic understanding of the character of Christian believing that does 
not easily fall prey to criticisms that claim a reductively intellectual conception of the character of 
Christian believing. This not only helps various Protestant Christians themselves overcome reductive 
conceptions of the character of their Christian believing but it clears the space for a more fruitful 
dialogue with Christians in other traditions and denominations by removing unnecessary and 
unhelpful misconceptions about the nature of faith that not only obscure the intelligibility of the 
centrality of believing in Christianity but also lead to unnecessary divides and disagreements on 
theological doctrines, orientations, methodologies, and visions of the Christian’s relationship to 
wider society (politically, socially, historically, and intellectually) among Christians in different 
traditions and denominations.  
 
 Two further clarifications are important to keep in mind as the reader follows the argument 
of the thesis. First, while a significant portion of the thesis engages with Karl Barth and Rudolf 
Bultmann this thesis is not primarily interested in Barth and Bultmann for their own sake. It does 
intend to contribute to scholarship on Barth and Bultmann, but this is a secondary aim of the thesis 
rather than its primary aim. Barth and Bultmann (and their conceptual descriptions of the character 
of Christian believing and the nature of faith) are a means to the end of providing an answer to why 
believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. In this sense the thesis is conceptually 
oriented and grounded in its motivation rather than being primarily historically motivated. Even 
though it aims to present Barth and Bultmann accurately and in a way that is defensible amidst Barth 
and Bultmann scholarship its primary aim is not oriented around solving interpretive disputes in 
Barth and Bultmann scholarship. This is why the vast majority of secondary literature engaged with 
in the thesis (whether by theologians, classicists, or philosophers) is more widely oriented around 
reflections on the character of believing and the nature of faith rather than Barth and Bultmann 
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secondary literature (although there is also engagement with secondary literature on Barth and 
Bultmann).22 Second, the two main strands of questions of this thesis really ought to be seen as 
structurally united for the purposes of the argument. Much of the content of the thesis focuses on 
how Christians ought to understand the character of Christian believing and the nature of faith in a 
holistic manner because this is how Christians are able to better grasp the central significance of 
believing in and for Christianity. Structurally speaking they are not two separate questions in the 
argument of this thesis. The main question of the thesis “why is believing centrally significant in and 
for Christianity” is answered by asking the question of “what does it mean to believe in Christ?” in a 
manner that highlights the holistic character of Christian believing and the implicit dimensions of 
explicit faith. By highlighting the holistic dimensions inherent in the character of Christian believing 
and the implicit dimensions of explicit faith the central significance of believing in and for 
Christianity becomes more intelligible when we attend to the way that believing is not merely an 
isolated or atomized aspect of a Christian’s existence but that it is, constitutionally, normatively and 
transformatively pervasive in all aspects of the believer’s concrete existence (both individually and 
corporately) in the world, among others, and before God.   
 
 The thesis first and foremost ought to be seen as a work of Christian systematic theology 
oriented around the conceptual theme of the character of Christian believing and the intelligibility of 
its central significance in and for Christianity. While terms such as phenomenology and 
hermeneutics are used at times throughout the thesis this thesis is neither a phenomenology nor a 
work of philosophical hermeneutics. Even though hermeneutical and phenomenological thinkers are 
engaged with it is done from the perspective and in the service of a work of Christian systematic 
theology. The thesis points out the importance of attending to the hermeneutic and 
phenomenological dimensions of the Christian act of faith and the state of a Christian’s believing for 
having a non-reductive understanding of the character of Christian believing but this is not 
attempted in a manner and a degree to which it would be done in a study that was more explicitly 
focused on providing a hermeneutics or a phenomenology proper. Hermeneutic and 
 
22 As such, even if there is exegetical dispute in the Barth and Bultmann community over certain 
instances of Barth or Bultmann interpretation in this thesis this is not structurally detrimental to the 
aim of this thesis or the success of its argument if what is presented plausibly presents how 
Christians should think about the character of Christian believing and better understand its central 
significance in light of reflecting on the issue with Barth and Bultmann. 
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phenomenological thinkers are engaged and referenced in this thesis from the perspective of 
theology to the extent necessary to helpfully address the specific question laid out in this thesis. 
 
 The reasoning behind the choice of Barth and Bultmann has been explained above but at 
this point it will be helpful to give some explanation for the other interlocutors that appear in the 
thesis. Given that the ultimate aim of the thesis is conceptually oriented rather than historically 
oriented (i.e. this work does not aim primarily to be an intellectual history of Barth and Bultmann 
and their conceptions of the character of Christian believing) the choice of possible interlocutors 
who are likewise oriented around the concepts of faith, belief, and believing is vast. However, if this 
thesis is not primarily an intellectual history but is instead ultimately oriented around a conceptual 
investigation then it ought to provide some sort of orientation of how Barth and Bultmann’s 
thought relates to other thinkers on the topic in order to be able to better evaluate their particular 
contribution as well as point out areas of commonality that they share with other thinkers in the 
Christian tradition.23 It is important to acknowledge commonalities with other thinkers, and not only 
their unique contributions, in order to show that even amidst their unique emphases there are 
aspects that anchor them to a wider continuity with Christian communities across time, space, and 
place. In Christian theology, which is based in part on the reception of divine revelation and the 
understanding that God actively works to aid the human reception of God’s revelation, the value of 
theological reflections on any given topic that fail to show aspects of commonality amidst their 
novelty remain suspect.  
 
To a certain extent the choice of interlocutors has been a pragmatic one. These interlocutors 
work, but other interlocutors could have worked as well. Beyond the key thinkers engaged with in 
the body of the thesis there are numerous shorter references to other theologians and philosophers 
both within the body of the text and throughout the footnotes. These all aim to critically situate and 
provide a wider conceptual context in which to situate what Barth and Bultmann’s work offer us in 
terms of our conceptual understanding of the character of Christian believing in order to better 
understand why believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. That being said, given the 
 
23 On the other hand, neither does this thesis attempt to present an exhaustive or even 
comprehensive account of what theologians and philosophers have had to say about the nature of 
faith and the character of beliefs and believing so choices had to be made when others could have 
also been chosen in their place. 
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aims of the thesis the theological interlocutors chosen in chapter three all have a positive yet critical 
appreciation for the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein that partially influence their work. The 
aptness of Wittgenstein’s work for the question of this thesis offers some rationale for choosing 
these theologians rather than others. Fergus Kerr and Cornelius Ernst come from a Roman Catholic 
background while Rowan Williams and Graham Ward come from an Anglo-Catholic background 
who all operate as fruitful interlocutors to compare and contrast the novelty and continuity found in 
Barth and Bultmann coming from their Reformed and Lutheran backgrounds. Teresa Morgan as a 
classicist, on the other hand, offers an excellent ancient perspective to compare and contrast with 
Barth and Bultmann in her extensive study on early conceptions of pistis and fides.24 In chapter four 
H.H. Price (and Eric Schwitzgebel), Ludwig Wittgenstein, Robert Brandom, and Andrew Inkpin 
were chosen because of their specific usefulness for articulating various aspects of a holistic and 
non-reductive dispositional understanding the character of believing that are able to compliment and 
further articulate aspects of the character of Christian believing that are brought up in the preceding 
chapters.  
 
 The first three chapters of the thesis engage with the theological reflections of Karl Barth 
and Rudolf Bultmann on their various understandings of implicit dimensions of explicit faith. 
Beyond giving a rich description of the character of Christian believing from a theological 
perspective which includes a number of aspects that are ripe for further development at the 
anthropological level (such as Barth’s conception of the self-involving character of Christian 
believing and Bultmann’s conception of faith as historical deed and as self-understanding, etc.), one 
of the key aspects that both of these theologians do is warn against becoming theologically reductive 
in our understanding of the human character of Christian believing. For both God as the object and 
subject of Christian faith (as other than us and as other than the world) plays a constitutional role 
not only in how we go about understanding the fides quae creditur but also for how we go about 
understanding the fides qua creditur. Both are insistent that the object of faith (God) constitutionally 
shapes not only how we understand the object(s) of faith and not only how we go about partaking in 
the act of faith but also how we go about understanding the act of faith (for both Barth and 
 
24 See Teresa Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and 




Bultmann the two cannot be separated without harming how we go about understanding the 
character of Christian believing, even if the two aspects can and should be distinguished). 
 
 The first chapter on Barth is oriented around presenting his understanding of the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith that highlight the non-reductive and holistic character of Christian 
believing. It focuses on how he understands the object of faith to orient, originate and constitute the 
character of Christian believing and on how he understands that character to consist of aspects of 
acknowledgment, recognition, and confession that are understood to be “more than cognitive” and 
more widely embedded and embodied amidst and within the believer’s various ways of being in the 
world in light of being encountered by God rather than seeing those aspects to be discrete (or always 
explicit) actions in and of themselves.  
 
 The second chapter on Bultmann focuses on presenting his understanding of the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith that highlight the non-reductive and holistic character of Christian 
believing. This chapter presents Bultmann’s thought at length and across his corpus partially due to 
the widespread influence that Barth has had on the poor reception of and engagement with 
Bultmann’s thought on the character of Christian believing in English speaking systematic theology. 
Bultmann’s understanding of the implicit dimensions of explicit faith all add intelligibility to why 
believing is centrally significant as it more adequately shows the depth and breadth of human 
existence that the character of Christian believing is involved in. His reflections on the how faith 
relates to human perception and vision, how the act of faith is not a work but is characterized by a 
decision of humble obedience and historical deed, how faith consists of a holistically understood 
conception of self-understanding and development in light of future possibilities and promises, how 
faith even amidst the concreteness of bodily-historical existence is characterized by an act of 
desecularization and detachment from ultimate anxieties in the world that results in true freedom all 
integrate together to offer a plethora of implicit dimensions of explicit faith that begin to help us 
better understand why believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. He rejects virtually 
every other stock understanding of the nature of faith in an attempt to distinguish an understanding 
of the character of Christian believing that is less reductive (both theologically and 
anthropologically), and in doing so he provides fertile ground in which to begin to understand the 





 The third chapter operates as a transitioning chapter between the more descriptive first two 
chapters and the more explicitly constructive fourth and final chapter. Its aim is to more clearly 
compare and contrast Barth and Bultmann with one another and to bring their insights into 
conversation with the other theologians mentioned above in order to more clearly discern points of 
commonality as well as continuing difference and further move toward the constructive dimensions 
of the final chapter. In the interest of ecumenical relations between those who “follow” Barth and 
those who “follow” Bultmann the chapter is meant to show that the differences between the two 
theologians really appear amongst a wider background of continuity and commonality. In the 
interest of ecumenical relations beyond Barth and Bultmann it seeks to show points of fruitful 
continuity with Kerr, Ernst, Williams, and Ward as well as begin to point forward to how certain 
aspects of their thought might be developed further.  In its engagement with Teresa Morgan’s work 
it aims to show continuity with ancient conceptions of the character of Christian believing in order 
to show that the novel aspects found in the way Barth and Bultmann express the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing aren’t so novel that they 
do not have any support in the wider ancient Christian traditions.  
 
 The fourth and final chapter of the thesis seeks to further attend to the holistic character of 
Christian believing by focusing on a non-reductive dispositional approach to understanding the 
phenomenon of believing. An underlying aim here in light of the overarching argument of the thesis 
is to further show how the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith might be seen to hold 
together in a more intelligible fashion and one that gives a clearer explanation of how the character 
of Christian believing is dynamically capable of development and novelty amidst commonality and 
continuity. The key philosophical interlocutor here is H.H. Price, but Ludwig Wittgenstein, Eric 
Schwitzgebel, and Robert Brandom also contribute. Furthermore, by incorporating non-reductive 
accounts of the linguistic and social dimensions of the cognitive content of faith it can be more 
clearly seen how belief in and for Christianity is not simply an abstracted, disengaged, or reductively 
intellectualistic phenomenon. In doing so it helps us better appreciate and understand the 
significance of declaring that an individual’s faith is wholly self-involving in a non-individualistic 
manner. It also enables us to be in a better position to avoid reductive rejections of the cognitive 
dimensions of belief while at the same time not be required to affirm reductively intellectualist 
conceptions of the cognitive dimensions of the character of Christian believing in an abstract and 
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disengaged manner. In this section Andrew Inkpin and Eberhard Jüngel are the primary 
interlocutors that help the chapter reflect on these issues (in light of what has come before with 
Barth and Bultmann) with the ultimate aim of better understanding why believing is centrally 
significant in and for Christianity. This chapter is concerned to further articulate the implications for 
stating that Christian faith is “wholly self-involving” by looking at proper and improper ways to talk 
about faith in a dispositional manner as well as consider how the human volition/action, emotion, 
and cognition are intimately connected in an understanding of the character of Christian believing  
 
 The thesis as a whole seeks to show how the holistic dimensions of the character of 
Christian believing and the implicit dimensions of explicit faith make the central significance of 
belief and believing for Christianity more intelligible. It seeks to point toward the fact that even 
though we ought not think of Christian belief along the lines of a mere Christian worldview we still 
ought to understand Christian belief as an intentional way of being in and of perceiving the world in 
light of the reception of God’s revelation to us in Christ. In short it seeks to show that the central 
significance of belief in Christianity is made more intelligible when one attends to the pervasive 
extent to which believing is embedded within our many ways and aspects of existing in and with 
Christ, in, for, and against the world in anticipation of and participation in salvation, restoration, and 
reconciliation (that God the Father has provided in Christ through the power of the Spirit). 
Believing is centrally significant because it is not merely one isolated thing among others that is 
related to those salvific motifs, but is rather an all-encompassing and wholly self-involving 
intentional way of being that is itself an actualization of those salvific motifs, not merely some thing 
that is related to them.
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Chapter 1: Karl Barth and the Implicit Dimensions of Explicit Faith 
 
Introduction 
Karl Barth is well known for his emphasis on God as the object of faith. He is also well known for 
his many criticisms of other theologians for focusing on the human dimension to the detriment of 
properly attending to the divine as Other, as sovereign Subject, and as the ultimate Agent of 
salvation. If we consider Augustine’s taxonomy of belief (consisting of the fides qua creditur and the 
fides quae creditur) it is fair to say that Barth emphasizes the fides quae both ontologically in the event of 
reconciliation and cognitively in the event of faith. He is strongly critical of theologians who, in his 
judgment, reduce Christian theology or the Christian faith and a Christian’s faith to the Christian 
religion or to any purely immanent phenomenon. This aspect of Barth’s work is well known. This 
chapter, however, is not primarily interested in this dimension of Barth’s work (it is only interested 
in that aspect insofar as it is necessary to help us understand the implicit dimensions of explicit faith 
and the holistic character of Christian believing on the human side of the character of Christian 
believing). It is primarily interested in what Barth has to say about the human act of faith once he 
finally gets around to writing about it.1 For Karl Barth the object of faith plays a central role in 
constituting the character of Christian believing in all its many facets. One cannot adequately 
understand the character of Christian believing without a proper recognition and acknowledgment 
of the central role that Jesus Christ plays in constituting the character who believes and the character 
of believing in Him.2 Insofar as an understanding of the object of faith is integral to understanding 
 
1 It is telling that in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), The Oxford Handbook of Karl Barth, eds. Paul Dafydd Jones and Paul T. 
Nimmo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), and in The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Karl Barth: 
Barth in Dialogue eds. George Hunsinger and Keith I. Johnson (Hoboken: Wiley Blackwell, 2020) 
none have a chapter devoted specifically to articulating Karl Barth’s conception of a Christian’s faith. 
Dawn DeVries has a good essay engaging with Barth’s understanding of the nature of faith, but it is 
in a short chapter that devotes space to both Schleiermacher and Calvin as well. See Dawn DeVries, 
“Does Faith Save?: Calvin, Schleiermacher and Barth on the Nature of Faith” in The Reality of Faith in 
Theology: Studies on Karl Barth Princeton-Kampen Consultation 2005, eds. Bruce McCormack and Gerrit 
Neven. (Bern: Peter Lang AG, 2007), pp. 163-190. A lengthier engagement with Barth on this topic, 
then, oriented around a slightly different question than Devries’ chapter ought to offer a needed 
contribution to Barth scholarship on this topic. 
2 One recent example highlighting this aspect of Barth’s emphasis on divine primacy, in a different 
context concerned to better exposit Barth’s understanding of theological rationality, is Martin 
Westerholm’s impressive monograph The Ordering of the Christian Mind: Karl Barth and Theological 
Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). To take just one example, in speaking about 
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the human act of faith this chapter will engage with what Barth has to say concerning the object of 
faith, but, again, its interest in doing so lies in further articulating how Barth understands the human 
act of faith and in understanding the human act of faith it is interested in how Barth understands the 
character of Christian believing in a holistic and reflexive sense. Furthermore, in the context of the 
wider argument and interest of this thesis this engagement with Barth’s understanding of the nature 
of faith is done with the aim of better understanding the holistic character of Christian believing 
because this is how we can begin to better understand why believing is centrally significant in and 
for Christianity. 
 In the introduction to his Christ and Culture Graham Ward complains that, for all its dogmatic 
merit, Barth’s understanding of the nature of faith in the event of reconciliation comes across as 
overly autocratic and abstract as it neglects to satisfactorily describe the Christian believer’s believing 
in the event of reconciliation. In Ward’s estimation Barth “tells us nothing about the process of that 
act, namely how God causes human beings to participate in him and have eternal life.”3 He agrees 
that we ought to continue to affirm God as the initiator of redemption, as ontologically different 
than creation, and that we ought to continue to deny a Pelagian position concerning the event of 
reconciliation. However, given that according to Barth “faith paradoxically ‘even in its emptiness 
and passivity . . . has [trägt] this character of supreme fullness and activity’”4 Ward faults Barth for 
not further unpacking this fullness and activity of the believer. As he goes on to state, “Furthermore, 
it [faith] is an engagement that can take many different forms, not just passive obedience. What is 
missing from Barth’s account of faith is the experience and practices in which faith becomes 
 
Barth’s conception of the analogy of faith, Westerholm importantly points out the importance of the 
primacy of divine activity and at the same time subtly points out that Barth also makes an aspect of 
human activity irreducible to this concept. As he says, “Barth’s account of the analogy of faith is 
important for him in preserving the primacy of divine activity in the knowledge of God; but it has a 
further importance for us because it also makes a form of human activity irreducible for this 
knowledge” (The Ordering of the Christian Mind, 24). However, Westerholm’s monograph does not go 
into as much detail as it could regarding how Barth understands the human activity of faith in 
greater detail. This is not a fault of Westerholm’s work, as the monograph is only focused on the 
nature of faith as it sheds light on Barth’s understanding of theological rationality, but more work 
could be done to show the various details of Barth’s understanding of the human activity of faith 
and this thesis seeks to fill that gap.  
3 Graham Ward, Christ and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 8. Barth would probably 
counter that the New Testament does not offer many resources regarding an answer for such a 
“how” question, but the “how” question is still theologically important. 
4 Christ and Culture, 8. 
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operable and evident: the formation of the one who is being faithful. What is missing is a sociology 
and a phenomenology of believing.”5 For Ward, “what is missing in Barth’s account is the process 
whereby love is received and responded to,”6 or at least there is not a concrete description of the 
phenomenon as we might encounter and recognize it in our lived reality, as love, faith, and hope are 
actually witnessed in embodied believing individuals and communities, with all the hermeneutical 
intricacies that accompany such embodiment. In short, for Ward “there is in Barth no account of 
the economy of desire and the productions of faith, discipleship, and personal formation.”7 While 
Barth himself does not provide a proper sociology or phenomenology (and neither does this 
particular thesis) this chapter seeks to show places within Barth’s thought that could be more 
fruitfully engaged with by those who wished to do so. 
 David Ford makes a similar observation when he compares Barth as theologian to Paul 
Ricoeur as Christian thinker. Ford perceives that differing “conversion experiences” might partially 
explain the differing emphasis: Barth’s on the primacy, nature, activity, and identity of Christ; 
Ricoeur’s on the transformative dimensions of the believer in the event of reconciliation. Drawing 
on the work of John David Dawson, Ford writes: “He [Dawson] suggests that Frei, a convert to 
Christianity, was centrally concerned with its distinctive identity, as represented above all by the 
identity of Jesus Christ. Origen, on the other hand, was born a Christian and at ease in that identity, 
and was more concerned with how the Christian grows in faith, love, hope, and holiness and is 
transformed through the Holy Spirit. I suggest that there is some analogy with Ricoeur and Barth.”8 
Regardless of whether this is a satisfactory explanation for the different emphasis in Barth and 
Ricoeur the point remains: Barth’s description of the transformative and holistic agency of the 
believer in faith is perceived to be lacking—especially when one wants to better understand how the 
theological understanding of faith in the event of reconciliation is witnessed and recognized in the 
phenomenological realm of our concrete, lived lives.  
 It is important, however, to note that while we don’t find in Barth an extended 
phenomenological or sociological description of faith, discipleship, personal formation, etc., we do 
find a discussion of these Christian concepts at a higher level of abstraction from that found in their 
 
5 Christ and Culture, 8. 
6 Christ and Culture, 8. 
7 Christ and Culture, 8. 
8 David Ford, “Paul Ricoeur: A Biblical Philosopher on Jesus” in Jesus and Philosophy: New Essays ed. 
Paul K. Moser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 183. 
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concrete embodiment in individual believers and believing communities in various times and places. 
While Barth might not indulge in the description that Ward, or anyone seeking a thicker description 
of the nature of faith, might want, the fact that Barth does not himself engage in the endeavor does 
not mean that he offers nothing of value for those who wish to. The value and need of various 
levels of description need not be set in an either/or relationship to such an extent that the value of 
the one invalidates the other. Just because we cannot truly or fully understand, say, the concept of 
“courage” apart from recognizing and witnessing concrete embodiments of courageous deeds and 
courageous persons does not thereby invalidate the value of talking about the concept of courage at 
a level of abstraction and generality. On the other hand, just because we talk about courage in the 
abstract does not necessarily mean we understand or recognize what it means for me or you or us to 
be courageous in this or that particular circumstance (nor that we will in fact be courageous). Indeed, 
one might wonder if we could recognize courageous deeds as courageous if we did not also speak 
about them at a level of abstraction, and vice versa (i.e. if we could meaningful speak about courage 
without having witnessed examples of courage embodied in various courageous deeds). As Martin 
Westerholm rightly points out, “The effect of language is always contingent on the imaginative 
resources of the one to whom a word is spoken”9 and when the word “faith” is spoken the 
imaginative resources for a responsible theological understanding will unavoidably be constituted by 
abstract or formal descriptions based on revelation and perceptions of phenomenological instances 
of “faith” witnessed and embodied in particular believing individuals in particular situations that 
simultaneously inform and influence the reception and deepening understanding of the meaning of 
“faith” simply because the phenomenon of faith is both general and specific, cognitive and holistic, 
contiguous and novel in its many manifestations variously embodied in individual Christian believers 
 
9 Martin Westerholm, “Discernment and the Theological,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 
16:4 (October 2014), 465. In this portion of his paper he goes on to talk about how experience 
conditions the various depths and ways of understanding using Augustine’s discussion of someone 
who speaks of Carthage. As Westerholm states, “Just as one who speaks of Carthage will be 
understood in one way by those who know the city, in another way by those unfamiliar with 
Carthage, who can think only of a city quite generally, and in another way by those who know 
nothing of cities and will struggle to understand the word ‘Carthage’ at all” (ibid.). One could add 
that those who have spent a significant amount of time in Carthage will know of it in a slightly 
different manner than those who have merely read about it. Something similar obtains concerning  
the concept and phenomenon of “faith” since faith, like a city, is something that is inherently more 
than an idea and is likewise a phenomenon that gives itself to various levels of understanding as it is 
an embodied way of existing in the world in relation to Christ and to others (of course, it ought to 
be recognized that the concept of a city and the phenomenon of this city is also significantly different 
from the concept and phenomenon of faith). 
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in relation to Christ, the Christian community past and present, and in their various relations to the 
non-believing world and its various activities. Faith is a response and relation to a common object 
(Jesus Christ) by unique (and in other ways similar) individuals and communities, which is 
constitutive of one’s identity and understanding in existence as a whole.  
 The answer to the jailor’s question, alluded to in the introduction, in Acts 16 “what must I 
do to be saved?” elicits our further question “what does it mean to believe?” An answer to this 
question involves various levels of understanding not only because the concept and the 
phenomenon of faith and believing are rich (inherently more than disinterested general assent, but 
none-the-less involving a level of “abstract” description), but also because human individuals are 
rich and polyphonically constituted as well (inherently more than abstracted essentialized selves). In 
a certain sense one must learn (akin to how one might learn a skill from a master craftsman) how to 
have faith, and in this sense acquiring, manifesting, and forming one’s faith is more akin to learning 
how to be wise or perform an action well that requires multiple dimensions of mastery. It involves 
instances of perception and judgment as abstract language is appropriated in concrete circumstances 
as it is witnessed in others and shown in and enacted by oneself. A desire to better understand the 
self-involving nature of faith requires that we not only reflect theologically on the object of faith that 
furnishes its unique content and relation, not only on the conceptual differences between assent and 
trust, but also on how we understand the self—since our understanding of the self (whether it is 
explicitly reflected on or not) will inherently condition our understanding of the character of the self-
involvement of faith.10 
 
10 In his paper on how we discern the properly theological, with a different emphasis than this 
chapter, Westerholm acknowledges the significance that anthropological assumptions have for the 
outworking of theological understanding. He writes of how Gogarten and Bultmann react differently 
than Barth to Gerhardt Kuhlmann’s “call for reflection on theological anthropology, for it is idealist 
understandings of the principles of human activity that render the theological problematic, and so 
solution may reasonably be sought in new understandings of human activity issuing from newer 
forms of phenomenology and existentialism” (“Discernment and the Theological,” 461). According 
to Westerholm, Barth merely accepts the idealist anthropology and moves to emphasize that all true 
speech about God must be God’s speech while Bultmann and Gogarten go on to interrogate the 
idealist anthropology and work at an alternative understanding. Differing understandings of 
theological anthropology and of human activity shape not only how we perceive the possibility of 
human speech of God, but also how we understand the phenomenon and concept of faith as it 
relates to living and being in Christ as the believer continues to live in her created/historical present. 
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In the portion of the Church Dogmatics IV.1 that we will focus on Barth writes about the nature of 
faith as it occurs “within the event of reconciliation.”11 In doing so he looks at how we understand 
faith as it relates to justification, to the work of the Holy Spirit, to the being of the community, to its 
object, and how we understand faith as it relates to, or is understood as, a free human act. It is the 
latter dimension that we are most interested in, but for Barth we need to understand those other 
dimensions in order to properly understand the character of Christian believing in the Christian act 
of faith. It is instructive to recognize that Barth speaks of the nature of faith slightly differently when 
he relates it to justification than he does when he relates it to sanctification, and the portions of his 
thought that come across as most autocratic stem from his focus on this aspect of the distinction. 
For him, following the common Protestant trajectory, the doctrine of justification must not be 
blurred into that of sanctification,12 and how we talk about the believer’s activity in relation to both 
of these doctrines differs slightly, although they are not entirely separated.  
 When Barth speaks about the nature of faith in relation to the believer’s justification he 
speaks of it in mostly negative terms due to his ultimate concern to demythologize the notion that 
faith is in any way a means for humans to justify themselves in their own strength. As he says, “If 
demythologising is anywhere necessary and demanded, it is at this point. Our very first task was to 
set aside a limine a basic misunderstanding, to reject the idea that, in virtue of an inner quality of what 
the believing man does, faith is the real means which man can use to justify himself and himself to 
declare the divine pardon.”13 One of the primary aspects in sinful persons that is overcome in the 
event of reconciliation is one’s pride and vanity in oneself apart from a proper recognition of one’s 
dependence on and need for God. Genuine faith, therefore, for Barth is characterized by an act of 
utter humility and self-criticism and a reliance on Christ alone and on a recognition that Christ has 
done what the believer could not do on her own—justify, redeem, and restore herself, nor make 
herself worthy of these prior to God’s initiative.14 Faith for Barth involves a recognition that the 
believer is not worthy. But he treads carefully here, as he says, “the exclusion of works [cannot] on 
 
11 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, IV.1 tr. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), 643. 
12 See CD IV.1, 768. 
13 CD, IV.1, 618. 
14 As he puts it, “There is not one, therefore, who has first to win and appropriate this right for 
himself. There is not one who has first to go or still to go in his own virtue and strength this way 
from there to here, from yesterday to to-morrow, from darkness to light, who has first to 
accomplish or still to accomplish his own justification, repeating it when it has already taken place in 
Him” (CD, IV.1, 631). 
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the basis of this humility have anything to do with indifferentism, quietism or libertinism,”15 and he 
exhorts his readers to make sure “that we do not think and speak and live in ways which give 
substance to these objections and suspicions. Where there is justification, there is also sanctification. 
Where there is faith, there are also love and works. The man who, justified by faith, has peace with 
God has also peace with his neighbor and himself. That he lives as one who is righteous by faith to 
the exclusion of all works is something that he will establish and attest in his works.”16 This 
necessary relationship between justification and sanctification is made more intelligible when we 
move beyond reductive and simplistic intellectualist accounts of believing and attend to the implicit 
dimensions of humility that is an integral aspect in explicit faith and the holistic character of 
Christian believing.  As Barth goes on to explain; 
That we are good for nothing is true, but it is not so relevant that the confession of this truth 
has independent significance. Nor can the negative form of faith, faith as a vacuum, be 
asserted as a singular magnifying of the glory of God, as though that glory were the greater 
the less man is before it, and greatest of all when man is absolutely nothing. It is significant 
even for the negative form of faith that it is faith in God. Before God man is not nothing 
but something, someone. God is far from finding pleasure in the nothingness of man as 
such.17 
The positive aspect of faith concerning the believer’s agency as it relates to justification for Barth 
consists in the believer’s outward-directed reliance on Christ.  If this reliance becomes misdirected 
and turns inward (notice that the issue isn’t how active this reliance is concerning the agency of the 
believer, which is open to a plethora of potential phenomenological forms of manifestation), or if 
this act becomes understood as taking place outside of an actual relation to Christ (as the believer is 
encountered by Christ in the present) then it ceases to be Christian faith.18 As he says, “its form as 
humble obedience, in which it is renunciation, openness to this object and therefore faith in Jesus 
Christ, is in the last resort negative only in appearance. As openness to this object, as the knowing 
and grasping of the alien righteousness of Jesus Christ, it can be only a maintaining of that humble 
obedience, a comforted despair, in so far as it is a human form of being, a human act and 
experience.”19 It isn’t a question of the activity or non-activity of the believer, but the character of 
that activity in relation to Christ as an engaged humble reliance. Here it is important to note that 
 
15 CD, IV.1, 627. 
16 CD, IV.1, 627. 
17 CD, IV.1, 628. 
18 See CD, IV.1, 632. 
19 CD, IV.1, 633. 
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humble obedience is an implicit dimension of explicit faith that is holistically related to the other 
dimensions of explicit faith and not something separate to the believer’s act of faith that merely 
occurs as a result of faith. 
 However, Barth readily affirms early on in his section on faith and justification that “there is 
more to be said of faith than that in it and by it man comes to his justification.”20 For Barth 
justification is the central concept of faith (which is perhaps closely aligned with his decision to 
portray sin primarily as pride) but he writes that “the justification of sinful man, the restoration of 
his peace with God, is only one of the problems of the Christian life. And so faith has other 
dimensions than that of its relation to man’s justification. It has other forms than that in which it is 
the knowledge, the apprehension, the realisation of the right addressed to man in the judgment and 
sentence of God. This is its centre. This is faith in its truest sense. But the centre has a 
circumference.”21 And these peripheral aspects of faith, these implicit dimensions of explicit faith, 
contribute to our understanding of the central significance of faith by highlighting the other aspects 
of human existence that faith is embedded, embodied, and enacted within. 
 For Barth the work of Christ plays an integral role in the peripheral aspects of faith in, as he 
calls it, the “subjective realisation of the atonement,” which includes both individual believers and 
the existence of the Christian community in the world. As he says,  
Christology is like a vertical line meeting a horizontal. The doctrine of the sin of man is the 
horizontal line as such. The doctrine of justification is the intersection of the horizontal line 
by the vertical. The remaining doctrine, that of the Church and of faith, is again the 
horizontal line, but this time seen as intersected by the vertical. The vertical line is the 
atoning work of God in Jesus Christ. The horizontal is the object of that work; man and 
humanity. . . . The particular problem involved might be described as the subjective 
realisation of the atonement. The one reality of the atonement has both an objective and a 
subjective side in so far as—we cannot separate but we must not confuse the two—it is both 
a divine act and offer and also an active human participation in it: the unique history of Jesus 
Christ; but enclosed and exemplified in this history of many other men of many other ages.22 
For Barth it is accurate for us to understand the character of Christian believing as “the subjective 
realisation of the atonement” and as an active human participation in the redemptive activity of 
God. Even though Barth acknowledges the role that the Holy Spirit, as sent by Christ, has in this 
 
20 CD, IV.1, 618. 
21 CD IV.1, 618. 
22 CD, IV.1, 643. 
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subjective realization by individuals and by the community he acknowledges that the New 
Testament seems to repel questions of how exactly this takes place.23 However, he is more 
forthcoming regarding how the individual Christian believer is related to the Christian community. 
For Barth the Christian community, in its true sense, is primary and the faith of individual believers 
is secondary since Christ is the head of the Christian community and the common object of all 
individual faith. He also speaks of the individual’s faith being of central importance for making the 
faith of the community what it is, but the individual’s faith is intersubjectively constituted through 
participation in the community of saints, past and present.24 One clear implication of a holistic 
understanding of the character of Christian believing is that even an individual’s faith is not merely 
individualistically constituted or manifested in a reductively individualistic and isolated manner. 
 As his life evidenced as well as his writing, this does not mean that individual Christian 
believers cannot stand against various forms of the visible church. Individual faith and judgment can 
challenge various sociological and phenomenological manifestations of the visible church. Indeed, 
for the sake of the true church it sometimes must. But as far as the true Church is understood 
 
23 See CD, IV.1, 648-650. 
24 As he says, “The Christian is first a member of the Christian community and only then, and as 
such, this individual Christian in his particular Christian being and nature and presence. And this 
means that the Christian faith is first the faith of the Christian community and only then, and as 
such, affirmed and shared by them, the faith of the men united in it. It does not have in them, as it 
were, its original and normative form. It is not the sum, as it were, of the different individual acts of 
Christian faith, which would necessarily mean the cross-cut, agreement and compromise between 
them. In and with their individual faith Christians participate in and with the faith of the community. 
In this their faith has its basis, norm and limit. It derives from it and is built up on it. And the same 
is true of all the personal knowledge and confession of faith. It is, as such, basically co-ordinated 
with and subordinated to the knowledge and confession of the community. As personal knowledge 
and confession it has its own place and right and freedom within the knowledge and confession of 
the community, not outside it, not elsewhere, not in abstracto” (CD, IV.1, 705). 
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correctly in its “third dimension”25 the individual’s faith is always in continuity with the Christian 
community as the Christian community is in continuity with Christ.26 
 
The Human Activity of Faith 
The last thirty-nine pages of this volume of the Church Dogmatics IV.1 is devoted to investigating faith 
as a human activity of the individual believer and almost half of those pages are focused on the 
object of faith. As he says, “We shall give to the individual Christian and his faith the attention 
which he demands, but it must be at this point—not at the beginning of our way, but very briefly at 
the end.”27 Barth acknowledges that “In the modern period there have been massive theological 
structures which have begun at the very point where we now end. They started with the 
presupposition that, whatever may be the attitude to it, Christian faith as such is a fact and 
phenomenon which is generally known and which can, as such, be explained to everybody; or rather 
more cautiously, that a generally plausible account can be given of it because the possibility of it can 
be demonstrated and explained in the light of general anthropology.”28 It is this aspect of Barth’s 
thought that this thesis is most interested in. Looking back to the beginning criticisms however, one 
wonders if Barth does or can go about understanding Christian faith apart from some influence of 
“extra-biblical” anthropological factors whether or not he acknowledges them or not. When he goes 
on to say that “Christian faith is not in any sense a fact and phenomenon which is generally known 
and which can as such be explained to everybody”29 the rhetoric may very well be getting the upper 
hand here. Surely we can acknowledge that Christian faith cannot be reduced to such a phenomenon 
 
25 For Barth the nature of the church must not be sought abstractly in its invisibility, nor abstractly in 
its visibility, but concretely in its special visibility. As he says, “the emphasis in the present context 
must be upon the fact that the community called into being by the Holy Spirit, although it does not 
exist and must not be sought abstractly in the invisible, also does not exist and must not be sought 
abstractly in the visible. It does exist openly in a very concrete form, a historical phenomenon like 
any other. But what it is, the character, the truth of its existence in time and space, is not a matter of 
a general but a very special visibility” (CD, IV.1, 654). An analogy could be drawn regarding the 
individual’s faith. 
26 Especially since for Barth, “Faith is simply following, following its object. Faith is going a way 
which is marked out and prepared. Faith does not realise anything new. It does not invent anything. 
It simply finds that which is already there for the believer and also for the unbeliever. It is simply 
man’s active decision for it, his acceptance of it, his active participation in it” (CD, IV.1, 742). 
27 CD, IV.1, 741. 
28 CD, IV.1, 740. 
29 CD, IV.1, 741. 
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since it is integrally and inherently a relationship to Christ through the Holy Spirit who is not present 
and visible like fallen individuals are to one another, but Barth here seems to be operating with an all 
or nothing concept of explanation and understanding that begs for more nuance concerning the 
human dimensions of the Christian’s act of faith. He does not seem to entertain the possibility of 
levels of understanding in the way he sets up the problem. He acknowledges that “The Christian 
religion is a fact and phenomenon of this kind” and that “it can be considered and estimated 
historically, psychologically, sociologically and perhaps even philosophically. But the Christian 
religion is not as such Christian faith. Christian faith is something concealed in the Christian religion 
(like the true Church in its visibility),”30 but he leaves little room for understanding how the 
Christian faith is related to its phenomenological forms in the Christian religion. He just asserts that 
it is related and goes on to emphasize that in this relation Christian faith cannot be reduced to the 
Christian religion.  
 The crux of the issue, as Barth lays it out here, concerns how we ought to understand the 
relationship between Christian religion and Christian faith—since a Christian’s faith and the 
Christian faith only ever exist within the phenomenologically rich aspects that make up the Christian 
religion. Barth seems to think that various liberal theologians do not distinguish the two enough. 
Barth wants to hold that they are distinct (faith and religion) but not separate (and there is merit to 
this distinction). Barth’s critics, such as is evidenced by Graham Ward’s comments above, however, 
seem to think that Barth separates the two too much and that he does not describe the integral and 
constitutive connection between Christian religion and Christian faith as carefully as we ought to. 
While not wanting to entirely dissolve the distinction between the Christian faith and the Christian 
religion, the connection between the two would benefit by better acknowledging the close 
relationship between faith and religion as Christian faith is always embedded within the sphere of 
Christian religion.  
 It is here where theologians like Ward rightly find fault with Barth. A focus on the 
anthropological dimensions of Christian faith manifested and embedded in the Christian religion 
does not necessarily mean one is trying to hastily make it credible to outsiders, nor must it 
necessarily lose sight of its object in doing so. It is not necessarily reductive. A focus on the 
anthropological dimensions very well could be motivated by a desire to better know the object of 
 
30 CD, IV.1, 741. 
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Christian faith as that object is actually encountered in concrete situations in the world thereby 
gaining a better understanding of the object of faith as well as the reality of faith. Barth seems 
hesitant to go too far in this direction, lest the Christian’s faith be seen to be Pelagian, theologically 
reductive, or merely anthropological. Given his aims to address anthropological reductions of many 
sorts it is perhaps understandable why he does not develop these anthropological dimensions further 
than he does, but it seems that there is room to develop the embodied dimensions of faith that 
Barth acknowledges further than he himself does—and in a way that acknowledges and articulates 
both the theological richness of the object of faith and the anthropological richness of the act of 
faith as it relates to the God who encounters persons in and through their situations in the world.  
 In Barth’s view the emphasis found in much modern theology on the doctrine of faith is 
characteristic of arrogance. In his view “they rest on the fact that in the last centuries (on the broad 
way which leads from the older Pietism to the present-day theological existentialism inspired by 
Kierkegaard) the Christian has begun to take himself seriously in a way which is not at all 
commensurate with the seriousness of Christianity.”31 While this may be true of some who focus on 
the anthropological dimensions of the Christian religion to the detriment of the reality and otherness 
of God it certainly isn’t the case that all who give close attention to the individual Christian’s 
subjectivity are likewise motivated. It is possible to undertake such investigations in the humility that 
characterizes Christian faith that exists in an active dependence in relation to Christ within one’s 
concrete time and place. Furthermore, not only is it possible, but it is necessary if we are to have an 
adequate understanding of the character of Christian believing and a better understanding of why 
faith is centrally significant in Christianity. The remainder of this chapter will focus on what Barth 
says about the object of faith to then understand how he understands the act of faith in order to 
better understand the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith that he presents as being 
constitutive of the character of Christian believing. It is important to spend time engaging with what 
he has to say about the object of faith because for Barth the object of faith significantly conditions 
the character of the Christian’s act of faith. This is furthermore done to articulate the holistic 
character of Christian believing and provide more intelligibility to the central significance of 
believing in and for Christianity by showing how the notion of believing in Christ is inherently much 
 
31 CD, IV.1, 741. 
37 
 
more expansive than is often acknowledged and pervades more widely into all areas of the 
Christian’s concrete existence.  
 
The Object of Faith: Orientation, Origination, and Constitution 
According to Barth, faith is “the basis of the Christian existence” and it is “that which makes a man 
a Christian.”32 Faith is undeniably a human activity, but, in Barth’s words, it differs from other 
human activities “in spontaneity and native freedom”33 and it is a human activity in a particular kind 
of relationship to the object of faith, who is genuinely other than the believer. As he goes on to say, 
“it is in relationship to its object, to something which confronts the believer, which is distinct from 
him, which cannot be exhausted in his faith, which cannot be absorbed by his believing existence, let 
alone only consist in it and proceed from it and stand or fall with it.”34 When it comes to the object 
of faith (Jesus Christ, the eternal Son incarnate, crucified, and resurrected) the human activity of 
faith does not condition, constitute, or change it. As he states, “as a human activity it consists in the 
subjectivisation of an objective res which in its existence and essence and dignity and significance 
and scope takes precedence of this subjectivisation and therefore of the human subject active in it, 
being independent and superior to this subject and what he does or does not do.”35 We might do 
well to interpret “subjectivisation” here  as appropriation, where the believer relates to the object in 
such a way as to make it her own, to acknowledge it, and allow it to play a normative role in shaping 
her existence in a multiform and polyphonic manner.36 The point is that the object constitutes (and 
enables) the character of Christian believing, but the believer does not constitute or create the object 
that is believed in. In Barth’s words, when it comes to the object of faith, “faith is simply following, 
following its object. Faith is going a way which is marked out and prepared. Faith does not realise 
anything new. It does not invent anything. It simply finds that which is already there for the believer 
 
32 CD, IV.1, 740. 
33 CD IV.1, 742.  
34 CD IV.1, 742. 
35 CD IV.1, 742.. 
36 This “subjectivisation” is one point in Barth’s thought that could be fruitfully engaged in another 
studied focused on providing a more in-depth phenomenology of believing. Even though Barth 
himself does not provide this he offers a dogmatic description that would justifying further 
investigation rather than outright rejection of Barth as being overly abstract or autocratic. 
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and also for the unbeliever. It is simply man’s active decision for it, his acceptance of it, his active 
participation in it.”37 
 This emphasis on the object of faith, no doubt, is in part to distinguish Barth’s 
understanding from that of Feuerbach’s or anyone else who would have us understand the object of 
faith as something reduced entirely to the immanent realm of human empirical existence. According 
to Barth, the advantage that the believer has over the unbeliever is that she recognizes that this 
object is in relation to her as it also relates to the unbeliever, since the object is not dependent on the 
act of faith of the believer. For Barth, the unbeliever’s lack of recognition puts her in an abnormal 
state. As he says, “Faith is the normalizing of the relationship between man and this object. It is the 
act in which man does that which this object demands, that which is proper to him in face of this 
object—the fulfilment of the correspondence to what this object is and means of itself for every 
man.”38 
 As mentioned above, for Barth “the objective res subjectivised in faith, is Jesus Christ, in 
whom God has accomplished the reconciliation of the world, of all men with Himself—the living 
Jesus Christ Himself, in whom this occurrence, this fulfilment, this restoration of the broken 
covenant between God and man, is not an event of the past, not a theoretical truth and doctrine, but 
for all humanity and all men (irrespective of their attitude to Him) a personal present, no, a present 
person.”39 Faith is concerned with “the normalisation of the human relationship to him.”40 All 
created persons are in relation to God in Christ, but it is those who relate in faith to Christ that 
avoid the “the great abnormality of unbelief” that consists in a corrupted and inadequate way of 
relating to Christ and consequently to oneself and to others.41 At the broadest level for Barth, faith 
consists of a human activity in relationship to the object of faith, Christ, who encounters the believer 
in her particularity.  
 
37 CD IV.1, 742. 
38 CD IV.1, 742. 
39 CD IV.1, 742-743. 
40 CD IV.1, 743. 
41 CD IV.1, 743. Attending to the holistic character of Christian believing also makes the corrupting 
detriments of unbelief more intelligible, since the person’s relationship to the object of belief is a 
multiform one that is wholly self-involving. It’s not just a matter of relating to the object with one’s 
mind in an abstract and disengaged manner. 
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 There are three points that Barth makes to describe how the object of faith and the 
believer’s relationship to it characterizes the nature of a Christian’s faith. For Barth faith inherently 
involves a relationship to God in Christ who is seen to be outside the believer and the character of 
Christian believing is oriented to, originates in, and is constituted by Jesus Christ. 
 First, faith “consists in the orientation of man on Jesus Christ.”42 To be oriented on Christ is 
to be no longer oriented on or unduly reliant on oneself. The believer is aligned with or toward Jesus 
Christ. Looking to Christ rather than to herself. As he says, “The man who believes looks to Him, 
holds to Him and depends on Him. He renounces all self-determination in His favour.”43 As Barth 
goes on to describe, “In faith man is no longer in control at his centre, he is outside himself and 
therefore in control. The orientation on Jesus Christ which takes place in faith is not external and 
occasional. It is not one of the orientations in which he may find himself in his relationship with 
other things and persons.”44 In this sense, although Barth does not go on to describe this further, 
the orientation that is an aspect of faith in Christ needs to be understood as consisting of more than 
conscious cognitive reflection. It will at times involve conscious cognitive reflection and at times 
verbal confessing of statements regarding Christ, but it is not possible for the believer to be 
constantly oriented to Christ if this is taken to consist of constant conscious cognitive reflection. 
Believers are not constantly reflecting consciously on the object of their belief, there are tacit 
dimensions of believing. The orientation that Barth is talking about is not something that is simply 
another activity or state among the many activities and states that the believer finds herself in but is 
in some way constituted within all those activities and states of the believer. This orientation is not 
“external and occasional.” This orientation involves cognitive or linguistic content as he will go on 
to articulate, but it cannot be fully accounted for in an isolated and abstract manner. Believers are 
not constantly consciously reflecting on Christ, so this orientation needs to be understood in a more 
holistically self-involving manner. In Barth’s description of the orientation of the believer to Christ 
the believer’s orientation to Christ is implicitly more holistically involving (both theologically and 
anthropologically) than a mere abstract and formal awareness nor an isolated assent of the mind. 
The theologian interested in further unpacking the character of Christian believing, therefore, finds 
 
42 CD IV.1, 743.. 
43 CD IV.1, 743.  
44 CD IV.1, 743. 
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some precedent here to unpack the embedded and engaged manner of this orientation in Barth’s 
writing further than Barth himself did.  
 As he goes on to say, “If a man believes, this means that he has found in Jesus Christ an 
object which does not merely concern him and concern him urgently, which does not merely call 
him to itself and therefore out of himself, which does not merely claim him, but which is the one 
true object, which concerns him necessarily and not incidentally, centrally and not casually. It means 
that he has found in Him the true centre of himself which is outside himself.”45 For Barth “faith is a 
human activity that is present and future, which is there, in the presence of the living Jesus Christ 
and of what has taken place in Him, with a profound spontaneity and a native freedom, but also 
with an inevitability in face of His actuality. The reverse is equally true: with an inevitability, but with 
a native freedom.”46 For Barth the human activity of faith involves a reflecting of Christ’s glory in 
and through the believer’s own particularity and identity. As he says, “This reflecting of the glory of 
the Lord is made possible by the uncovering of the human face, by the seeing which is the result of 
this uncovering, by the fact that in this seeing man becomes the mirror of that which faces him, the 
‘glory of the Lord,’ and, above all, by the ‘glory of the Lord’ itself.”47  
 Furthermore, Barth wants to emphasize that the believer’s active orientation in faith in 
relation to the object of faith is both utterly dependent on Christ and at the same time a genuinely 
free human act. As he says,  
In this work man himself is nothing. He is not in control. He simply finds himself in that 
orientation. He accepts it. In it he sees and reaches out and grows beyond himself. In it he is 
for the first time faithful to himself. For as the doer of this work he loses his own life to find 
it again as he loses it (Mk 8:35) . . . . But as he does it, he does a genuine and free work, his 
own proper work. That is the first thing. Faith is in Jesus Christ. It is the action of the 
Christian in the face of this His Lord, in direct responsibility to Him, in renunciation in His 
favour.48 
In line with this and with what Barth said above, this act of orientation that the believer embodies in 
relation to Christ is, since it is not external or occasional, not necessarily a distinct act among other 
various acts that the believer might perform but is a way of embodying various actions and states of 
being. It involves linguistic content, but it is more than a conscious awareness of various linguistic 
 
45 CD IV.1, 743-744. 
46 CD IV.1, 744.  
47 CD IV.1, 744. 
48 CD IV.1, 744.  
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content understood merely in an isolated or abstracted manner. It is more holistically embodied and 
embedded within the believer’s concrete existence than that. This implicit dimension of orientation 
in the character of Christian believing pervades the entirety of the believer’s existence and this adds 
further intelligibility to why believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. This dimension 
will be further investigated later on when we look into the act of faith as it consists of 
acknowledgment, recognition, and confession.49 
 Second, faith is not only oriented on or directed at Christ, but the character of Christian 
believing is also based or founded on and originated from Christ. In Barth’s words, “We do not 
compromise its character as a free human act if we say that as a free human act—more genuinely 
free than any other—it has its origin in the very point on which it is also oriented. It is also the work 
of Jesus Christ who is its object.”50 Barth insists that it is the work of Christ that makes the human 
act of faith a genuinely free activity. As he says, “The Son makes a man free to believe in Him. 
Therefore faith in Him is the act of a right freedom, not although but just because it is the work of 
the Son.”51 The way that Barth speaks about the relation between divine and human agency is one 
where they are not in competition with one another and where human agency finds its fullness  
when acting in relation to Christ in humble dependence. Without Christ’s enablement the believer 
would not choose to orient herself on Christ due to the corrupting effects of sin. Faith is based on 
Christ in this sense in that Christ enables the believer to orient herself on Christ.52 
 Barth sums up this section by asking, “how can sinful man . . . believe?”53 The believer does 
not believe in or by her own strength in any kind of Herculean fashion, as Barth stresses, faith is 
 
49 It significant to note that these three words are all different forms of kennen rather than wissen since 
the former carries more self-involving connotations of knowing rather than the more disengaged 
connotations associated with wissen. 
50 CD IV.1, 744. 
51 CD IV.1, 745. 
52 Furthermore, for Barth faith was a created good of the human relation to God that was corrupted 
by sin. As he says, faith “belongs basically and decisively to the good nature of man as God created 
it that he should be able to believe. Believing might have been more natural to him than breathing. 
He was created to be the covenant-partner of God and therefore for God. The gulf between him 
and faith is something contrary to nature. It is created only by his being in the act of pride (CD IV.1, 
745). Since all humans exist in this act of pride, according to Barth, faith must be enabled and 
originated from Christ in addition to being oriented on him. The human activity that is involved in 
the faith that is based and oriented on Christ is one characterized by humble dependence (see CD 
IV.1, 745-746). 
53 CD IV.1, 746.  
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enabled and based on the work of Christ for the believer. However, Barth does not want to view 
faith or belief as being on the same plane as unbelief. For him Christian believing is on a different 
level because Christ as the object of faith is not a neutral object that simply allows the believing to 
choose between two equal options.54 For Barth this necessary aspect of assurance is due to the 
nature of the object of faith, namely Christ, in His encounter with the believer. It is not due to 
something inherent in the believer herself or her actions. This irresistible necessity of the free human 
activity of faith in relation to Christ is also attributed to the activity of the Holy Spirit. As he says, “it 
is the awakening power of the Holy Spirit that this impossibility as such and this necessity as such so 
confront a man and illuminate him that he does the only objective, real and ontological thing which 
he can do, not omitting or suppressing or withholding but necessarily speaking the Yes of the free 
act which corresponds to it, choosing that for which he is already chosen by the divine decision, and 
beside which he has no other choice, that is to say, faith.”55 An aspect of having faith, according to 
Barth, is the believer’s awareness of God’s overwhelming power through the Holy Spirit and 
through Christ for her well-being . Typical of the reformed tradition, Barth further emphasizes this 
aspect of assurance that is a structural aspect of the believer’s faith. As he says,  
Faith means to be awake on the basis of this awakening: to be awake to the strong One who 
awakens him and who alone can awaken him; to be awake to the necessity with which He 
does this, a necessity which excludes all pseudo-freedoms: to be awake to the self-evident 
nature of the arising which, on the part of man, will directly follow his awakening. Faith is at 
once the most wonderful and the simplest of things. In it a man opens his eyes and sees and 
accepts everything as it—objectively, really and ontologically—is. Faith is the simple 
discovery of the child which finds itself in the father’s house and on the mother’s lap.56 
In this sense the character of the believer’s existence in relation to the object of faith is one 
dependent on the gracious activity of God in Christ through the Spirit. Furthermore, this 
dependence is manifested thorough the believer’s multiform awareness of God’s loving presence for 
her as she acknowledges, recognizes, and confesses her dependence on Christ in and through her 
 
54 See CD IV.1, 746-747. 
55 CD IV.1, 748. The Holy Spirit is the one who enables the free activity of faith by the believer in 
Christ. The Holy Spirit is understood as “the power in which the object of faith is also its origin and 
basis, so that faith can know and confess itself only as His work and gift, as the human decision for 
this object, the human participation in it which he makes in his own free act but which he can only 
receive, which he can understand only as something which is received, which he can continually look 
for as something which is received again and which has to be confirmed in a new act” (CD IV.1, 
748). 
56 CD IV.1, 748.  
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particular situation(s) in the world. The metaphorical description of being “in the father’s house and 
on the mother’s lap” implies that there are implicit emotional dimensions tied up with the cognitive 
and intellectual dimensions of a Christian’s faith further highlighting the point that the character of 
Christian believing isn’t something merely or reductively intellectual that parallels a believer’s 
emotional existence but that it structurally and in inherently includes those dimensions implicitly. 
 The third and final dimension that Barth discusses concerning the relation of the human 
activity of faith to the object of faith is that the believer is not only oriented to and based on the 
object of faith, but she is also constituted by it. The believer is created anew. As Barth says, “in the 
twofold relationship of faith to Jesus Christ, as faith is oriented and based on Him as its object, there 
takes place in it the constitution of the Christian subject. And we do not forget that it becomes and 
is this subject only in this action: not on the basis of a creaturely character of this action as such, but 
in virtue of the fact that as it is oriented so it is also based on Jesus Christ. Yet it is also true, and we 
must say it expressly, that in this action there begins and takes place a new and particular being of 
man.”57 The human activity of faith in isolation is not the direct cause of this new creation, but it 
actively participates in this constitution of the creature’s new identity as it actively relates to the 
activity of God. Faith, for Barth, is closely tied up with the notion of the redemptive activity of God 
for the world and with the notion of the consummate new creation to come. As he says, “The faith 
which has Jesus Christ for its object is therefore faith in this being and action of His for the world, 
for all men and for every man. And those who can believe in Him—in Paul’s phrase, those who are 
of faith (of faith in Him)—are the first-fruits and representatives of the humanity and the world to 
which God has addressed Himself in Jesus Christ.”58 The Christian believer attests to this coming 
consummation that has already begun in and through Jesus Christ for the world. As he says, “What 
Christians have in and for themselves in the sharply differentiated particularity of their being they 
have as the bearers and representatives of a specially qualified and emphasized solidarity with all 
other men.”59 What is revealed to, in, and through Christians and the manner in which they attest to 
it is not entirely abstract or general, as Barth notes speaking of 1 Timothy 4:10 that Christ’s activity 
for those who believe is “concretely revealed to them and concretely known by them, demanding 
their concrete service.”60 Barth then moves to briefly describe how the truth of Christ is 
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appropriated when he says that “His truth is known in obedience, and acknowledged in humility and 
confessed in thankfulness, the people which lives and builds up itself to be a light shining in the 
world (Phil. 2:15) in reflection of His glory.”61 Obedience, acknowledgment, humility, and gratitude 
are implicit dimensions of the character of Christian believing that imply the fact that the whole self 
is involved in the character of Christian believing and not merely the intellect in isolation.  
 Furthermore, Barth also refers to the irreducibly intersubjective dimensions of the character 
of Christian believing as the individual believer relates to the saints of the Church. As he says, “The 
faith which has Him as its object is as such faith in Him as the Creator and Lord of the fellowship of 
the saints. It is faith as it lives by and for and in and with this fellowship—the faith of this fellowship 
and as such the faith of individual Christians. Just as a man would not be a man in and for himself, 
in isolation from his fellow-men, so a Christian would not be a Christian in and for himself, 
separated from the fellowship of the saints. With his personal faith he is a member of this body of 
Christ.”62 This importantly qualifies the individual character of Christian believing and how we 
understand the believer’s way of relating to the object of faith. This intersubjective understanding of 
individual identity (first in the Church, but also in the world within one’s specific time and place) has 
implications for how we understand the constitution of an individual’s faith as necessarily related to 
public relations and necessarily and as such cannot be reduced to something entirely private in a 
psychological sense or entirely isolated in an anthropological sense (in addition to the theological 
sense of relating to God who encounters the believer from outside the believer herself). For Barth, 
the individual believer’s faith is tied up with her relations to other persons (specifically her fellow 
saints). It is not something that is constituted in an isolated or individualistic manner.63  
 In building up to the next section where Barth focuses extensively on the act of faith Barth 
importantly states that “the faith and therefore the acknowledgment, recognition and confession are 
their act, it is evident that the event of their faith (while it has no creative aspect as their act) is more 
than cognitive in character. From the point of view of the presupposition at work in their act, from 
the point of view of the men as its doers, it is clearly the positing of a new being, the occurrence of a 
 
61 CD IV.1, 750. 
62 CD IV.1, 750-751. 
63 Even more starkly Barth says, “If faith is outside the church it is outside the world, and therefore 
a-Christian” (CD IV.1, 751). The fellowship of the community is an essential ingredient of the 
character of Christian believing just as individuals are essential for the community 
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new creation, a new birth of these men.”64 Barth here importantly acknowledges that the event of 
faith is more than cognitive and that it is inherently transformative for the believer. Further 
acknowledging and reflecting on the “more than cognitive” character of Christian believing as it 
takes place in the ongoing event of reconciliation helps us to better understand the holistic character 
of Christian believing and in doing so it helps us to begin to better understand the central 
significance of believing in and for Christianity. While the act of faith changes what and how a 
believer thinks this change and this act is “more than cognitive.” Barth concludes, “To this extent 
we cannot deny to the event of their faith a certain creative character.”65 However, in line with his 
hesitations to articulate this event in any way that might give rise to the assumption that the believer 
herself is responsible for constituting herself anew apart from a proper dependence on God’s 
activity for her Barth makes a point to link this constitutive and creative dimension of the event of 
faith most directly to the activity of the object of faith that the believer relates to in her act of faith. 
As he goes on to say, “Because the faith of this sinful man is directed on Him and effected by Him, 
the event of his faith is not merely cognitive as a human act but it is also creative in character. The 
new being effective and revealed in it, the new creation, the new birth—they are all the mystery of 
the One in whom he believes and whom he can acknowledge and recognise and confess in faith. 
When it is this One who closes the circle around him, a man can and must do that which he does in 
faith.”66  
In summary Barth states, “On the one hand we are dealing with the being and action of Jesus Christ, 
on the other with the particular, the most particular, fact of the existence of the individual man.”67 
As he goes on to say, “This is—in general terms—the form of His being and activity in which He 
Himself is the mystery in the event of faith, in which He gives to this event a creative as well as a 
cognitive character.”68 The creative character is most directly related to the activity of God in Christ 
while the activity of the believer truly participates in that activity while in no way acting as the sole 
origin of this new creative constitution. For Barth the particularity of the person and her situation 
and her relationships are important, and this is an important acknowledgment when we later 
compare Barth with Bultmann. As he says, 
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When a man can and must believe, it is not merely a matter of an “also,” of his attachment 
as an individual to the general being and activity of the race and the community as 
determined by Jesus Christ. In all the common life of that outer and inner circle he is still 
himself. He is uniquely this man and no other. He cannot be repeated or represented. He is 
incomparable. He is this in his relationship with God and also in his relationship with his 
fellows. He is this soul of this body, existing in the span of this time of his. He is this sinful 
man with his own particular pride and in his own special case. For all his common life he is 
alone in this particularity. It is not simply that he also can and must believe, but that just he 
can and must believe. And if the being and activity of Jesus Christ Himself is the mystery of 
the event in which he actually does so, then we must put it even more strongly and precisely: 
that in this event it takes place that Jesus Christ lives not only “also” but “just” as his 
Mediator and Saviour and Lord, and that He shows Himself just to him as this living One. 
He became a servant just for him. It was just his place that He took, the place which is not 
the place of any other. In this place that He took, the place which is not the place of any 
other. In this place He died just for him, for his sin.69 
This highlights the fact that the character of Christian believing inherently involves aspects of 
continuity as well as novelty. It is important that the Christian believer reflect on the pro me of 
Christ’s redemptive activity in the most concrete terms as it relates to the believer’s honest self-
understanding.70 The point is that for Barth part of the character of Christian believing is an 
acknowledgment, recognition, and appreciation of the fact that Jesus Christ was and is specifically 
interested in and came for the individual believer in all her concrete particularity that makes her who 
she is on the horizontal plane as well as the vertical plane.71    
 For Barth, the self-understanding of the believer is wrapped up in a hermeneutical circle of 
sorts between the pro me, pro nobis, and the propter nos homines. An understanding that Christ came to 
save the individual, the individual as she relates to the community of the church, and the community 
of the Church as it relates to the redemption of the world through God in Christ and in the Spirit. 
Having stated all this concerning the believer’s relation to the object of faith and the object of faith’s 
relationship to the believer, Barth then moves on to more closely focus on the act of faith within 
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The Act of Faith: Acknowledging, Recognizing, and Confessing 
Reflecting on the previous section Barth writes, “We have now said and considered what we had to 
say concerning the object of faith, its origin, and finally and above all the basis of the Christian 
subject, and therefore the coming into being and the being of the Christian.”72 He starts out by 
affirming that, “Christian faith is a free human act.”73 In line with what he articulated in the previous 
section Christian faith is not understood as one act among other acts but as “the act of the Christian 
life.”74 The act of faith is embedded and embodied within the many manner of ways that a Christian 
exists within the particularities and continuities of her world. As he says, “By what we have called in 
the title the act of faith we mean the basic Christian act which, when it takes place, is the act of the 
Christian life, the Christian act which embraces and controls all individual acts and activates, 
permeating and determining them like the leaven of Mt. 13:33.”75 He acknowledges that from other 
perspectives love and hope are also central Christian acts. He writes,  
Like love and hope from other aspects, faith is the act of the Christian life to the extent that 
in all the activity and individual acts of a man it is the most inward and central and decisive 
act of his heart, the one which—if it takes place—characterises them all as Christian, as 
expressions and confirmation of his Christian freedom, his Christian responsibility, his 
Christian obedience. On whether or not this act takes place depends whether these acts are 
rightly done from the Christian standpoint. If a man does them in faith, if in doing them he 
first performs the basic act of faith, then he does them as a Christian, he does them rightly 
from the Christian standpoint.76 
In this sense it is again more than consciously cognitive and can manifest itself in holistic and 
multiform ways of the believer’s intentional existence in the world. Rather than being merely one act 
among other acts it is holistically embedded and embodied within the believer’s intentional way of 
existing in the world. In this section Barth goes on to develop what he means by saying that the 
Christian act of faith consists of an acknowledging, recognizing, and confessing. These are 
understood to be different aspects of the same unified but multiform act, not different sequential 
stages or distinct actions. They are mutually interrelated and as such they are implicit dimensions of 
faith that characterize Christian believing in a holistic manner that is beyond a simple understanding 
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76 CD IV.1, 757-758. This will be an important point of resonance with Bultmann’s understanding of 
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of belief as an isolated mental act of thinking certain thoughts to be true concerning the person and 
message of Jesus Christ. In highlighting this polyphonic nature of the act of faith Barth contributes 
to a better understanding of why believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. 
 Barth is quick to point out that the act of Christian faith consists of a type of knowledge. As 
he says, “Why a knowledge? As we have seen, underlying it there is the power of His Holy Spirit 
awakening man to faith. As the event of a human act on this basis, faith is a cognitive event, the 
simple taking cognizance of the preceding being and work of Jesus Christ. But we are not dealing 
with an automatic reflection, with a stone lit up by the sun, or wood kindled by a fire, or a leaf 
blown by the wind. We are dealing with man. It is, therefore, a spontaneous, a free, an active event. 
This active aspect is expressed in the three terms: acknowledgment, recognition, and confession.”77 
Just because the Christian act of faith is more than cognitive does not mean that it is non-cognitive 
or that it does not have significant dimensions of explicit cognitive understanding. As God reveals 
himself in and through human language the knowledge of faith does consist in variously relating to, 
appropriating, and embodying specific linguistic content while one is actively relating to Christ and, 
for Barth, the act of acknowledgment is the first dimension that should be talked about. As he says,   
It might be objected that acknowledgment includes and presupposes recognition, so that the 
latter ought to be treated first. This may be true enough in other cases, but when it is the 
taking cognizance of Christian faith the reverse is true. The recognition is certainly included 
in the acknowledgment, but it can only follow it. Acknowledging is a taking cognizance 
which is obedient and compliant, which yields and subordinates itself. This obedience and 
compliance is not an incidental and subsequent characteristic of the act of faith, but primary, 
basic and decisive. It is not preceded by any other kind of knowledge, either recognition or 
confession. The recognition and confession of faith are included in and follow from the fact 
that they are originally and properly an acknowledgment, the free act of obedience.”78 
In Barth’s case you only properly come to true knowledge of God when you encounter God in the 
right manner, namely in humble obedience. There is no neutral access to true knowledge of God 
because the knowledge of faith takes place in a relationship to the person of Christ in the present. 
Acknowledging is not merely an observing correctly or a knowing about accurately, but a relating to 
properly. 
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 Along these lines Barth engages with the classical analysis of genuine faith as consisting of 
notitia, assensus, and fiducia. He states that, “If we were to use the terminology of the older dogmatics, 
we should have to speak first of assensus and only then of notitia—although this would have sounded 
very strange to its authors with their concern for formal logic. The only thing is that 
acknowledgment is much more than assensus and recognition than notitia.”79 For Barth 
acknowledgment and recognition are much more than mere awareness of information and 
commitment to the accuracy of that information. The commitment and understanding involved is 
more self-involving than that. In starting to further articulate the dimension of acknowledgment in 
the act of faith in Christ Barth speaks of the necessity of the “earthly-historical form of His 
existence.”80 As he goes on to state,  
On the level of an earthly-historical event—of which we are now speaking—his encounter 
with this object of his faith will therefore be in some form his encounter with the Christian 
community, a direct or indirect encounter with its ministry or proclamation or one of its 
activities. And what he will experience in this encounter if he comes to faith will be this, that 
the relative authority and freedom in which the Christian community exists in the world and 
in which he experiences its existence will confront him, not in some kind of non-obligatory 
way, but with such compulsion that he must not only accept and respect it but submit to its 
law and desire to associate himself with it and join it.81 
For Barth, the Christian believer’s acknowledgment of Christ takes place through the 
acknowledgment of the relative authority of the Church, rightly understood insofar as it is a faithful 
witness to Christ. As he goes on to say, “If a man comes to Christian faith, this means that in the 
encounter with the community of Jesus Christ he encounters Jesus Christ Himself, that in its relative 
authority and freedom he encounters His absolute authority and freedom, the law to which the 
community itself is subject, and therefore a law which is superior to him and binds him.”82 For 
Barth, the church is the vehicle through which the believer acknowledges Christ’s authority within it. 
 
79 CD IV.1, 759. He acknowledges that the classical understanding also included the aspect of fiducia 
in addition to notitia and assensus but he goes on to ask, “This seems evident enough, for cognizance 
of a thing implies a prior acquaintance. But what does notitia mean in this case?” (CD IV.1, 758-759) 
and “how can there be an acquaintance with the will of God for us taken from His word except in 
that act of acknowledgment and therefore of obedience and compliance?” (CD IV.1, 759). Here he 
seems to be reacting against forms of the classical analysis that portray the three aspects as distinct 
stages or developmental parts of faith rather than simultaneous aspects. 
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The acknowledgment is not ultimately directed at the Church, just as faith is ultimately not directed 
at the individual, but the believer acknowledges Christ through her participation in the church. As he 
states, “Acknowledgment as the basic moment in the act of Christian faith has reference to Jesus 
Christ Himself—presupposing, of course, the mediatorial ministry of the Christian community 
which is His body and the consequence of an active acknowledgment of its existence and the desire 
to be a member of it.”83 
 Just like the object of acknowledgment is not directly and ultimately directed at the church, 
so too, for Barth, it is not ultimately directed at a specific doctrine or proposition. As he describes it,  
The active acknowledgment of Christian faith, in which recognition and confession are 
included and from which they result, does not have reference to any doctrine, theory or 
theology represented by or in the community. It does not have reference to any creed or 
dogma formulated and championed by the community, not even the most ancient and 
universal. Even less does it have reference to the dogmatics which gathers together and 
expounds that dogma, not even the most churchly of dogmatics. Nor does it have 
reference—as the Reformers so sharply emphasised—to the histories of the Old and the 
New Testaments, to the prophetic and apostolic theology as such on whose witness the 
proclamation of the community is founded. At its root as this acknowledgment Christian 
faith is not the subservient acceptance of any reports or propositions, irrespective of 
whether they are biblical or churchly or modern. At this root it is indeed an obedient 
acceptance. But the object of it is the One whom the Bible attests and the Church as taught 
by the Bible proclaims, the living Jesus Christ Himself, none other.84 
Here Barth is working with a fine nuance. At one level the various doctrines and propositions 
concerning Christ are not the ultimate object of acknowledgment. This risks reducing it to mere 
assent and it also risks reductively intellectualizing the act of faith and construing it merely as the 
relationship of the believer to ideas and propositions about Christ rather than ultimately to Christ 
himself. Stated in this way it is more obvious why Barth rejects this type of thinking (as does 
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Bultmann). But even a proper ontological relationship to Christ that is undertaken in proper 
acknowledgment that consist of humble obedience to Christ within the sphere of the Church in the 
world includes a multifaceted awareness of basic statements about Christ that suffice to identify 
Him. In talking about faith as consisting of knowledge Barth is equally not wanting to reduce faith 
to a nondescript feeling or disposition. He wants to emphasize that this proper acknowledgment 
consists in a proper relation to Christ Himself and not merely ideas about Him nor merely to the 
community of the Church. As he goes on to say,  
It is He Himself, the living Jesus Christ, the Head of the Church, the Lord of Scripture. It is 
most important to maintain this expressly and in face of all false orthodoxy because this is 
the point which decides whether we will understand faith rightly: that it is the work of 
human insight, resolve and action; but that as this human work it is real Christian faith only 
directly in the encounter with its object, only as the gift of the Holy Spirit of Jesus Christ 
Himself, only as the work of the obedience which is pledged to Him as the freedom which is 
given by Him. This truth is either denied or hopelessly obscured in a conception of faith 
which involves as its basic act the acceptance of certain statements which attest and proclaim 
Him, which does not, therefore, consist in simple obedience to Himself.85 
We might say that for Barth, the acknowledgment of faith in Christ consists of a minimal awareness 
of linguistic statements about Christ supplied by the believer’s engagement in the community of 
saints and its understanding of Christ through the Scriptures (and this is an important point of 
agreement with Bultmann). However, the ontological relation and dependence on Christ is primary 
and will necessarily include one’s acknowledgment of various statements about Christ, but it appears 
that for Barth the important point to note is that one’s acknowledgment of having been encountered 
by Christ is the source of one’s acknowledgment of various statements and not the other way 
around, and certainly not only a relation to ideas about God. 
 
85 CD IV.1, 760-761. It is here that Barth admits a certain similarity between his thought and that of 
Rudolf Bultmann and Willhelm Herrmann. As he says, “In the result it might appear so, but perhaps 
only in relation to the negative element in this result, our opposition to a false orthodoxy, our refusal 
to ground the act of faith in the acceptance of the texts of the Bible or the propositions of the 
Church. If only there were an obvious unity on the positive element, that the living Lord Jesus 
Christ attested by the Bible and proclaimed by the church is the One who must be accepted and 
acknowledged at the basis of the act of faith, and therefore that the negation must be made only on 
this ground (and not on the ground merely of certain ethico-anthropological propositions)! To the 
extent that this is not clear, and so long as it is not clear, it is better to leave open the question of this 
agreement. For it is much to be feared that in what we are now going to say we shall have the 
support of neither Herrmann nor of Bultmann” (CD IV.1, 761). 
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 Barth then moves on to talk about the recognition involved in the act of faith and in doing 
so he begins to shed further light on some of these issues. In line with the issue we were just 
engaging with he states that,  
Recognition is not of itself and as such the basic act of faith, which consists in that obedient 
and compliant taking cognizance. Faith is a recognition only to the extent that a recognition 
is included in that obedient and compliant taking cognisance. When we say this, we say that 
it is only the statement which is secondary. For that which proceeds from the 
acknowledgment as a second thing is already included in it as the first. If we may, and must, 
understand and formulate positively the definition given by Calvin—“All true knowledge of 
God (omnis recta Dei cognition) is born of obedience”—then as the basic act of faith this 
obedience is not an obedience without knowledge, a blind obedience without insight or 
understanding, an obedience which is rendered only as an emotion or an act of will. How 
could a recognition proceed from it or in any way follow it if it were not already contained in 
this first thing as a second?86 
The act of faith involves the distinct but not separated aspects of acknowledgment and recognition. 
These are not separate acts, but different dimensions of the same act of faith. The dimension of 
acknowledgment adds a thicker description of the manner of relation that also includes an aspect of 
recognition since it is not a blind faith, but a knowing faith. In his words, “there is a recognition in 
the basic act of that obedience, of that acknowledgment (we must now continue) because the living 
Jesus Christ who is the object of that acknowledgment, to whom man subjects himself in the 
obedience of faith, is Himself not without form, but is the Jesus Christ attested in Holy Scripture 
and proclaimed by the community.”87 Acknowledgment, recognition, and confession, again, are all 
different aspects of knowing in faith. As Barth continues to describe the aspect of recognition he 
states,  
What is decisive is the objective truth that in and with the fact that he is called by Him to the 
obedience of faith he is given ground and cause to recognise Him in His authentic form, and 
therefore rightly. He would not obey Him if at the same time he did not begin in some way 
to see and understand Him, if of his obedience there were not born in outline a recta cognitio. . 
. . It is a right recognition in so far as it is in the form determined by His own being and His 
own revelation of His being that He encounters man in the witness of Scripture and the 
proclamation of the community; in so far, therefore, as the subjective fulfilment of the 
knowledge objectively proffered to man is limited and controlled by the fact that it always 
 
86 CD IV.1, 761. In the next paragraph he deals with Calvin’s rejection of the fides implicita. 
87 CD IV.1, 762. 
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takes place in the sphere of Holy Scripture which attest Him and the community which 
proclaims Him in obedience to Scripture.88 
According to Barth there is a right and a wrong way to recognize Christ and this is judged first and 
foremost by Christ himself but also secondarily according to the witness of Scripture and the witness 
of the community insofar as it is aligned with Christ. It is an active and ongoing recognition on the 
part of the believer, and it is one that is capable of ever deepening understanding. As he says, “This 
sphere is a wide one, which leaves open to the believer many and different possibilities of seeing and 
understanding Jesus Christ and therefore of the subjective fulfilment of the right knowledge 
proffered to him.”89 It is here too that Barth gives some space for developing and understanding of 
the unity and diversity that constitutes the Christian faith and a Christian’s faith. As he notes, not 
only are there valid varied ways of recognizing Christin the act of faith, but this variation is 
something to be expected and celebrated due to the richness of Christ. The richness and variation 
are to be understood within the bounds of right and wrong recognitions of Christ guided by 
Scripture and the community’s reception of it (ultimately judged by Christ himself), but within these 
bounds diversity of recognitions is to be expected and celebrated.90 
 
88 CD IV.1, 762. 
89 CD IV.1, 762. In the next paragraph he discusses Luther’s, Calvin’s, and the Heidelberg 
Catechism’s different but equally responsible recognitions made within the sphere of scripture and 
the church.  
90 As he states at length, “The recognition of Christian faith can and should be varied. The reason 
for this is as follows. Although its object, the Jesus Christ attested in Scripture and proclaimed by 
the community, is single, unitary, consistent and free from contradiction, yet for all His singularity 
and unity His form is inexhaustibly rich, so that it is not merely legitimate but obligatory that 
believers should continually see and understand it in new lights and aspects. For He Himself does 
not present Himself to them in one form but in many—indeed, He is not in Himself uniform but 
multiform. How can it be otherwise when He is the true Son of the God who is Eternally rich? Of 
course, all knowledge of Jesus Christ will have not merely its basis but its limit and standard in the 
witness of Scripture and the proclamation of the Church. It is possible only within this definite 
sphere. It is only in this sphere that Jesus Christ has a form for us men, that He can therefore be an 
object of our knowledge and known by us. Again, it is a wide sphere with many possibilities. But in 
correspondence with the uniqueness and unity of Jesus Christ Himself it is a sphere with limits, and 
these limits are always the criterion in the question whether what we regard as the knowledge of 
faith in Jesus Christ is true knowledge, whether indeed it can be seriously called knowledge or not. 
Outside this sphere, Jesus Christ has no form for us; He is not an object of our knowledge and He 
cannot be known by us. The believer whom He has definitely encountered in this sphere and not 
elsewhere will not even try to seek Him outside this sphere. If he did, both Jesus Christ and his faith 
would dissolve into nothingness. The problem of the knowledge of faith in Jesus Christ is, therefore, 
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 Barth here again emphasizes and goes on to emphasize the importance of the believer being 
engaged in the community of other believers who are likewise acknowledging and recognizing 
Christ. As he says, “If to believe means eo ipso to associate and attach oneself to the community, then 
the knowledge of faith necessarily consists in the fact that a man enrolls and continues in the school 
in which the community has always found and from which it can never remove itself, that of the 
witness of Scripture, in which he cannot help but learn with the community and therefore listen as 
well to the voice and word of the community.”91 For Barth, the fact that the believer is pursuing 
knowledge of Christ in this context is of primary importance and the fine details of the content of 
faith are of secondary (but still of importance). As he says, “In the measure that it takes place in this 
context, the knowledge of faith is genuine knowledge—and the question of this range and form and 
particular direction, although it is serious, is only secondary. What matters is that it is a knowledge 
which is qualified by the context in which alone it can take place,”92 and that “it is a matter of 
recognizing in this context the Lord whom we acknowledge. We must all see to it that in our 
recognition we accept our particular responsibility to Him. As he is the object and origin of faith in 
general, He is also of the recognition of faith. And He is the ultimate Judge who they are that truly 
recognise Him when they acknowledge Him.”93 Here again the dimension of humility, this time 
applied to the recognition of the content of faith, is an important implicit aspect of the character of 
Christian believing. 
 At this point, however, Barth shifts his concern and begins to articulate his understanding of 
the act of recognition in an attempt to safeguard it from any anti-intellectual misunderstandings. He 
also acknowledges that he has yet to satisfactorily describe what recognition consist of. As he says, 
“We must not allow ourselves to be persuaded by any anti-intellectualism that there is not a definite 
element of knowing—of which the existence of this sphere of Scripture and the church is the basis 
and limit and norm.”94 He acknowledges again that there are different depths of knowledge for the 
 
absolutely tied up with the existence of this sphere, as is the answering of the problem with respect 
for this sphere. This knowledge is nourished by the witness of Scripture and its exposition and 
application in the proclamation of the community. It cannot refuse to accept this as its norm, and to 
be criticized and corrected by it as it listens to the exposition and application of it in the fellowship 
of the saints” (CD IV.1, 763-764). 
91 CD IV.1, 764. 
92 CD IV.1, 764. 
93 CD IV.1, 764. 
94 CD IV.1, 764. 
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Christian, but he adamantly insists that true knowledge of God is present in even the most 
elementary act of faith, which consists in a facility for the right words to express that knowledge. In 
this sense Barth talks about how every Christian ought to be a theologian of sorts. As he later states, 
“Of course, if what he feels and wants is something without form, then he is not a theologian, but 
he is also not a Christian. For Jesus Christ is not without form, but in the sphere in which he 
encounters Him He is both form and object—and in the same sphere in which he listens to the 
word of Scripture and to that of the community (and therefore to Himself) he can know Him.”95 
The genuine character of Christian believing consists in definite knowledge of God in Christ and 
although it includes more than this awareness it is not less, according to Barth. As he goes on to 
affirm, “Of course, the knowing of faith and its recognition can never be an abstract knowing.”96 It 
cannot be abstract primarily in the sense that its content is concretely constituted by the person of 
Christ and the witness of Scripture and fellowship with the saints who have and are recognizing and 
acknowledging this content and object. Insofar as acknowledging and recognizing is more than 
cognitive awareness, the knowing of faith is more than a neutral intellectual understanding, but one 
that is embodied in various forms of intentional existence and through the various relationships that 
the particular believer has. Barth is less explicit about this dimension here, but it seems to be implicit 
in his position. As he mentions, “In all the so-called truths of faith we have to do with the being and 
activity of the living God towards us, with Jesus Christ Himself, whom faith cannot encounter with 
a basic neutrality, but only in the decision of obedience. The idea of an abstract knowledge of this 
object—we might almost say the idea of a theologian abstracted from the fact that he is a 
Christian—is one which has no substance.”97 He continues this train of thought when he says that, 
“positively the knowing of faith cannot be an abstract knowledge because it is only one element in 
the active recognition of faith. It is an indispensable element. It is an integral element. It decides its 
meaning and direction. It shows us what must be the object and origin of the recognition of faith. 
But it is only one element. Taken alone, as an abstract knowledge of God and the world and even of 
Jesus Christ it can only be described as unimportant and even, as Jas. 2:19 tells us, negative, a 
possibility or impossibility of demonic being.”98 There is a necessary dimension of the believer’s 
 
95 CD IV.1, 764-765. 
96 CD IV.1, 765. 
97 CD IV.1, 765. 
98 CD IV.1, 765. 
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awareness of specific linguistic content that truly and rightly describes Christ, the believer herself, 
and God’s activity for the believer.99 
 Barth goes on at length to further articulate the relationship between the act of recognition 
as it relates to the pro me involved in relating to an understanding of God’s activity in Christ for the 
believer. As he states,  
And in knowing this, the believer knows of himself that he himself is the man for whom 
Jesus Christ is, for whom, in whose place, He acts and rules, in short, with whom He deals 
as an all-powerful and all-loving human lord—if there were such a thing—would have to 
deal with a man who is utterly attached and subject to him. He knows that he himself is the 
man who is the possession of this Lord. But if this is what he knows concerning Jesus Christ 
and therefore himself, it is not an abstract or dead or neutral, but a concrete and living 
and—do we need to say it?—a supremely and profoundly implicated knowledge. Let us say 
it for once, it is his existential knowledge, his knowledge in the active recognition of his 
faith.100  
Barth’s hesitancy to refer to this knowledge as existential knowledge indicates that Bultmann’s 
thought is lurking in the background here. In important continuity with Bultmann’s thought Barth 
states that, “if it is an active recognition—a recognition in the full sense of this important word—
then necessarily it reaches out from that knowledge to the awareness, the self-understanding and 
self-apprehension, of the whole man, thus becoming an action and decision of the whole man.”101 
The recognition is not an isolated or disengaged recognition, but one that is fully embodied in the 
believer’s intentional way of being in the world that is truly changed as a result of God’s action in, 
for, and through the believer. Barth goes on to ask, “From this knowledge, from the recognition 
 
99 Barth again further reiterates, “The knowing of faith is, of course, a true and genuine knowing. It 
is related to its object. It is an objective and, as such, a theoretical knowing. We can say this quite 
calmly, and it must not be denied. But, as such, it is at once a practical knowing. It both knows and 
recognises. It is this to the extent that as a knowing about Jesus Christ it includes in itself from the 
very first a knowing about the believer himself. It is already included in the root of faith as the 
acknowledgment of Jesus Christ, it is born of that obedience as cognition, that the One in whom I 
believe and about whom I can know when I believe in Him, that this One—we now come to the 
final proposition of our second section—is what He is and does what He does for me, pro me; that 
He is ‘my Lord,’ as Luther so rightly emphasised in a formula which unfolded so much objective 
knowledge; that He is my Lord and therefore my Saviour and Mediator, my Redeemer from sin and 
death and the devil, my hope of service in righteousness, innocence and felicity, because He died for 
me and rose again for me” (CD IV.1, 765-766). 
100 CD IV.1, 766. 
101 CD IV.1, 766. 
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characterised by this knowledge, does there not necessarily follow a total disturbance of my being, a 
radical decision in relation to my salutation vis-à-vis myself and the world? Does not this 
recognition—without ceasing to be recognition, but becoming recognition in the deepest sense—
necessarily take on the form of a free act which is characterised as a basic act by the fact that it is—
we must not say only, but just—the act of my heart?”102 Even in describing the act of recognition of 
the believer as her free act and decision that aligns itself with a radical change in her identity Barth is 
still concerned to make sure that we do not confuse the penultimate human act with the ultimate 
divine act. It is this conflation of the penultimate and the ultimate that Barth is concerned that 
Bultmann and others succumb to.103 In speaking about the relation between his own understanding 
and that of Bultmann, Roman Catholics, and others he states, “If only we were agreed—and this 
applies to my neighbour on the left as well as on the right—that the ultimate and the penultimate 
things, the redemptive act of God and that which passes for our response to it, are not the same. 
Everything is jeopardised if there is confusion in this respect.”104 Barth is concerned that they 
conflate the activity of the believer in faith and the activity of God in Christ for the redemption of 
 
102 CD IV.1, 766-767. 
103 In response to the early Luther and to Bultmann, Barth writes, “The real presentation 
(repraesentatio) of the history of Jesus Christ is that which He Himself accomplishes in the work of 
His Holy Spirit when He makes Himself the object and origin of faith. Christian faith takes note of 
this, and clings to it and responds to it, without itself being the thing which accomplishes it, without 
any identity between the redemptive act of God and faith as the free act of man. Jesus Christ and 
His death and resurrection do not cease to be its object and origin. It is always grounded in the fact 
that Jesus Christ becomes and is and remains its object and origin. What takes place in the 
recognition of the pro me of Christian faith is not the redemptive act of God itself, not the death and 
resurrection of Jesu Christ, not the presentation and repetition of His obedience and sacrifice and 
victory. What is Bultmann’s conception but an existentialist translation of the sacramentalist 
teaching of the Roman Church, according to which, at the climax of the mass, with the 
transubstantiation of the elements—in metaphysical identity with what took place then and there—
there is a ‘bloodless repetition’ of the sacrifice of Christ on Golgotha? . . . With the later Luther they 
will understand faith as a recognition and apprehension (comprehendere) of Jesus Christ as the One 
who died and rose again for us men and in our place, but they will not confuse it with the dying and 
rising again of Jesus Christ, nor will they confuse the dying and rising again of Jesus Christ with what 
takes place in faith. Therefore, when they speak of what takes place in faith, they will not speak of an 
absolute disturbance or an eschatological decision or the redemptive act of God” (CD IV.1, 767-
768). 
104 CD IV.1, 768-769. 
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the believer; in an unnecessary repetition of the work of Christ.105 Barth is happy to speak of the 
believer’s active participation in the ongoing reception, appropriation, and manifestation of her 
redemption that is genuinely transformative in a qualified sense. It is dependent on the real presence 
and activity of Christ who encounters the believer in her present circumstances in light of what He 
has done for her in the past and will continue to do for her in the future, but once that is understood 
Barth has no problem talking about the believer playing an active role in appropriating that 
redemption in a concrete way.106 As Barth himself states, “faith is the free act of man. If this is 
secure, we cannot speak too strongly of what takes place in it as the recognition and apprehension of 
Jesus Christ, as the subjective realisation of the pro me. There is no doubt that in it as this recognition 
there is a comprehensive disturbance and decision, an act of the human heart which carries with it, 
and after it, a total change in man’s whole situation.”107 
Barth also incorporates two other implicit dimensions of explicit faith when he speaks about 
the classic concepts of mortification and vivification. Barth states that the believer “expresses 
himself as a Christina in the fact that he is able and willing to be only in the likeness of Jesus Christ 
and His death and resurrection, in both an inward mortification and an inward vivification.”108 When it 
comes to how acknowledgment, recognition, and mortification relate to the believer’s self-
understanding in relation to the activity of Christ “it follows that I am seriously alarmed at myself, 
that I am radically and heartily sorry for my condition, that I can no longer boast of myself and my 
thoughts and words and works and especially my heart, but can only be ashamed of them, that I can 
think of myself and my acts only with remorse and penitence.”109 Continuing to speak of the inward 
 
105 As he says, “Faith is the free act of man, and is wonderful enough in relationship to Jesus Christ 
as its object and origin. It is a recognition and apprehension of His being and activity for man. But it 
is not the repetition of it. The being and activity of Jesus Christ needs no repetition. It is present and 
active in its own truth and power” (CD IV.1, 769).  
106 As Bruce L. McCormack notes, in a slightly different context looking primarily at Barth’s 
theological ontology, “true humanity” for Barth “is realized only in the act of faith and obedience” 
and McCormack goes on to note that Barth “[employs] historical categories (categories of lived 
existence) to overcome the essentialistic treatment of classical theological anthropology” 
(McCormack, Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 
2008], 199). This further highlights the close connection of Barth’s conception of the character of 
Christian believing as being transformatively and holistically embedded in the particularities of the 
believer’s concrete situation(s) in the world in a non-reductive way that maintains the importance of 
divine otherness. 
107 CD IV.1, 769. 
108 CD IV.1, 769. 
109 CD IV.1, 771. 
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act of mortification Barth states that “it is the Christian attitude on its negative side. The knowledge 
of faith involves no less than this. This heartfelt act of penitence cannot be avoided by anyone who 
knows Jesus Christ as his Saviour and is determined and stamped and enlightened by Him.”110 
Speaking of the positive side, alluding to the inward act of vivification, Barth states that “If I know 
Him and myself in Him—and that is the knowledge of faith—this means that I see myself as the 
one to whom that right and life are given, as the one to whom He has given Himself as righteous 
and alive for me.”111 This vivification is closely tied to the believer’s assurance and trust that Christ 
truly is for her. As he states, “on this positive side faith is simply trust—that is why the older 
theologians talked of fiducia. Not an arbitrary trust, but a trust which responds to the Word of God 
spoken to me. Not an indefinite trust, but a trust which is grounded in the knowledge of faith as the 
knowledge of Jesus Christ. And we must add that in this responsive and well-grounded trust we 
have to do not only with myself but with the community and the world.112 Here Barth indicates that 
the individual’s faith cannot be individualistic. 
 For Barth, this notion of vivification is tied to a peaceful confidence that God is not only for 
the believer herself, but for the good of the Church and the world as well. As he goes on to describe, 
“This is what the older theologians called vivification, the vivification which does not come to a 
Christian once only but continually, which does not determine his attitude only occasionally, but is 
everywhere present—this time as a clear overtone.”113 Barth goes on to further describe and sum up 
these dimensions of vivification and mortification by stating,  
It cannot be otherwise than that, when a man believes, then, in spite of all the limitations in 
which he still exists, in the knowledge of the restoration of his right and life as it has taken 
place in Jesus Christ, he will become a free man, i.e., a man who is no longer a simple 
servant and victim of his pride, but who is called away from it to the obedience of humility, 
for which he is also both ready and willing. As he bears that deep wound and accepts that 
bitter pain of penitence, he will hope for the grace of God and in that hope he will be at 
bottom a cheerful man. And although on his journey from the beginning of his way to the 
end he will often enough be assaulted and he will have to fight and he will often be thrown 
down, but will always rise up again and continue, yet in his relationship with God and man 
and himself he will be seriously and finally a peaceful man, peaceful because held by the One 
 
110 CD IV.1, 772. 
111 CD IV.1, 772-773. Again Barth goes on to qualify this restoration to account for the ongoing 
struggle with sin. 
112 CD IV.1, 774. 
113 CD IV.1, 774. 
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in whom he is already restored, in whom he is already the righteous and protected covenant-
partner of God.114 
This determining, stamping, and enlightening takes shape in two aspects. That of overcoming one’s 
pride by Christ and that of recognizing one’s appropriation of Christ’s restoration in oneself. These 
aspects of vivification and mortification happen continually for the believer, in line with Barth’s 
general commitment to an actualistic outlook rather than seen as a once and for all event. This again 
also highlights some of the other emotional aspects inherent in the character of Christian believing. 
 The third and final aspect of the Christian act of faith in Christ is that of confession. As he 
states, “Christian faith is a confession. At the very first we called it generally an act of taking 
cognizance. We described this as basically an act of acknowledgment in which we then saw an act of 
recognition from which this proceeded. In this limited and definite sense Christian faith is man’s 
taking cognizance of Jesus Christ.”115 As he has been at pains to demonstrate, however, Christian 
faith is not merely a matter of taking cognizance of Jesus Christ. Confessing is also a necessary 
dimension of genuine Christian faith. Barth boldly states that “The taking is accompanied by giving, 
the acknowledgment and recognition by confession. A Christian who simply acknowledges and 
recognises without confessing is not a Christian.”116 One dimension of the character of Christian 
believing, for Barth, is to be a holistic witness of Christ to others. As he says, “so the goal of faith as 
the free act of man is the act of his witness and therefore of his confession. What is acknowledged 
and recognised by man in faith is the radiance of God, his qabod, doxa, Gloria, glory, honour, self-
manifestation in the being and activity of Jesus Christ. But this radiance cannot be stopped in and by 
the one who acknowledges and recognises it. It breaks through and lights up the man himself.”117 
Alluding to a few biblical metaphors Barth states that “the man who believes in Jesus Christ is, as 
such, the lighted candle which belongs per se to the candlestick. His taking cognizance is also a 
giving.”118 This witnessing and confessing that takes place in and through the character of Christian 
believing is one that is unique to her individuality and faithfully reflective of Christ as her life and 
her words are made manifest in the world for those with the eyes to see. As Barth states, 
 
114 CD IV.1, 775. 
115 CD IV.1, 776. 
116 CD IV.1, 776. 
117 CD IV.1, 776. 
118 CD IV.1, 776. 
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The consequence is irresistible that where anyone believes as a Christian a history is enacted: 
a history of the heart, which, as such, is audible and visible in world-history; an individual 
history which, as such, calls for impartation and communication; a secret history which, as 
such, has a public character and claim; a history which is not apparent—for what does it 
matter that a man finds himself summoned to that obedience and compliance in relation to 
Jesus Christ, and resolved upon it in his own freedom, and what is the little penitence and 
confidence in which this is revealed in his attitude?—but a history of immeasurable dynamic 
because it takes place in the light of the great history of God.119 
The Christian believer participates in the ongoing redemptive activity of God in and for the world in 
a transformative way that is publicly manifested for those with eyes to see. Confession, understood 
in a holistic sense, is this dynamic aspect that is made manifest in the world. As Barth states at some 
length, 
In general terms, confessing is the moment in the act of faith in which the believer stands to 
his faith, or, rather, to the One in whom he believes, the One whom he acknowledges and 
recognises, the living Jesus Christ; and does so outwardly, again in general terms, in face of 
men. . . . to be that altered man who belongs to Him in our whole being and therefore 
outwardly as well. . . He is absolutely different only in the mystery of his existence as 
grounded in Jesus Christ, not in what he himself is and does on this basis. His confessing is 
striking and extraordinary and surprising and spectacular and aggressive, both in itself and in 
its effects, only in the eyes and ears of those who lack categories to understand what he is 
and does on this basis.120 
Here Barth points out that there are indeed hidden implicit dimensions of the character of Christian 
believing as they relate to the divine human relationship but he acknowledges that there is also an 
accompanying public manifestation that is transformative for the believing and potentially 
transformative for those who witness and come into contact with Christians holistically manifesting 
the confession of their faith. Again alluding to biblical metaphors Barth writes that “because he is a 
little light reflecting the great light, his action stands out from that of others, he becomes a witness 
of the great light, without especially willing to do so, and without in any way helping to do so. His 
task is that he should not cease to be that little light reflecting the great light. His task is that he 
should not place that little light under a bushel. If he sees to this, he does the act of confessing 
which is required of him, the confession of faith.”121 Barth then again touches on the necessarily 
intersubjective dimension of what it means to be human and therefore as faith involves the whole 
 
119 CD IV.1, 776-777. 
120 CD IV.1, 777. 
121 CD IV.1, 778. 
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person of the necessarily social dimension of the individual believer’s faith. He asserts that 
fellowship is naturally and by creation an inherent dimension of humanity and especially of the 
humanity of the Christian (we might add that concern for the wellbeing of one’s neighbor is also, if 
not natural, an inherent Christian disposition). Along these lines Barth writes, “since faith is his free 
human act, he cannot perform it without his neighbors, without communication with them. He 
cannot try to keep it concealed from them. Whatever may be their attitude to him, he owes this to 
them. To exist privately is to be a robber. . . . This is all the less possible in so far as what is required 
is not an act of particular heroism, but simply that in the sight and audience of his fellows he should 
stand to his faith, i.e. to the One in whom he believes and to what his attachment to Him involves 
for himself, that he should not be unbelieving, but believing.”122 Faith is embedded and embodied 
within one’s way of existing in the world with and for others. While one might argue that there are 
“private” or “inner” dimensions of faith there is also an inherently public or communal dimension 
to its constitution both with fellow believers in the Church and with the Churches witness to those 
in the world. As Barth states, “above all, the necessary summons to confession is concretely given by 
the existence of others who, according to their confession in the world, are likewise caught up in the 
act of faith by the existence of the Christian community. It is not on the basis of his own discovery 
and private revelation, but by the mediatorial ministry of the community which is itself in the school 
of the prophets and apostles, that a man comes under the awakening power of the Holy Spirit and 
therefore to faith.”123 
 With this understanding it is, according to Barth, the believer’s “task to make this known in 
human language for human ears, and with the act of his human life before human eyes—yet again, 
not in great deeds, but in the mere fact that he is who he is, and that as such he says what he has to 
say and does what he has to do and makes open use of the freedom which is given him to do 
this.”124 Barth’s holistic understanding of the act of confession inherent in the act of faith challenges 
conceptions of the nature of faith that are overly privatized and atomistically individualistic. Like the 
other aspects, confession is not a special act entirely distinct from everything else that the Christian 
is and does. This being the case, the Christian’s confession is phenomenologically rich, but Barth 
 
122 CD IV.1, 778. 
123 CD IV.1, 778. 
124 CD IV.1, 779. 
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doesn’t unpack this further, even though he lays the groundwork at a higher level of descriptive 
generality that is at the same time theologically and Scripturally rich. 
 
Conclusion 
Given all this, it is fruitful for those seeking a richer description of the character of Christian 
believing to engage these aspects where Barth more directly speaks about the active and dynamic 
nature of the free Christian act of faith and not only those places of his writings that focus on 
justification and more exclusively on the object of faith, which emphasize the believer’s passivity in a 
manner that does not as adequately speak about the various human dimensions of the character of 
Christian believing.  
 Barth’s descriptions of the object of faith and the act of faith helpfully articulate some of the 
aspects that constitute the implicit dimensions of explicit faith. For Barth, understanding how Jesus 
Christ as the object of the believer’s faith orients, originates and constitutes the character of 
Christian believing is significant for a proper understanding of the human act of believing in 
Christianity and it adds further intelligibility as to why believing is centrally significant. Barth’s 
multiform conception of the holistic Christian act of faith that consists of the dynamic and implicit 
aspects of recognition, acknowledgment, and confession adds further intelligibility to how the 
believer is wholly self-involved and not involved in an isolated, atomistic, or individualistic manner, 
which again adds further intelligibility to how and why believing is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity.  The character of Christian believing is not something that can be adequately 
understood in an isolated or abstractly disengaged manner primarily because Christ as the object is 
actively involved in encountering the Christian believer. As this chapter has sought to show, Barth’s 
writings are capable of contributing to an account of the character of Christian believing that is more 
phenomenologically rich and yet remains concretely and specifically Christian. Barth’s writings help 
safeguard our understanding of the character of Christian believing from being theologically 
reductive in their emphasis on the primacy of Christ as the object of faith and its significance for our 
understanding of the act of faith and his insights. His emphasis on the self-involving nature of faith is 
packed with latent significance that is congruent with a more phenomenologically rich description of 
the character of Christian believing that is at the same time neither anthropologically nor 
theologically reductive (even though his work, nor this thesis, undertakes a properly 
phenomenological investigation). As a work in Christian theology Barth’s multiform conception of 
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the character of Christian believing and the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith shows the 
non-reductive character of Christian believing and in doing so it provides greater intelligibility into 
the central significance in and for Christianity. In emphasizing that Christ as the object of faith 
orients, originates, and constitutes the believer and that the believer relates to Christ by 
acknowledging, recognizing, and confessing Him in a multiform and holistic manner amidst one’s 
concrete circumstances in the world Barth’s work begins to unpack some of the implicit dimensions 
of explicit faith that better help us understand why faith is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity. Barth begins to show us how there are many different aspects that are related to one 
another that simultaneously constitute the character of Christian believing and he acknowledges that 
that character is one that cannot be satisfactorily understood in a reductively individualistic way nor 
in a way that simply operates with an abstract conception of the personal identity of individual 
believers, nor with an atomistic conception of human cognition.
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Chapter 2: Rudolf Bultmann and the Implicit Dimensions of Explicit Faith 
 
Introduction 
It is fair to say that interest in Rudolf Bultmann and the reception and productive engagement with 
his work in English speaking systematic theology (as opposed to New Testament studies) is sparse 
when compared to Barth; and this is in part due to the wide success of Barth’s influence in English 
speaking systematic theology and his own (at times hasty) interpretations of Bultmann. As Benjamin 
Myers points out, “Karl Barth was one of the earliest and most influential critics of Bultmann’s 
doctrine of faith; later critics have often done little more than restate the basic objections which 
Barth had already formulated.”1 Recently Myers, and to a greater extent David Congdon,2 have 
begun to reassess Bultmann and engage his work in ways that are constructively fruitful for 
systematic theology today. In addition to contributing to the main aim of this thesis3 this chapter in 
particular aims to also contribute to this reassessment and fruitful engagement with Rudolf 
Bultmann’s work for systematic theology today. The decision to spend an extensive amount of space 
presenting Barth and Bultmann’s various understandings of the nature of Christian faith in the first 
two chapters and in continuing to more closely compare them with each other (as well as with other 
theologians) in the third chapter is a direct result of the conviction that Barth poorly represents 
Bultmann’s thought on the nature of faith and that, while there are difference between them, the 
similarities of thought between Barth and Bultmann on the human act of faith are strikingly 
apparent. Both have a lot to offer in terms of helping us better understanding the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith and in doing so both help the central significance of belief in Christianity 
become more intelligible. This chapter seeks to extensively articulate Bultmann’s understanding of 
the holistic character of Christian believing in order that he might further help us understand why 
belief is centrally significant in and for Christianity and that he might be more fairly understood.  
 
1 Benjamin Myers, “Faith as Self-Understanding: Towards a Post-Barthian Appreciation of Rudolf 
Bultmann,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10:1 (January 2008), 22. 
2 See David Congdon, The Mission of Demythologizing: Rudolf Bultmann’s Dialectical Theology (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2015). 
3 Namely, its question concerning why belief is centrally significant in and for Christianity and its 
argument that by attending to the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and to the holistic character of 
Christian believing this centrality becomes more intelligible. 
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Rudolf Bultmann has much to say about the nature of Christian faith and the character of 
Christian believing. His position on the nature of a Christian’s faith is fascinatingly nuanced. This is 
easily missed if one neglects to attend to the variety of alternative positions that Bultmann criticizes 
and attempts to differentiate his position from. He criticizes rationalist (and irrationalist), idealist, 
romantic, and mystic positions. He criticizes various Roman Catholic as well as Protestant 
conceptions. He also criticizes “pietistic” positions that reduce the concept of faith either 
psychologically or sociologically. He critiques various strands of both liberalism and orthodoxy. As 
he says, “the two paths of liberalism and orthodoxy are in error because they are nontheological. In 
both the object does not determine theology, and for this reason both lose their object altogether”4 
and as such they are false approaches to understand the character of Christian believing adequately. 
 For Bultmann the fides qua creditur cannot be understood apart from its relationship to the 
fides quae creditur and the fides quae creditur is only properly encountered through the fides qua creditur. 
Faith is not a general timeless and formless attitude, capacity, or feeling. Nor is faith merely the faith 
in Christianity, faith in other people’s faith. Nor is faith to be understood as a mere assent to 
propositions, ideas, or “pure doctrine.”5 It is not merely “a resolve to submit to a doctrine,”6 nor is it 
a resolve to assent to a universal worldview or system of doctrines. If either was the case then the 
content of faith and the mode of faith would be possible apart from an actual encounter with God 
through revelation in one’s particular historical situation in the world, and for Bultmann this 
encounter is never a neutral affair. As he says, “Should there be talk of God, then it is of course clear 
that there can be talk of him only as Lord, that is, as the one who sends the moment and makes his 
claim in it, as the one whose claim is heard precisely in the claim of the here and now.”7 This further 
highlights some of the implicit dimensions of explicit faith. Bultmann describes his aversion to 
thinking of faith as a worldview further,  
In a worldview, which means in a theory about the world as a totality—about its formation, its 
progression, and its meaning—human beings seek to secure themselves by conceiving their 
existence on the basis of the world understood in thought. It therefore does not matter 
whether the worldview is based on rational principles, empirical observation, dogmatic 
tradition, or value judgments, experiences, and the like. It is essential that a worldview 
 
4 Rudolf Bultmann, What is Theology? (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 49. (Bultmann, Theologische 
Enzyklopädie [Tübingen: Mohr, 1984], 34). 
5 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 49. See “reine Lehre” (Theologische Enzyklopädie, 33). 
6 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 48. 
7 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 71-72. 
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proceeds in general propositions that are true when disregarding my concrete existence in 
the here and now, since this existence can only be understood on the basis of the 
worldview.”8 
He goes on to describe that “in contrast to this, Christian faith claims that this interpretation of 
human existence overlooks precisely its actual reality. For this existence in the world is always 
insecure, and indeed because human beings stand under the claim of God, who calls them out of the 
world. If this claim is heard and affirmed, the person gains a security that is never a worldly 
phenomenon but rather is only grasped and known in reflection on concrete existence, which is 
addressed in the here and now by God.”9 He then moves on to explain that those who are drawn to 
worldview see the essence of human existence as “general and timeless.” In contrast to this Bultmann 
views temporality as central to our understanding of human persons and goes on to state that “as 
temporal, human existence is insecure, which means that it stands always in decision, and faith says 
that this character of decision consists in the fact that the human person is addressed by God and 
should hear and obey.”10 
 For similar reasons Bultmann criticizes the Roman Catholic view of justifying faith for being 
mere “theoretical faith in the revealed truths”11 where these truths are understood as universal truths 
with little particular purchase (i.e. with very little claim on the believer, challenging her to see/be 
herself in a certain way in her particular historical situation). He criticizes Protestant dogmatics for a 
slightly different reason. Although he agrees with the Protestant assertion that justification is 
acquired apart from works and that faith is not mere assent to universal truths, but “actually a laying 
hold of grace”12 as it relates to the promises of God and “is understood in its intentionality as faith 
in, that is, in God’s saving deed, as much as it is also trust,”13 he nevertheless critiques Protestant 
dogmatics for articulating an abstract notion of trust.  
 As he says, “Faith is a human possibility only in a specifically historical situation, in which a 
specific proclamation is transmitted. It is neither an a priori of the human spirit nor a universal 
 
8 Rudolf Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope” translated by David Congdon in 
The Mission of Demythologizing: Rudolf Bultmann’s Dialectical Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 
846. 
9 Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope,” 846. 
10 Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope,” 847. 
11 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 104. 
12 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 107. 
13 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 107. 
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attitude of soul such as optimism or peace of mind and the like; it is not a ‘disposition.’”14 
Furthermore he states that “the promissiones cannot at all be seen to be ‘true’ without the applicatio to 
me.”15 He also criticizes the classic Protestant analysis of faith consisting of notitia, assensus, and fiducia 
when this is construed as a type of temporal sequence of progression. As he says, “the illusion arises 
that the saving deeds must first be assented to before they can be the basis for faith, though they 
become visible as saving deeds only in faith. . . . The result then is that theology establishes itself as 
the object of faith by demonstrating the truth of the saving doctrines. Then it is no longer God’s 
saving deed mediated through the notitia (or the word), but pure doctrine which is regarded as the 
object of faith.”16 This to Bultmann would be an idolatrous objectification of God, and succumbs to 
a similar critique as the Roman Catholic position. The object of faith becomes reduced to a relation 
to ideas about God, rather than to a relation to an actual encounter with God within the particular 
historical situation. 
 Conversely, Bultmann criticizes pietism for its tendency to reduce faith to a human attitude 
and thereby lose sight of the fact that faith is intended toward and in an encounter with God; as real 
and as Other than the world, the self, and others. This approach he finds in various forms of 
romanticism and historicism. According to Bultmann, people like Schleiermacher and Troeltsch fall 
into this error. This position places undue emphasis on the recipient(s) of faith at the expense of a 
proper consideration of God as the Revealer who is subject in and as revelation to those that he 
encounters in faith.17 As he says, “Faith here is thus construed as a universal religious feeling. 
Nothing at all is believed—experience as such, experience as psychic event, is faith.”18 
 Mysticism goes wrong in the other direction. It denies the historicity of our existence and 
pursues a flight from existence into the being of God; in no small manner due in part to its dualistic 
anthropology.19 It acknowledges the utter otherness of God but denies that God encounters us (as 
historical beings) in the world. It, therefore, according to Bultmann, mistakenly holds that “to see 
God, one must be free of, be void of self” and that we must “step outside of self” 20 in order to receive 
 
14 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 107. 
15 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 108. 
16 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 108. 
17 See Bultmann, What is Theology?, 87-90. 
18 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 112. 
19 See Bultmann, What is Theology?, 127. 
20 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 119. 
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salvation. In the end, for Bultmann, “mysticism cannot have a real relation to the church of the 
Word, since the Word is directed to the concrete historical person, and intends to teach him to 
understand his concrete historical situation.”21 Not only is faith intended at the living God, its 
intentional character is constituted by a word that is understood concretely and is holistically 
appropriated within the concrete particularities of the believer’s world in a non-reductive manner. 
As he elsewhere states, “Thus faith is also different from mysticism, which knows a soul elevated 
over time in the same way that every anthropology that contrasts the body with the soul as that 
which is authentically existential in people is altogether alien to faith, which knows human existence 
only as bodily, because it is temporal. Thus faith knows nothing of the flight of mystics from bodily-
temporal existence; faith knows instead that it is addressed in existence by God, that it is placed in 
decision and hears the word of forgiveness in and for existence.”22 Bultmann here highlights how he 
sees bodily-historical particularity to be an integral part of our anthropological constitution and, 
therefore, as an integral aspect of our understanding of the character of Christian believing. Part of 
the significance of believing for Christianity becomes more intelligible when recognize how it is 
integrally constituted within and through the particularities of our lived existence. 
 Given this wide array of criticism made by Bultmann, those who are quick to criticize his 
understanding of the nature of faith as merely liberal, or as a reducing of theology to anthropology, 
or as wanting to understand the nature of faith as entirely devoid of any kind of conceptual content, 
or as devoid of reference and relation to a truth outside oneself, miss the mark when they do not 
first grapple with how Bultmann attempted to distinguish his understanding of the nature of faith 
from these various and wide ranging positions.23 Despite whatever valid criticisms might remain, 
 
21 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 125. 
22 Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope,” 847-848. 
23 For example, in an early work John Webster describes Bultmann’s conception of faith as “not 
knowledge about certain things, in just the same way that revelation is not revelation of certain 
things. Faith is not intellectual, it is existential. That means to say that the meaning of faith rests not 
in the grounds of faith, but merely in the fact of faith’s existence. Faith is not meaningful because it 
is faith in certain things, but because it is an act of man, a decision in obedience to the call of the 
kerygma” (Webster, Rudolf Bultmann: An Introductory Interpretation [Leicester: Religious and Theological 
Studies Fellowship, 1980], 22). This is a one-sided and over-simplified presentation of Bultmann’s 
conception of faith. It would be better to say that faith is not merely knowledge about things since 
knowledge and understanding of God and of oneself are intimately involved. God as the object of 
faith who encounters the believer in the event of the kerygma is an important part of understanding 
the nature of faith for Bultmann. Furthermore, the choice between faith being “intellectual” or 
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whatever constructive development awaits to be done, it is clear that those criticisms cannot be 
easily or fruitfully made prior to the hard work of trying to grasp the nuances and intricacies of the 
position Bultmann attempted to put forward. The fact that he initially defies easy categorization 
promises that an extended reflection on his position is worth the effort (Not merely towards the end 
of giving him a fairer hearing among his misinterpreters for its own sake, nor even towards 
recovering Bultmann’s position as the normative position for today, but primarily as a fruitful means 
to facilitate a contemporary articulation of what it means to have faith in Christ that is sufficiently 
nuanced itself. 
 This chapter focuses on Bultmann’s understanding of various implicit dimensions of explicit 
faith as he understands them to be non-reductively embedded within the believer’s bodily-historical 
existence, and as such it will focus on key themes and concepts that he uses to describe the authentic 
or genuine character of Christian believing in various places throughout his corpus that go beyond 
what is readily understood to be involved in what it means to believe in Christ. While it aims to fairly 
and accurately present Bultmann’s understanding of the character of Christian believing (which is 
often not understood very well) its primary aim is not a historical reconstruction of Bultmann’s 
thought for its own sake, but is ultimately concerned to glean useful insights for truthfully 
understanding the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian 
believing in order that we might better understand why belief is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity today. As Bultmann himself states there are two forms of historical interpretation: 
“First, your interest may be to give a picture of a past time, to reconstruct the past; second, your 
interest may be to learn from historical documents what you need for your present practical life. For 
example, you can interpret Plato as an interesting figure of the culture of fifth-century Athenian 
Greece, but you can also interpret Plato to learn through him the truth about human life. In the 
latter case your interpretation is not motivated by interest in a past epoch of history, but by your 
search for the truth.”24 In this instance, our engagement with Bultmann is primarily motivated by a 
“search for the truth” that is relevant to our present concern to better understand the central 
significance of belief in Christianity by attending to the implicit dimensions of explicit faith rather 
 
“existential” is a false option. This is especially apparent when cognition and the intellect are seen to 
be significantly constituted within the particularities of the person’s lived existence. 
24 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (London: SCM Press LTD, 1958), 51-52. 
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than one that is primarily concerned to exposit Bultmann in and of himself for his own sake.25 
Bultmann’s description of dynamic implicit dimensions of explicit faith that are holistically held 
together will further aid in providing intelligibility as to why belief is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity. With that qualification in mind it will nevertheless be helpful to start by looking at what 
he has to say about the character of Christian believing in his The Gospel of John and his two volume 
Theology of the New Testament before engaging with some of his more occasional writings and in more 
detail with aspects of his Theologische Enzyklopädie (translated as What is Theology?).  
 
Faith as Dependent, as Obedience, and as Self-Understanding: Initial Insights from The 
Gospel of John and Theology of the New Testament 
Early on in his commentary on John’s gospel Bultmann states that Christian belief “is the 
appropriate answer to the revelation [of Jesus]”.26 Divine revelation and an understanding of Jesus 
Christ as the “Revealer” of God and of true human existence are integral to Bultmann’s 
understanding of the character of Christian believing. Like Barth emphasizes even more clearly, 
Bultmann here notes that the character of Christian believing is constituted by an object who is a 
subject outside of the believer that actively encounters her. Bultmann furthermore closely links 
Christian believing with a type of transformation of the believer’s existence, a certain type of change 
in the believer’s perceptual awareness that is in some sense beyond natural perception even while 
this perception remains within human existence. As he states, “It is equally clear that the 
transference into this new mode of existence is given only to the man who believes in the revelation 
with which he is confronted in Jesus; further that the new existence is characterized by the 
illumination which comes from understanding oneself in relation to God: the tekna Theou are the uioi 
tou photos (12.36).”27 He later states that it is the “exalted, glorified Lord who is the object of 
Christian faith.”28 and it is believers who “see” or recognize and acknowledge his glory.29 The vision 
 
25 Furthermore, our engagement with his New Testament writings will, therefore, be guided by our 
overall theological interest in constructing a theological account of the character of Christian 
believing and will not be concerned to investigate the finer details of his Greek exegesis nor debates 
concerning the merits of other aspects of his historical interpretation of this or that detail in this or 
that portion of the New Testament. 
26 Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), 51. 
27 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 59. 
28 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 152-153. 
29 See Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 69-70. 
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of faith for Bultmann is unavoidably historical and at the same time beyond any mere observation of 
natural events as it is tied to the community of believers who pass it on through history; it cannot be 
fully reduced to anything immanent in this world since it is inherently directed at and related to the 
Revealer who cannot be so reduced. It is belief in the mission of the Revealer in the world amongst 
us in the saving event that makes rebirth and the gift of eternal life possible. As Bultmann says, “The 
mission of the Son, embracing as it does both his humiliation and his exaltation, is of decisive 
importance, for it is by faith in this mission that man gains life.”30 As he continues,  
At the same time this means that faith is not one of man’s good works, receiving life as its 
reward; nor is unbelief seen as an evil deed incurring judgement. Just as faith already 
possesses life (5.24: 6.47), so too unbelief is already lost (3.36; 9.41). Faith and unbelief are 
the answer to the question posed by God in the mission of Jesus; they are a new possibility 
for man which is made open to him only by the saving event (cp. 9.41; 15.24). If faith and 
unbelief are not the works of man, neither are they spiritual dispositions (diatheseis) which can 
be developed. Rather just as pistis, so to speak, does not know what it is doing—in as much 
as it cannot consciously decide to acquire zoe—so too unbelief is also ignorant of the fact 
that it is bringing judgement on itself. It is blind. Yet since faith and unbelief are the answer 
to the question of the divine love, they are (notwithstanding the fact that they are not 
achievements or spiritual dispositions) responsible deeds, in which it becomes manifest what 
man is.31 
Faith for Bultmann is wholly self-involving. It is not some “thing” that the believer possesses, but it 
is a way of living in relationship to Christ within one’s concrete historical situation in the world, 
made up of all of one’s various relationships and possible activities. This distinction between works 
and deeds as it relates to notions of compartmentalization and objectification is important for 
properly understanding the believer’s activity in faith. For now, it suffices to point out that for 
Bultmann faith (and unbelief as it relates to death) consists in the beginning and continuation of new 
life itself and is not something entirely prior or separate that brings the believer life. If that were the 
case then it would indeed be a work, something that the believer could separate herself from and 
point to as a justification for her reward. Inherent in faith is a recognition of one’s “own need for 
help.”32 Faith for Bultmann is also not an autonomous act either of God prior to the believer’s faith, 
or of the believer prior to God. As he says, “God’s work in man occurs in the act of faith, and does 
not stand in some mysterious sense behind it”33 since “in Jesus God acts, that his history is an event 
 
30 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 154. 
31 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 156. 
32 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 207-208. 
33 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 234. 
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of revelation, that salvation depends on faith in him, and that faith in him is assured of salvation 
because God himself is active in this faith.”34 As Bultmann later explains further,  
For John there is no ‘ethics’, no doing of the will of God. which is not primarily the 
obedience of faith; it is the action demanded by God (cp. 6.29). Admittedly for John there 
are no ‘dogmatics’ without ‘ethics’; but the love which is demanded of men grows out of 
faith and cannot exist without it. The consequence of faith is the work of love, because faith 
is not abstract speculation (neither of course is it the blind acceptance of dogma), but it is 
the answer to the challenge which is issued in Jesus’ word.35 
Obedience and responsible action in love are integral to how Bultmann understands the character of 
Christian believing. In other passages Bultmann avoids speaking of the active dimension of the 
believer as a work. And for reasons of clarity he prefers to speak of it as a deed. In this passage 
Bultmann does refer to faith as the “work demanded of man” in response to the demand presented 
by the revelation of God in Christ, and in the last line he refers to the faith of the believers as the 
work that Christ bears witness to. As Bultmann goes on to state, 
God can only be approached through his revelation (1.18). To have knowledge of God does not 
mean to have adequate information about him, whether this be gained from the tradition (as 
is the case with the Jews, or with any form of orthodoxy, including Christian orthodoxy) or 
whether it be derived from general thoughts and ideas; it means to know him as the one who 
encounters man in his revelation, who puts man in question and demands his obedience. 
Thus knowledge of God includes true readiness to hear him when he speaks. If this 
readiness is absent, if, that is, there is a refusal to accept the Revealer, there is not true 
knowledge of God.”36 
For Bultmann the way that believers approach God through his revelation is faith. And faith is more 
than a simple awareness of information, even if that information is true. Faith inherently involves a 
humble submission to Christ not only as savior, but also as Lord, and this takes place in a personal 
encounter that goes beyond a mere encounter with information. Again, this is not a onetime act or 
event on the part of believers, nor is the event of Christ’s crucifixion and resurrection understood 
merely as a past event with no continued activity of God in the present. As Bultmann says, “the 
community does not now enjoy an existence that is already complete and independent in its own 
right, but exists by believing, i.e. by continually overcoming both the present, mundane existence, 
and the offence afforded by the fact that the doxa can only be seen in the sarx genomenos. The 
 
34 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 234. 
35 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 274-275. 
36 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 283. 
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community lives, and the believer lives, from the future; and his faith has meaning so long as this 
future is not an illusionary dream or a futurum aeternum.”37 The promise of faith found in the gospel 
message brings assurance that death for the believer is overcome and that one need no longer fear it. 
But Bultmann is hesitant to speculate on what life after death might look like. As he explains, “The 
only thing that is clear is that an existence for the believers with the Revealer beyond death is 
requested, and thus promised. Death has become insignificant for them (11.25f.); but not in the 
sense that they can ignore it because their earthly life is not complete and meaningful in itself; but 
because their life is not enclosed within the limits of temporal-historical existence.”38 As he goes on 
to say, “Thus it is also true of the believer that his participation in life is not exhausted in his 
historical existence within time, even though nothing positive can be said about the ‘then’ beyond 
death. The Evangelist avoids all speculation about any heavenly journey of the soul, and refrains 
from any description of conditions of another world, such as form part of Gnostic mythology. But 
the fact that he has seen that ‘the view beyond has been barred’ from us, does not make him fall 
back on the opinion that human life can find its completeness in this world; he knows the double 
possibility: that it falls to pieces in condemnation, or that it is eternal in faith.”39 Faith, then, for 
Bultmann is inherently tied to eternal life that breaks into the believers present and promises future 
existence in life eternally and in this sense is tied to expectations of the future tied to the promises of 
God made in the message of the gospel, but he is hesitant to speculate much further about what this 
future existence beyond death might be like.40 The character of Christian believing involves an 
assurance of one’s continued existence in life after death, but it does not play a central role in 
shaping the believers existence and initial experience of eternal life within the present world in much 
speculative detail. 
 
37 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 519. 
38 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 520. 
39 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 520. 
40 As he states later on in his commentary, “The question about the odos is very quickly deflected into 
a question about the present fellowship with the Revealer, so that the anxiety in which the believer is 
placed is not anxiety about the promised other-worldly future, but about the believing existence in 
the world. This is why the promise of an other-worldly future after death does not contradict the 
idea that the resurrection is already experienced in faith now (5.24f.; 11.25f.). On the other hand this 
kind of faith is accompanied by the certainty of the nothingness of impending bodily death—but 




 One of the goals that faith in the Revealer accomplishes for Bultmann is the restoration of 
creation, in the sense that the believer exists in the world with a renewed self-understanding that she 
and the world are in fact the creation of God.41 As he states, “knowledge of the Revealer is 
knowledge of one’s own existence in him. The description of the Revealer as the light and the life 
had made it clear from the outset that authentic existence and true self-knowledge are a unity. With 
this kind of faith-knowledge, however, the original creature-relationship which had been lost has 
been won back.”42 Although it will be talked about further on in the thesis, this goes to show that 
Bultmann’s understanding of faith as self-understanding is not viciously subjective.  
Furthermore, love and faith are integrally related to one another in the existence of the 
believer as the believer relates to God who is love. As Bultmann says, “The exposition of the 
command of love as the essential element in constancy of faith makes it clear that faith and love 
form a unity; i.e. that the faith, of which it can be said, kathos egapesa humas, is authentic only when it 
leads to agapan allelous.”43 Later on in the commentary Bultmann expands on this by saying,  
The reason for the emphasis placed on this unity, and for the interweaving of the summons 
to faith and the summons to love in this way, is that life as we experience it seems to indicate 
a temporal succession in the order of faith and love, against which the real unity of the two 
must be maintained.. . . But what is their real relation to each other? It would be a 
misunderstanding to hold that it is really a succession, to regard the word as an introduction 
to action, and the action as the application of what has been heard.44 
Faith and love are not two separate things, but holistically love is an implicit aspect of the character 
of Christian believing. With the widespread recognition of the significance of love this itself should 
offer further intelligibility to why believing is centrally significant in Christianity. As Bultmann goes 
on to state,  
According to John 15 faith and love are, in fact, a unity. Faith is not authentic unless it is 
steadfast; i.e. unless it is the kind of faith that enables a man to decide beforehand the way all 
future action is to go. The fact that the Word assures faith of the love of God manifest in 
Jesus, and that this love is only received when it becomes the means whereby a man is 
himself freed to love, means that the Word is only properly heard when the believer loves in 
that he is a believer. . . .To summarise, therefore, faith is at once the resolute decision for the 
word that has been heard, and the resoluteness that embraces all possible future decision. 
 
41 For a recent defense of Bultmann’s conception of self-understanding see Benjamin Myers’ “Faith 
as Self-Understanding: Towards a Post-Barthian Appreciation of Rudolf Bultmann,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 10:1 (January 2008), 21-35. 
42 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 620. 
43 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 529. 
44 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 546-547.  
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Thus faith cannot be perceived as an isolated phenomenon, either by the believer himself, or 
by anybody else who looks on from outside. It is real only in the resoluteness that sustains 
the whole of life; and because that resoluteness is grounded in the believer’s decision for the 
Word, his faith is sure of it only in the sense that it holds before him the reason for his 
decision, i.e. it keeps him looking at the Word.45 
This decision for the word and this hearing is embedded and enacted within the concrete 
circumstances that individuals and particular communities of believers find themselves in. Here 
Bultmann describes the holistic character of Christian believing. As he says, “If the Spirit is at work 
in the word that is proclaimed in the community, then this word gives faith the power to step out 
into the darkness of the future, because the future is always illumined afresh by the word. Faith will 
see the ‘truth’ in each case, i.e. it will always be certain of the God who is manifest in the word, 
precisely because it understands the present in the light of this word.”46 The message of the gospel 
continually proclaimed through the activity of the Spirit amongst the believers in the world, the 
witness embodied in the person of Jesus Christ the Revealer, shapes how the believer perceives and 
exists in her present circumstances in light of the future promises of the Word of divine revelation.47 
As Bultmann puts it, “The believer’s existence is disclosed as itself the possibility given by the 
revelation; this realisation takes place in the new venture of faith itself. There is no reference at all to 
a new condition of the world which is still to come in the future. What is to come is real only for 
faith and in faith (faith as believing existence) and therefore it must always be won against the 
opposition of the world.”48 
 
45 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 547. 
46 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 574. 
47 As he says at length, “He does not have faith as a timeless possession, but only as a gift that has 
always to be grasped afresh. . . . In fact, however, every Now that the believer experiences is hall-
marked by the fact that in it the first decision taken for Jesus has to be maintained. Faith of course is 
based on the past, in so far as the eschatological word called it into being in the past; and the 
Paraclete, who is to show it the aletheia in the future, is only to call to mind what has already been 
heard by it. But the believer is based on the past only in that he was called to the eschatological 
existence then, an existence that is continually directed toward the future. He remains loyal to the 
word he has heard when he remains always ready to hear it afresh, when he does not tarry in his own 
past but in the word’s actually being spoken; for the speaking of the word, as the eschatological 
event, is a mode of being that anticipates every act of faith. The believer always has to catch up with 
this anticipatory existence, which is peculiar to the word; in catching up with it, he is however always 
at the end of time; his existence stands under the opsomai humas” (Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 582). 
48 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 586. 
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 While the character of Christian believing as it is directed at Jesus Christ involves a belief in 
his words as well as his deeds it also involves a belief in the continued work and application of those 
words to one’s own understanding of oneself in the present as well as one’s own appropriate holistic 
appropriation and emulation of the intention of those words and deeds within one’s present 
circumstances in the world.49 
 The character of Christian believing involves a continued witness and ongoing participation 
in the redemptive activity of God. However, according to Bultmann, “just as the success of what he 
did was visible only to faith, so the same will be true of the success they have.”50 The success of both 
God’s redemptive activity and the believer’s participation in it is not necessarily immediately visible 
to those who remain lost in sin. The vision of faith as the believer is encountered by Christ and His 
message in the present is necessary to discern such “success.” At least in the present worldly 
situation, saying nothing of a possible end time when such “success” is recognized by all. Towards 
the end of his commentary Bultmann writes that, “For to him [the Evangelist] the faith of 
‘Christians’ is not a conviction that is present once for all, but it must perpetually make sure of itself 
anew, and therefore must continually hear the word anew.  The meaning of faith, however, is to 
have life in his ‘name.’”51 This life is an “eschatological existence” in the present historical situation 
as it relates to the in-breaking of God within the world in hope and expectation of the redemption 
that has already begun and of what is promised to come. As he says, “Because this is so, because 
eschatological existence must become reality as historical existence, that which is its fruit can also be 
termed its condition. The believer must affirm, he must himself want to be, what he already is in the 
Revealer.”52 Here Bultmann acknowledges that desire is an inherent implicit dimension to explicit 
faith. 
 In Bultmann’s first volume of his Theology of the New Testament he explains how the so-called 
“Easter-faith” of the disciples was a particular way of understanding the significance of the cross of 
Christ that went beyond a simple reporting of the facts that constituted its happening. As Bultmann 
says, “The rise of the Easter faith made necessary a way of understanding the cross that would surmount, 
yes, transform, the scandal of the curse which in Jewish opinion had befallen the crucified Jesus (cf. 
 
49 See Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 609-610.  
50 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 610. 
51 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 698-699 
52 Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 620-621. 
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Gal. 3:13); the cross had to make sense in the context of the salvation-process.”53 “the call to believe 
in the one true God is simultaneously a call to repentance. According to Heb. 6:1, ‘repentance from 
dead works’ in conjunction with ‘belief in God’ (see above, 2) stands at the threshold of 
Christianity—i.e. repentance from or turning back from sinful deeds”54 thereby implying that 
repentance is an implicit aspect of explicit faith even if it is not its primary aspect. As he goes on to 
explain, however, even though faith is closely linked with the call to repentance the movement of 
the will in faith is not primarily that of repentance. As he writes, “The very rarity of the terms 
‘forgiveness of sins’ and ‘repentance’ in Paul (§ 31) and the similar rarity of epistrepsein . . . indicate 
that the movement of will contained in ‘faith’ is not primarily remorse and repentance. Of course, 
they are included in it; but it is primarily obedience which waives righteousness of one’s own.”55 The 
active dimension of faith includes confession not merely as a repentant acknowledgment of one’s 
sin, even if it includes this, but as a confession in the sense of witness and proclamation of who it is 
that the believer believes in. As he says, “’Faith’ is further insured against such misconceptions by 
the fact that it is simultaneously ‘confession.’ ‘Faith’ is ‘faith’ in . . .’ That is, it always has reference to its 
object, God’s saving deed in Christ.”56  
There are similarities to Karl Barth’s conception of faith as confession, but this also hints 
towards the intentional nature of faith that Bultmann on numerous occasions affirms. Faith is both 
epistemologically and ontologically intentionally directed at the person of Jesus Christ and as such 
cannot be reduced to any kind of general feeling, idea, or activity. As he goes on to describe, “Faith 
as response to the proclaimed word (which is called akon pisteos, ‘preaching of faith’), like that word 
itself, is part of the salvation-occurrence, the eschatological occurrence. As new possibility faith is the 
newly opened way of salvation. It is in this sense that the ‘principle of faith’ can be contrasted with 
the ‘principle of works’ (Rom. 3:27). Faith can also be said to ‘come’ and ‘to be revealed’ (Gal. 3:23, 
25).”57 As he goes on to say, 
This, of course, does not take from the concrete ‘faith’ of the individual that decision-
character which belongs to its very nature as ‘obedience’ (§ 35, 1). Nevertheless the concrete 
realization of the possibility of faith in the individual’s decision of faith is itself eschatological 
occurrence. Since the believer experiences the possibility of the faith-decision as grace, it is 
 
53 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 45-46. 
54 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 73. 
55 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 317. 
56 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 317. 
57 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 329. 
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only as a gift of grace that he can understand his decision—his own decision! And because 
he knows that it is God who accomplishes his willing and doing—his concrete, historical 
existing in ‘faith’—he is conscious not of being relieved of responsibility for it but on the 
contrary of being made responsible for it (Phil. 2:13f.; §35, 4).”58 
Faith then is understood as a gift and as a possibility that is not among the possibilities of natural 
existence alone. It happens within natural existence but is only made possible by the in-breaking 
grace of God within the world, and as such offers the possibility of an eschatological existence 
within historical (and we might add empirical) existence. The gift that is faith is not something inert 
or some “thing” that could be objectified. It is the gift of a possible way of existing that was not 
possible prior to encountering the grace of God. The believer is inherently and variously active 
throughout and is at the same time inherently dependent on God’s continued gracious presence in 
and for the believer. As Bultmann mentions,  
Thus, Paul can say that faith in Christ is ‘granted’ as a gift (Phil. 1:29). In fact, he can speak 
of it in downright predestinarian terms (Rom. 8:29; 9:6-29). If such statements about God’s 
‘foreknowing’ and ‘predestining’ or His ‘electing’ and ‘hardening’ be taken literally, an 
insoluble contradiction results, for a faith brought about by God outside of man’s decision 
would obviously not be genuine obedience. Faith is God-wrought to the extent that 
prevenient grace first made the human decision possible, with the result that he who has 
made the decision can only understand it as God’s gift; but that does not take its decision-
character away from it. Only so does the imperative, ‘be reconciled to God’ (II Cor. 5:20; § 
31) make sense. The predestinarian statements express the fact that the decision of faith 
does not, like other decisions, go back to this-worldly motives of any sort whatever—that, 
on the contrary, such motives lose all power of motivation in the presence of the 
encountered proclamation.59 
The agency of the believer is inherently involved in the act of faith, but it is involved in a way that 
cannot be described as autonomous or meritorious. Faith is portrayed to be the appropriation of the 
grace of God and as a reception of the Spirit which enables a new mode of existence within the 
believer’s existence in the world. As he says, “Faith’s obedient submission to God’s ‘grace,’ the 
acceptance of the cross of Christ, is the surrender of man’s old understanding of himself, in which 
he lives ‘unto himself,’ tries to achieve life by his own strength, and by that very fact falls victim to 
the powers of sin and death and loses himself (§§ 23, 24). Therefore, ‘faith’—as ‘obedience of 
faith’—is also released from these powers. The new self-understanding which is bestowed with 
 
58 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 329. 
59 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 329-330. 
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‘faith’ is that of freedom, in which the believer gains life and thereby his own self.”60 Again the believer 
is entirely active in her faith and in her faith with and for others in the world as a witness to God’s 
redemptive deed in Christ, but at the same time the believer is entirely and continually dependent on 
God, who is not of this world, and God’s continual activity of redemption, in which the believer 
continually participates.  
 In the second volume of his Theology of the New Testament Bultmann further describes the 
object of faith by describing the revelation that Christians believe in. He writes, “For the Revelation 
is represented as the shattering and negating of all human self-assertion and all human norms and 
evaluations. And, precisely by virtue of being such negation, the Revelation is the affirmation and 
fulfilment of human longing for life, for true reality. That the Revelation is this positive thing can 
only be seen by such a faith as overcomes the ‘offense’ and subjects itself to that negation, 
acknowledging its own blindness in order to receive sight (9:39).”61 One cannot help but wonder if 
some of this is a bit hyperbolic as if it were actually possible for revelation to be understood apart 
from all human norms and evaluations rather than critically and constructively through them. 
Insofar as those norms and evaluations are thoroughly self-assertive and sinfully rebellious rejecting 
this line of thinking makes some sense, but even the redemptive understanding of faith that 
overcomes the “offense” is by some means still understood through human norms and ways of 
evaluating even as they are redeemed and chastised by the revelatory action of God. At any rate, the 
point to be grasped here is that faith’s link to revelation and therefore to God as the object of faith 
is intimately tied to the “human longing for life, for true reality.” Continuing along with this line of 
thinking, however, Bultmann asserts that knowledge of the will of God for oneself and knowledge 
of faith’s object is only apparent, in its full significance, to those who have faith and relate to God in 
faith. 
 Bultmann states that, “Since it is to faith that it makes itself available as Revelation, the 
meaning of the Revelation can be further clarified by showing what happens when faith takes 
place.”62 The object of faith is Jesus Christ in his person and in his words. His deeds and his words 
constitute his identity and our understanding of him as the Revealer. As Bultmann says, “The 
identity of Jesus’ person with his word—or of his ‘work’ with his word—makes it possible for John 
 
60 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 330-331. 
61 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2 (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1955), 67-68. 
62 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 69. 
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to speak of ‘seeing’ just as he does of ‘hearing.’”63 As he goes on to explain, “The parallelism—or 
rather, identity—of believing, hearing, and seeing indicates by itself that sight to John is not mystical 
contemplation. Sight, or seeing, is to him faith’s perception: faith recognizes in the historical Jesus 
the ‘truth’ and ‘life’ which only he transmits and which therefore are not perceptible to direct 
contemplation.”64 
Similar to this the close relationship between believing, seeing, and hearing is a close identity 
with knowing and seeing. As Bultmann describes, “Sight, then, is the knowing that is peculiar to faith. 
Hence ‘see’ and ‘know’ can be combined or be used as alternatives.”65 As he goes on to say, “Faith is 
genuine only insofar as it is a knowing faith. This is expressed by Jesus’ promise of knowledge of the 
truth to believers if they loyally ‘abide’ in his ‘word’ (8:31f.). Genuine faith must not be confused 
with a seeming faith that is aroused by Jesus’ ‘signs’ . . . or may also be evoked by his discourse 
(8:30). Such faith may be a first tentative step toward him, but it has yet to prove itself as genuine 
faith. As ‘hearing’ the word must be supplemented by ‘keeping’ it, so genuine faith can be called 
‘keeping’ the word . . . or as ‘abiding in the word’ (8:31 tr.).”66 As he goes on to explain, faith is not 
something that is separate from knowledge, or something that merely leads to knowledge. Faith is 
inherently an act of knowing and as such is constituted inherently by knowledge. As he says, “Faith 
and knowledge, we conclude, cannot be distinguished as two stages. In the Christian Church there 
are not two classes of people, as there were among the Gnostics, who distinguished between ‘pistics’ 
(men of faith) and ‘gnostics’ (men of knowledge). Faith is not the acceptance of a dogma upon which 
there follows a disclosure of items of esoteric knowledge or a mystic vision. No, faith is everything. 
Knowledge cannot cut loose from faith and soar on out beyond it; faith, however, also contains 
knowledge—faith itself knows. Since for John all knowing can only be a knowing-in-faith, faith 
comes to itself, so to say, in knowing. Knowing is a structural aspect of believing.”67 This kind of 
knowledge, however, is not a disinterested, abstracted, or disengaged type of knowledge. It 
inherently includes a knowledge of oneself. As he states, “But this knowing is a believing knowledge, 
not one that stands off in aloof contemplation. Rather, it is such a knowledge that its possessor lets 
himself be determined by what he knows. It is an existing in what he knows; hence, his relation to 
 
63 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 72. 
64 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 72-73. 
65 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 73 
66 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 73. 
67 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 74. 
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what he thus knows can be expressed as a ‘being in’ or a ‘remaining in’ the Revealer of God (15:3f.; 
17:21).”68 The knowledge of faith is a wholly self-involving kind of knowledge that manifests itself in 
various ways in and by the believer throughout varying levels of explicit conscious awareness (this 
will be articulated further when dispositional accounts of believing are discussed). 
 For Bultmann the assurance of faith rests wholly on who and what the believer is believing 
in. As he says “faith’s assurance is both subjective and objective.”69 As he goes on to explain, “As 
subjective assurance it is described in the shepherd-discourse: the sheep know the shepherd’s voice 
and with sure instinct refuse to follow a stranger’s call (10:3-5, 8). . . . But as a faith that hears it finds 
its assurance not in itself, but in that in which it believes. . . . This assurance cannot be reduced to an 
experience within the world, and for that very reason it cannot be shaken.”70 The assurance that a 
believer enjoys is connected to the hearing of the word and as such has both objective and 
subjective dimensions. The subjective dimension is a resolve to believe the promises of the Gospel. 
The objective dimension is a trust in the reality, power, and trustworthiness of the God who makes 
those promises to and for the believer and is the object the ultimate object of trust for the believer. 
 Bultmann often speaks of the demand for faith or of the need to make a decision for faith. 
He even speaks of faith as decision. As he states, “This decision does not proceed from motives of 
this world, but is a decision against the world; it becomes a possibility only through the fact that 
God appears to man as He who is revealed in Jesus. Since this is so, the decision seems to be 
determined, but it is not (§43, 1). Admittedly, it is wrought by God, but not as if the working of God 
took place before faith or, so to speak, behind it; rather, God’s working takes place exactly in it. . . . 
In making its decision, faith understands itself as a gift.”71 In another instance he writes that,  
The demand for faith, therefore, is the demand that the world surrender the understanding it 
has had of itself hitherto—that it let the whole structure of its security which it has erected 
in presumptuous independence (§42; § 44) of the Creator fall to ruins. The inner unity of this 
demand with Paul’s concept of faith (§35) is clear in spite of its orientation against other 
antitheses than his. Faith is turning away from the world, the act of desecularization, the 
surrender of all seeming security and every pretense, the willingness to live by the strength of 
the invisible and uncontrollable. It means accepting completely different standards as to 
 
68 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 78. 
69 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 77. 
70 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 77-78. 
71 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 76-77. 
83 
 
what is to be called death and what life. It means accepting the life that Jesus has and is 
(5:19ff.; 11:25f.)—a life that to the world’s point of view cannot even be proved to exist.72 
The act of “desecularization” is a description of the implicit dimension of explicit faith that that is 
not often mentioned in line with Bultmann’s understanding of the nature of faith. It is entirely in 
line with his understanding of faith as eschatological existence and as obedience to the Lordship of 
Christ. The Christian does not ultimately rely on worldly security, but ultimately on the security that 
the true life offered by Christ promises. This again is also in line with Bultmann’s understanding of 
faith as the restoration of belief in the world as creation and in an understanding of oneself as God’s 
creature. Before one is too quick to take this act of desecularization to entail a flight from this world, 
in a dualistic manner affirming only the value of the other world with a complete disregard for the 
present, Bultmann states that “Faith is not a dualistic world-view.”73 By which he means that “Faith is 
not flight from the world nor asceticism, but desecularization in the sense of a smashing of all human 
standards and evaluations. It is in this sense that the believer is no longer ‘of the world’ (15:19; 
17:14, 16); i.e. since the world is no longer his determining origin (§ 43, 2), he no longer belongs to 
it.”74 As he goes on to say, “But their not being ‘of the world’ must not be confused with a retreat 
out of the world. Jesus prays to the Father: ‘I do not pray that thou shouldst take them out of the 
world, but that thou should keep them from evil’ (17:15). As God sent him into the world, so he 
sends his own into the world (17:18), not out of it.”75 Continuing with the theme of desecularization 
he writes that “As an overcoming of the offense and as a decision against the world faith is 
desecularization, transition into eschatological existence. In the midst of the world the believer is lifted out 
of secular existence—though he is still ‘in the world,’ he is no longer ‘of the world’ (17:11, 14, 16).”76 
 Going back to the relationship between faith and knowledge, or between believing and 
knowing, Bultmann takes time to articulate the developmental nature of the knowledge of faith as he 
engages with Paul and John’s theology. As he says,  
For the believer must, of course, understand what is proclaimed to him about God and 
Christ and also how his own situation is thereby qualified. The theological expositions in 
Galatians and Romans have no other purpose than to unfold the knowledge which is the 
concomitant gift of faith. Paul clearly saw that this knowledge is not merely capable of 
 
72 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 75. 
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development, but also stands in need of development. Faith must prove itself to be living 
faith by reaching in each case a right judgment as to what is required of the man of faith, for 
whatever does not come from faith is sin (Rom. 14:23). Paul wishes for his readers that their 
power of judgment may grow and gain in certainty.77 
There is inherently, then, within the character of Christian believing a capacity for growth and 
development. Faith and Christian belief are not inert phenomena or static possessions. They are a 
dynamic way of living and thinking that are theologically normed by the Lordship of Christ and 
theologically enabled by God’s gracious activity, but the character of Christian believing is inherently 
embedded, embodied, and enacted in the particular circumstances of particular believers. In a certain 
sense there will be both a continuity and discontinuity amongst believers. There will be similarity in 
that all their faith is directed at Christ, but there will be slight novelty in that the demand and 
opportunity to work out their salvation in the character of Christian believing which will be 
conditioned by their concrete situations (and just as no situation is completely or entirely unique 
there will also always be points of continuity amidst the different situations). As Bultmann 
continues, “Such ‘knowledge’ or ‘wisdom’ is the knowledge of God’s will; i.e. the power of judgment 
that lies within the Christian’s ethical willing and which it is every believer’s duty to cultivate and 
activate.”78 
          For Bultmann the New Testament itself is an example and a witness to the developing nature 
of the Christian faith. However, this faith is not Christian faith without an understanding of God as 
determining both its manner of believing and the content of what faith believes in. The self-
understanding of the believer is always understood in its relationship to an understanding of God as 
presented in the message and person of Jesus Christ. As he says, “For in the New Testament, faith is 
not understood as a self-understanding arising spontaneously out of human existence but as an 
 
77 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 128. 
78 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 129. Towards the end of the volume Bultmann 
states that, “The most important thing is that basic insight that the theological thoughts of the New 
Testament are the unfolding of faith itself growing out of that new understanding of God, the 
world, and man which is conferred in and by faith—or, as it can also be phrased: out of one’s new self 
understanding. For by the believer’s new understanding of himself we, of course, do not mean 
‘understanding as in a scientific anthropology which objectifies man into a phenomenon of the 
world, but we do mean an existential understanding of myself which is at one with and inseparable 
from my understanding of God and the world. For I am I, of course, not as an isolable and 
objectifiable world-phenomenon but I am I in my particular existence inseparably bound up with 
God and the world” (Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 2, 239). 
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understanding made possible by God, opened up by His dealing with men. Faith is not choosing to 
understand one’s self in one of several possible ways that are universally available to man but is 
man’s response to God’s word which encounters him in the proclamation of Jesus Christ. It is faith 
in the kerygma, which tells of God’s dealing in the man Jesus of Nazareth.”79  
 
Further Insights from Bultmann’s other Occasional Writings 
It is a common occurrence in Bultmann’s writings for him to speak about faith as obedience. The 
obedience that characterizes faith is primarily a willingness and desire to be of service to God’s 
redemptive activity in the world. 80 It is also common in Bultmann (as well as Barth) to speak of 
humility as an important implicit dimension of explicit faith. In both thinkers humility and 
obedience are closely linked but Bultmann here further describes why. In line with this readiness for 
service Bultmann states that “One aspect of faith is . . . the renunciation of all self-glorification in 
the presence of God, and the readiness to accept from God this endowment of ‘justification’, 
recognition and honour. For this very reason Paul is also able to designate faith as obedience 
(hupakoe) because, in this very renunciation of one’s own achievements, it is a radical submission to 
God. But in its other aspect faith is absolute trust, confidence in the grace of God—and Paul is 
certain of it when he looks at Christ.”81 In this characterization faith is safeguarded from any type of 
boasting, which would be counter to the nature of faith as humility and as obedience. 
          Again, another implicit dimension of explicit faith that Bultmann speaks of is a proper 
detachment from the world even as one continues to live in the world and for its wellbeing and this 
too is closely linked with a proper humility. This is also closely tied to the implicit dimension of 
desecularization that Bultmann also speaks about. In his essay entitled “The Understanding of Man” 
Bultmann states that “Belief means, as the anticipation of every possible future, the taking of man out of 
the world, and his ingrafting into eschatological existence. In this way it gives to the man of faith a 
peculiar detachment from the world:”82 This detachment is made possible by God’s grace. As he 
states in his essay “Grace and Freedom,” for Paul “Faith is regulated by the grace of God become 
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manifest in Christ.”83 As he expands upon this he writes, “What ‘by faith’ means is already made 
clear by this. Faith is the attitude opposed to that urge for recognition—the radical abandonment of 
self-glorification, of the desire for recognition by one’s own strength and achievement. It is the 
knowledge that the recognition which makes him secure for himself and in the presence of God can 
only be gifted.”84 As he continues to explain, “The simple surrender to God’s grace in renunciation 
of the desire for recognition is faith. And God’s grace is simply his goodness which recognizes man 
just as he is, and does not demand that he should make himself a better creature and one more 
worthy of recognition, but makes him a new and better creature by its acceptance of him as he is.”85 
Interestingly enough, however, in this essay Bultmann believes that this type of understanding of 
faith as “simple surrender to God’s grace” is counter to also believing certain propositions about the 
nature of Christ. As he says, “if we understand by faith in Christ the holding of certain dogmatic 
propositions as true, for example propositions about Christ’s being son of God, about his pre-
existence, his natures and so on, then one cannot, in fact, understand how such faith is said to be 
opposed to works. And the real understanding of faith was and is often obscured in the Church by 
its being reckoned as the holding of such dogmas to be true.”86 One might wish for Bultmann to 
further work out how this “simple surrender to God’s grace” relates to an intentional understanding 
of Jesus Christ that does also include a particular way of believing certain statements about Christ 
even if the believer’s relationship to those statements is more than a disinterested awareness or 
assent. But here Bultmann does not work this out and remains content to criticize such abstract 
propositions as they relate to belief in Christ. 
           In this essay however he further describes how obedience relates to the overcoming of pride. 
He writes, “Obedience is faith because it is the abandonment of pride, and man’s tearing himself 
free from himself—because it is surrender in pure trust, a trust without a guarantee, trust in God,”87 
and he continues to say that “Obedience and trust are at the deepest level one thing. Obedience is not 
vigorous self-control to achieve a work, but the abandonment of all power, submission to God, and 
readiness to receive from him every power as a gift. Faith is not a trust in God in general terms—
that is, the confidence that God will help me here and there, in this and that—but it is radical 
 
83 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 168. 
84 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 171. 
85 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 173. 
86 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 173. 
87 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 175. 
87 
 
surrender to God’s will, which is unknown to me before it happens, . . . Such faith, embracing 
obedience and trust, is therefore man’s decision against himself and for God, and as such, faith is an 
act.88 The act of faith as it is characterized simultaneously as obedience and trust is directed away 
from reliance on one’s own sinful self and toward a self-forgetful reliance on God.  
          Crucially (for beginning to better understand how we can go about understanding the agency 
of the believer in faith) in this essay Bultmann also goes on to describe the difference between an act 
and a work. As he says, “Indeed, the less faith is a ‘work’, the more it is an act; and it will now 
perhaps be clear in what the difference consists: in the case of the ‘work’ I remain the man I am; I 
place it outside myself, I go along beside it, I can assess it, condemn it or be proud of it. But in the 
act I become something for the first time: I find my being in it, live in it and do not stand alongside it. 
If I were to seek to look at myself and my act, I would destroy the act as an act, and degrade it into a 
‘work’”89 (this important distinction will be touched on again in further detail when we engage his 
Theologische Enzyklopädie where he talks about this at greater length). He goes on to talk about how 
faith as a free act relates to faith as a decision. Bultmann states that,  
In the decision to believe it is not the same as is normally the case in other decisions of life 
(which can, of course, also take on the character of decisions to believe from time to time), 
that is, it is not the case that man remains the same in it, and comes to his decision on the 
basis of considerations which remain outside the sphere of the decision—considerations 
which have force for him in all circumstances. Rather are all the considerations which 
otherwise have a motivating power for a man uprooted in the decision to believe, and are 
called in question and called to decision, so that man is entirely free—stands, as it were, in 
the open. Belief comes to pass in the abandonment of all security, and it is just that which 
distinguishes it from ‘works’. Man cannot understand his act of belief as an established work 
of his own purposeful activity, but simply as a God-given free act.”90 
In that sense the decision character of faith is such that it calls all other decisions that a person 
might have throughout one’s daily living (the various activities and tasks one undertakes and the 
various persons one comes into contact with) under the normative decision of the character of 
Christian believing. The decision of faith is a decision that is normatively and transformatively 
embedded and embodied within the various decisions of the believer’s life. Faith in this manner is 
normative for the entirety of one’s existence. In terms of theological understandings of the 
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relationship between human action and divine action Bultmann states that “Human freedom and 
divine grace are therefore not mutually exclusive; nor are they, as it were, added up or co-operating 
as two factors; they are a unity. Indeed we must say that it is only divine grace that is responsible for man’s 
real freedom.”91 
          The grace that is appropriated in the decision of faith is freedom from one’s sinful self for the 
restoration of the believer and for others. In this Bultmann emphasizes the significant role that 
bondage to sin plays in the believer’s bondage to various external demands and temptations. It is 
through this faith that believers begin to become free of bondage for themselves and for others. As 
he concisely states, “In this way dependence on God’s grace, and being given over to it, far from 
limiting our freedom, actually makes us in a real sense free.”92 True freedom is dependent on God’s 
grace, which is appropriated in faith, and because of that Bultmann makes the further statement that 
“All action apart from faith is basically inessential, in so far that in it we remain our old selves, even 
when from time to time we become, relatively speaking, new.”93 According to Bultmann, the 
reception of grace in faith is what makes our free decisions and action “essential.” As he goes on to 
say “the imperative to act as new men has gained meaning for us. Freedom remains dependence; that 
is, standing in grace is not a closed condition, but a gift constantly grasped in freedom. And it is 
constantly grasped again afresh in our knowing ourselves to be subject to the imperative, to act as 
new men. Now there is sense in saying ‘work out your own salvation in fear and trembling. For it is 
God which worketh in you both to will and to do his good pleasure.”94 
          In his essay “Faith as Venture” we find similar themes brought out concerning the nature of 
faith as are found elsewhere in Bultmann’s corpus. As he writes, “For faith does not mean to accept 
the proclamation of God’s forgiving love and to be convinced of its truth in general, but rather to 
regulate one’s life by it.”95 Lest we misunderstand this statement, however, Bultmann goes on to 
explain it further. He mentions that “this does not mean to possess this conviction alongside of 
others as the most valuable and most important and occasionally or even frequently to reflect on it 
and to take comfort from it; rather it means to let my concrete now be determined by the 
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proclamation and faith in it.”96 Here Bultmann again articulates the embedded and embodied 
character of Christian believing and the implicit dimensions of faith that make explicit faith in Christ 
what it is in reality. As he continues, “If the proclamation of God’s forgiving love is really valid for 
me, i.e., for me in my concrete life situation, then it is not at all understandable apart from that 
situation. And I am not to believe in general—also to believe alongside of or behind my other 
relationships—but rather am to believe here and now as one who has something to do (or to endure) 
and who is to do this thing in faith—who is to venture what he does in faith and venture his faith in what he 
does.”97 Again we see that the character of Christian believing for Bultmann is one that is embedded, 
embodied, and enacted in one’s historical and social situation, but which nevertheless is not 
reducible to one’s social or historical situation as this faith is manifested in relation to God’s 
encounter with the believer in the world. Bultmann goes so far as to say that if one does not 
understand one’s faith within one’s everyday affairs one does not actually have genuine faith. As he 
states, “However, this faith would not be genuine if the everyday affairs in which I once again 
shortly find myself and for which the word is spoken do not appear in its light. If I do not allow my 
concrete present to be qualified by the word that is spoken to me, then I have not really believed it 
for all of my hearing. Only when I now actually understand myself and my situation in terms of the 
word, only when I now see or venture to see my neighbor in the other person who encounters me, 
only then have I believed and do I believe now.”98 As he later goes on to affirm, the venture of faith 
only takes place as a venture in faith. As he states,  
But it must be said just as definitely that there is no venture in faith that is not 
simultaneously a venture of faith. For otherwise one would come out with exactly as abstract 
and general a faith as before. What would it mean to say that I might venture something in 
faith if I did not in so doing venture to believe? It would mean that here, too, faith was 
understood as a conviction or a state of feeling that lies behind my actual life instead of being 
at work in it. It would mean that faith was thought of as a possession of my ‘inner life’ at 
which I could look and from which I could then look away to my ‘tasks and duties, 
exigencies and temptations.’ No, I ‘have’ faith only when I have it ever anew in my duties 
and exigencies.99 
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In further reflecting on the nature of faith he acknowledges that the notion of “having faith” is 
much different than “having money and goods or having convictions and feelings.” Rather just as 
“one does not ‘have’ friendship or love except as something that is daily new” so one does not have 
faith except as one participates in or is characterized by it anew each day.100  
          In his essay “The Historicity of Man and Faith” Bultmann helpfully articulates his 
understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology, which is pertinent to how we 
go about understanding the character of Christian believing. This is particularly helpful not only 
because he uses philosophical concepts to articulate his understanding of theological matters (and is 
often charged for illegitimately doing so), but also because this project draws on philosophical 
insights as it seeks to offer a dogmatically informed description that at the same time uses 
philosophical insight in its goal to provide a sufficiently nuanced understanding of the holistic 
character of Christian believing in order to better understand why believing is centrally significant. 
As Bultmann mentions in this essay,  
In the sense indicated, then, theology does indeed ‘repeat’ the work of philosophy; and it 
must repeat it if what happens in the Christian occurrence that is realized in faith, in ‘rebirth,’ 
is not a magical transformation that removes the man of faith from his humanity. It must do 
it if existence in unfaith is both annulled and preserved in existence in faith. If, through faith, 
existence prior to faith is overcome existentially or ontically, this still does not mean that the 
existential or ontological conditions of existing are destroyed. Theologically expressed, faith 
is not a new quality that inheres in the believer, but rather a possibility of man that must 
constantly be laid hold of anew because man only exists by constantly laying hold of his 
possibilities. The man of faith does not become an angel, but is simul peccator, simul justus. 
Therefore, all of the basic Christian concepts have a content that can be determined 
ontologically prior to faith and in a purely rational way. All theological concepts contain the 
understanding of being that belongs to man as such and by himself insofar as he exists at all. 
Thus theology should indeed learn from philosophy . . .’101 
In this we have the beginnings of an articulation of theology and of faith as the renewal and 
restoration of human existence. Neither are entirely new but a reworking of the old in light of God’s 
revelation in the world. If this type of thinking is not affirmed, then one is hard pressed to uphold 
the continuity of identity between the man of “unfaith” and the man of faith, between a theology 
that is done in the world in the midst of God’s accommodation to human understanding, or one 
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that is entirely devoid of any possibility of human understanding. This line of thinking qualifies some 
of Bultmann’s more hyperbolic statements concerning the nature of faith as the only way to true 
knowledge of God. Despite the rhetoric, this content of faith, the intentional dimension of 
understanding the significance of Christ, is only ever understood through human language and 
through the concepts and ways of understanding that are embedded within that. This will be 
important for future chapters when we focus on the linguistic content of Christian believing as it 
relates to the believer’s holistic appropriation and transformation.  
As Bultmann importantly continues to say, 
But what I cannot concede to him [Kuhlmann] is that the theological explication of existence 
in faith may not fall back on the philosophical analysis of man. On the contrary, I affirm that 
this is precisely what theology must do if it at all wants to clarify existence in faith in a 
conceptual way, i.e., if it wants to be a science and not merely a sermon. That there has to be 
theology as a science in addition to preaching is, to be sure, neither to be deduced from an 
idea of science nor to be established by the philosophical analysis of existence. For the latter, 
theology is indeed ‘superfluous.’ Theology can have its basis only in the man of faith. Only 
faith can motivate applying oneself to a science that undertakes a conceptual interpretation 
of existence in faith, and so theology can only be a movement of faith itself.102 
Theology and one’s understanding and appropriation of Christ as the Revealer always takes place in 
our world, which is constituted by the languages, concepts, and cultures that make us who we are 
and form the medium and capacity for intelligent and responsible understanding. Again, Christ 
encounters believers in their concrete situations not in the abstract, nor does he do so in an isolated 
fashion. The revelation of Christ makes a claim on believers with normative implications for all of 
life, which is constituted by God (who becomes present within creation but is also beyond creation) 
and the concrete particularities of one’s various situations in creation that constitute the identities 
and cognitive capacities of believers.103  
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Given the situated nature of all human understanding the normativity of theological understanding 
unavoidably goes back and forth, reminiscent of notions of the hermeneutical circle. One can only 
understand Christ as the Revealer in light of how one already understands oneself in one’s world. 
Furthermore, one can only understand Christ’s normative claim on one’s life through Christ’s 
appropriation and accommodation of the concepts and way of understanding that the believer 
understands. Bultmann goes so far as to say that “What ‘revelation’ means in general cannot be any 
more exactly and completely specified by the man of faith than by any man of unfaith. Every man, 
because he knows about death, can also know about revelation and life, grace and forgiveness.”104 
But as Bultmann has frequently argued, the genuine character of Christian believing is not merely 
concerned with what revelation, or knowledge of God, means “in general.” And this is not 
necessarily (although in some cases it may indeed) to classify such general knowledge as false. As he 
goes on to say,  
What “more,” then, does the man of faith know? This—that revelation has actually 
encountered him, that he really lives, that he is in fact graced, that he is really forgiven and 
will always be so. And he knows this in such a way that by faith in the revelation his concrete 
life in work and in joy, in struggle and in pain is newly qualified; he knows that through the 
event of revelation the events of his life become new—“new” in a sense that is valid only for 
the man of faith and visible only to him, that indeed only becomes visible in the now and thus 
must always become visible anew. The only new thing that faith and faith alone is able to say 
about revelation is that it has become an event and becomes an event. And what theology 
can do is, on the one hand, to say the very same thing and, on the other hand, to undertake 
the conceptual explication of such speaking about the event of revelation, to the end that the 
man of faith will have critical knowledge of himself and that preaching will actually speak of 
revelation and faith.105 
Since genuine faith is more than having a general awareness or even assent to information anyone 
who remains merely on that level is said to not know God and to not have faith, and as such this 
further dimension of genuine faith and knowledge of God is invisible to those who do not 
themselves exist in faith. As Bultmann continues to talk about revelation as the object of faith he 
writes,  
If the revelation of which faith and theology speak is an event, then it is not an ‘original 
mode of being,’ ‘a way of existing that stands open to man “in and of himself.”’ Nor is grace 
‘a disposable quality of the natural man.’ The knowledge about what revelation is in general 
and man’s knowledge about his dependence on revelation (or the denial of this) is indeed a 
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knowledge on the basis of the ‘lumen natural.’ And this knowledge has no need of the 
‘clarification’ of the gospel, however certain it is that from the hearing of the gospel such 
clarification of the natural man can actually be derived and can be appropriated by 
philosophy—just as an actual friendship can also actualize the ‘preunderstanding’ of 
friendship and further its conceptual explication. Whatever the man of faith acquires 
through such ‘clarification,’ however, then stands open also to the understanding of unfaith. 
This is so, on the one hand, because ontological analysis will become all the more certain and 
complete the richer the ontic experience and, on the other hand, because every ontic 
experience (as an experience of man) has the ontological conditions of its possibility in the 
human structure and therefore can be understood as possible on the basis of this structure.106 
In this Bultmann affirms an interaction between philosophy and theology that does not reduce the 
one into the other, even if they can both contribute to further developments in their respective 
fields.  
          However, he goes on to state that faith receives a clarification of profane existence of which is 
invisible to philosophy and this clarification could be said to be another implicit dimension of 
explicit faith. As he states, “It is a ‘clarification,’ namely, that does indeed permit ‘profane’ existence 
to appear as ‘always already graced.’ Of course, philosophy can even ‘understand’ this in the formal 
sense, just as well as it can understand that in actual friendship my eyes are opened with respect to 
my past so that I recognize what was genuine in it and what was not. But only the man of faith 
understands (in the ontic or existentiell sense) profane existence as graced. This does not mean, 
however, that ‘the humanum has again become theos,’ but rather that the natural man is again 
discovered as a creature of God.”107 What is made visible in hindsight to those who have faith, 
which is not visible apart from faith, is also that existence before faith “does not stand in a neutral 
sphere so that if it is to be moved to love, it must first undergo a miraculous transformation. Love is 
not caritas infusa, but rather is from the outset an ontological possibility of human existence of which 
man dimly knows. Faith is from the outset an ontological possibility of man that appears in the 
resolve of despair. It is this that makes it possible for man to understand when he is encountered by 
the kerygma. For in willing to resolve man wills to believe and to love.”108 With recognizable 
Heideggerian motifs Bultmann writes that, “being limited by death so far from simply ceases for the 
man of faith that it rather constantly appears and must constantly be overcome in faith and in 
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love.”109 As he goes on to describe, “As faith is coming under the eyes of God, so love is the 
resolution that lays hold of the situation, and hope, the being ahead of oneself in care, in which one is 
concerned for himself, but in which this ‘for himself,’ while not destroyed, is left in the hands of 
God. And by the same token, joy is nothing other than the anxiety that motivates man (as the latter is 
anxious about ‘nothing,’ so joy rejoices in ‘nothing’) in a specific modification, namely, as 
‘overcome.’”110 Here once could argue that while love, hope, and joy are not reducible to faith they 
are possible implicit dimensions of explicit faith in Christ. 
          In Bultmann’s essay “Romans 7 and the Anthropology of Paul” he makes a few comments 
that are worth noting for the purposes of better understanding his conception of the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing in order to better 
understand why belief is centrally significant in and for Christianity. Firstly, he attacks what he terms 
“subjectivistic anthropology” as being counter to the anthropology of Paul and, in consequence, 
counter to his understanding of anthropology. As he says, “This non-Pauline anthropology—I will 
refer to it in brief as the subjectivistic anthropology—presupposes that the ‘willing’ of which Paul 
speaks is the willing that is actualized in the individual acts of will of the subject who is lord of his 
subjectivity; in short, it presupposes that the willing is conscious. This presupposition is false. For man 
is not primarily viewed by Paul as a conscious subject; the propensities of man’s willing and doing 
which give him his character are not at all the strivings of his subjectivity. Rather, according to Paul’s 
view, human existence transcends the sphere of consciousness.”111 This is an important point to 
note in order to avoid overly intellectualist and reductively cognitive accounts of Christian believing. 
As he continues to point out, ““Thus it seems clear, first of all, that the ‘willing’ of which Paul 
speaks is not a movement of the will that lies in the sphere of subjectivity, any more than—as is 
clear without any question—are the ‘thinking’ and the ‘mind’ of Rom. 8:5-7, 8:27 and the ‘desiring’ 
of Gal. 5:17. Rather this ‘willing’ is the trans-subjective propensity of human existence as such.”112 
This is important for our interest in the character of Christian believing insofar as it alludes to an 
intentional mode of being that is present beyond conscious reflection. In so far as faith and 
Christian believing involve the will of the believer, which can be found in Bultmann’s multiple 
motifs (e.g. obedience, decision, deed, etc.), this then gives us precedent to begin to understand faith 
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itself as a “trans-subjective propensity” or as a holistic and wholly self-involving way of existing in 
light of the revelation encountered in Jesus Christ, which consists of more than conscious reflection 
even if it sometimes in some cases manifests in conscious awareness of various aspects of the 
contents of belief in Christ.  
          In Bultmann’s essay “The Task of Theology in the Present Situation,” written in 1933 and 
originally delivered as a lecture, he writes that “as theologians in the service of the church, we have 
to develop the basis and meaning of Christian faith for our generation, the first thing we must do is 
to reflect on what is in principle the relation of faith to nation and state, or the relation between the 
life of faith and life in the political order” and as he continues to say, “this relation is determined by 
faith’s being directed to the God who is Creator and Judge of the world and its Redeemer in Jesus 
Christ.”113 This importantly notes the close relationship between the character of Christian believing 
and the believer’s socio-political existence. As he later goes on to describe, “Faith in the Creator is 
not a philosophical theory or a world-view that one has in the background of his concrete 
experience and action, but rather is something that we are to realize precisely in our experience and 
action as obedience to our Lord. That God is the Creator means that man’s action is not determined 
by timeless principles, but rather by the concrete situation of the moment,” 114 of which God as 
creator has placed or enabled one to be in. Here again we find Bultmann’s rejection of abstract and 
objectified understandings of the nature of faith that are understood to be behind or above one’s 
concrete existence in the world. God, however, who encounters us in the world remains beyond it 
and not reducible to it. As Bultmann goes on to state, “God stands beyond the world. Therefore, 
however much faith understands the world as his creation, indeed, precisely because it understands 
the world as his creation, it acquires a peculiar relation of distance to the world.”115 In this sense 
faith has a critical relationship to the world as it stands in sin and depravity. As he later continues, 
“Christian faith must be a critical power in the present discussion, and it must prove its essentially 
positive character precisely in its critical stance. How can it do this? Well, it can do it because it knows 
not only about sin, but also about grace—because it knows God not only as the Judge, but also as the 
Redeemer, who through Jesus Christ restores his original creation. Redemption through Jesus Christ 
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means the forgiveness of sins through the revelation of the love of God, and therefore also means 
the freeing of man to love in return.”116 
 
          In his “The Meaning of the Christian Faith in Creation” Bultmann moves on to talk again 
about the decision character of believing. Beyond repeating what he has many times said elsewhere 
in his corpus, what is of particular interest in this essay is how Bultmann further explains how 
historical existence is necessarily also social existence, and both are constitutive, in a non-reductive 
way, of the character of Christian believing. As he writes at length,  
 
Man’s historical existence has this character because it only takes place with others, in relation 
to whom one must make concrete decisions. Man stands in a historical world in which he is 
bound together with concrete human beings. It is in relation to them that he is responsible, 
not to some universal law or Idea. In this responsibility he wins his true dignity because in it 
he ventures himself and, through surrender, wins himself. Through these concrete bonds 
there arise the possibilities that give to my life its richness, or else destroy it. For in this 
existence with others there is either trust and love or mistrust and hate. Here one either gives 
himself to the other or refuses himself; he either hears the other’s claim or ignores it. And 
none of this, through which man becomes rich or poor and determines his character one 
way or the other—none of this happens according to rules that are at the disposal of 
thinking; it cannot be calculated, but rather constantly demands action, venture, surrender. 
Thus, in all of this, man is constantly insecure. Our mutual ties are not something at our 
disposal, but rather always stand in danger. Love is possessed neither in giving nor in 
receiving in the way in which one possesses an insight or a conviction. It is not methodically 
learned and developed, but only grows in the concrete encounter with its decisions, when I 
hear the other and exist from him by giving and from him by receiving. And when once love 
has appeared, it is not simply there, nor does it develop with the immanent necessity of 
logical thought. Rather it ‘develops’ only through constantly new tests and decisions; it only 
is in that it is constantly laid hold of anew by constantly hearing anew the claim of the 
thou.”117 
 
In this sense the identity of the believer in faith is inherently tied to her relationships and encounters 
that make up her social life in the midst of her particular historical existence. In this sense the 
person’s identity or self-understanding might be rooted in the believer’s encounter with and faith in 
Christ as the Revealer of her identity, but this identity is at the same time always evolving and 
developing afresh as it is itself dynamic and constituted by her relationships with others and her 
ongoing activities in her specific situations in the world. The decision of faith is simultaneously a 
decision to love others and to grow in love towards others. As Bultmann again affirms, in line with 
 
116 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 162. 
117 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 214-215. 
97 
 
this understanding of faith as embedded and enacted within both historical and social existence, that 
the knowledge that is included in such a faith in creation  
is not a knowledge, however, that could prove faith in creation to the understanding; for it is 
not at all a knowledge that has been acquired by the understanding or that proceeds from 
rational bases. Rather it has grown out of reflection on human existence. Whether everyone 
so discovers his nature when he reflects on it must be left to him. All the Christian 
proclamation can do is to point it out to him and ask him if he understands himself in this 
way, if he is willing to acknowledge that this is true of him. Without such an 
acknowledgment, however, i.e., without the acknowledgment that man is a being who lives 
in time, in history, and in responsible relation with others and therefore is insecure and not 
at his own disposal—without this acknowledgment, there also is no faith in God the 
creator.”118 
This knowledge of creation as it is understood to be a structural element of faith, like all knowledge 
of faith, is dependent on an encounter with the event of revelation of Christ. It is not something that 
can be discerned or ascertained apart from such revelation. As he states, “Faith in the Creator can never 
be possessed once for all as a reassuring insight, but must constantly be won and realized anew. For if, in receiving 
forgiving grace, I receive my selfhood as a being from God, then I must at the same time understand 
and realize it as a being for God, i.e., as a life in love that I have to fulfill in my personal relations with 
others.”119 Again the inherently social dimension of and individual’s faith is highlighted, along with 
the continual assertion that faith is something that develops and is sustained ever anew; since it is 
not an objectified entity of any kind, but is itself a dynamic manner of existing in light of God’s 
revelation and grace. As he goes on to state, “Just as faith in creation is only possible on the basis of 
faith in redemption, so also can a man truly serve his nation only if he has been set free to love by 
receiving the love of God in Christ.”120 Furthermore, as he reiterates, “Thus the Christian faith sees 
the uncanny in evil, over which man does not become lord and which can only be overcome by faith 
in God’s forgiveness, by the faith that works through love. Such faith, however, is not mere 
knowledge of a dogma. The rational understanding of the Christian proclamation and the Christian 
faith in creation, which we have here been at pains to develop, has to achieve its true meaning in 
existentiell understanding. Thus Christian faith in creation must constantly be won and realized anew 
in the decision of the moment.”121 
 
118 Bultmann, Existence and Faith, 215-216. 
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          In another essay, “Liberal Theology and the Latest Theological Movement,” Bultmann 
instructively looks at the relationship between faith and states of consciousness in conversation with 
Karl Barth. As he says,  
 
Barth’s divergence is shown most plainly in his consistent emphasis on the truth that faith is 
not a state of consciousness. No doubt, along with faith there is also a state of consciousness—at 
least there can be. But as long as it is a state of consciousness it cannot be faith. To speak of 
the faith of men is to accept the full paradox of asserting something which cannot be 
affirmed of by any visible man, something which is completely unverifiable as a spiritual 
situation and which must never be identified with any such situation. From this concept of 
faith arises the polemic against all ‘religion of experience’, against piety, sense of sin, and 
inspiration. Hence comes the utter skepticism of religion as such, since religion claims to be 
a particular area of human spiritual life in which inheres the relation of man to God. On the 
contrary, the real truth is that what is confessed in faith is the calling in question of the whole 
man by God. The justified man, the new man, is believed in faith.122 
 
In this Bultmann seems to affirm that a state of consciousness is not a “structural component” of 
faith like knowledge is but is rather something that can coexist with faith at certain times and at 
certain points. In the latter part Bultmann affirms that faith cannot be reduced simply to religious 
practice as nor is it visible to anyone in the world regardless of whether or not they have faith. The 
close relationship between faith as eschatological existence within historical existence will need to be 
investigated and articulated further in the next chapter, since Bultmann seems to be walking a fine 
line here. Both Bultmann and Barth do not do enough to show how the character of Christian 
believing relates to various states of consciousness and this is something that dispositional analyses 
of believing will help with in the final chapter of this thesis.123 
 
122 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 50. 
123 Furthermore, in Bultmann’s essay “What Does it Mean to Speak of God?” he states that “our 
own faith can never be a standing ground on which we can establish ourselves. Faith is continually a 
fresh act, a new obedience. It always becomes uncertain again as soon as we observe ourselves from 
outside as men and begin to question ourselves. It is always uncertain as soon as we reason about it, 
as soon as we talk about it. Only in act is it sure. It is always sure as faith in the grace of God who 
forgives sin and who, if he pleases, justifies me who cannot speak from God but can only undertake 
to speak about God. All our action and speech has meaning only under the grace of the forgiveness 
of sins. And that is not within our control. We can only have faith in it” (Bultmann, Faith and 
Understanding I, 64-65). Here again Bultmann affirms the dependence of the believer on the object of 
their faith for their assurance and security, and this faith is portrayed to be something that only exists 
ever anew in deeds of the moment. Kierkegaardian motifs have been present throughout our 
exposition of Bultmann’s thought in this chapter, and in his “On the Question of Christology” he 
affirms that one of his goals is to “turn theology away from the false paths of idealism . . . and 
mysticism . . . , and thereby to make fruitful the theological work of Kierkegaard” (Bultmann, Faith 
and Understanding I, 116). 
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In “What Does it Mean to Speak of God?”  Bultmann affirms the inherently communal 
nature of the content of Christian faith in an attempt to avoid and entirely irrational conception. As 
he states, “In reality, however, these truths—no matter how strongly one may emphasize their 
supra-rationality and anti-rationality—never lose their rational character. For if revelation is seen 
only in the anti-rational, then it becomes the private concept of the individual; that is, its teachings 
have the character of revelation only in so far as their rational character has a negative sign. The 
‘faith by which we believe’ is therefore ultimately the resolve to hold as ‘true’ ‘truths’ which are not 
rational. This is self-deception, for one cannot consider as ‘true’ what is contrary to reason, as W. 
Herrmann was never tired of insisting.”124 As he goes on to say, “Faith in a doctrine is an 
impossibility. One can only understand a doctrine (critically) or submit to it by a deliberate resolve. 
In so far as we speak of faith as ‘trust’ (fiducia), the knowledge and acceptance of ‘pure doctrine’ are 
subsequent to it. This kind of theology forgets that the only possible access to the ‘faith which is 
believed’ is the ‘faith by which one believes’; and that the ‘pure doctrine’ can be developed only as a 
doctrine seen in faith.”125 This rejection of improperly focusing on the propositions and doctrines as 
the object of faith, however, has had equally problematic overreaction. As he states, “Thus it is 
understandable that theology since Schleiermacher rejects this confusion of faith with theology and 
the actual elimination of faith from theology which resulted, and sees the object of theology as faith, 
the ‘faith by which one believes’. But it goes to the other extreme. In opposition to the orthodox 
view that faith follows theology, it affirms the reverse: ‘religious faith precedes theology and 
produces it’ (so J. Wendland, RGG, V, col. 1197). The ‘faith by which we believe’ is made 
independent of theology.”126  This is an important point and it illustrates the middle road that this 
thesis itself is trying to both promote and follow. In an insightful summary he writes, “What then is 
the conclusion? We have seen that the old theology was a science of faith as the ‘faith which is 
believed’ for faith as the ‘faith by which one believes’; that the new theology is a science of faith as 
the ‘faith by which one believes’ and has therefore lost the ‘faith which is believed’; at the same time, 
it has also lost all reason for existing. For it is now included in the social sciences (Troeltsch) and has 
gained ‘universal validity’ at the cost of no longer mattering to anyone.”127 Bultmann continually 
emphasizes the important dialectical relationship between the object of faith and the act of faith. 
 
124 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 117. 
125 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 117-118. 
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The object of faith constitutes the both the act of faith and our understanding of the act of faith just 
as the act of faith enables the fullest understanding of the object of faith. As Bultmann states,  
When theology has abandoned its particular object, the ‘faith which is believed’, it can then 
no longer understand the ‘faith by which one believes’. It assumes that faith to be a human 
attitude which can be seen without seeing the object of faith. It misjudges the intentionality of 
faith. For the ‘faith by which one believes’ is what it is only in relation to its object, the ‘faith 
which is believed’. Plato long ago knew that love (eros) can only be defined as love of 
something (eros tinos). Faith which is conceived as a human attitude, as a spiritual function, as 
a pious frame of mind, as a sense of the numinous, and the like, is not faith at all. Faith exists 
only as faith in, that is as faith in its object, in God known in revelation.128 
Here again he emphasizes that the particular manner of faith only exists in a constitutive relationship 
with who it believes in and who it believes in constitutes how believers exist in relation to its object, 
who is God revealed in the person of Christ. Along these lines in his “Church and Teaching in the 
New Testament,” Bultmann states that “faith (pistis) is not a human mood or attitude as such—for 
example, trusting God or the like—but understood strictly in accordance with its intention, is faith 
in, that is, faith in the saving act. Hence faith is obedience . . .”129 Furthermore in his “The 
Significance of the Historical Jesus for the Theology of Paul” Bultmann similarly states that “The 
acknowledgment of Jesus as the Messiah is the substantive content of the ‘revelation’; it means that 
henceforth Paul understands Jesus as the Messiah, for without understanding there is no obedience. 
To understand another person as Lord correspondingly means to have a new understanding of oneself, as 
standing in the service of that Lord and attaining one’s own identity in such service.” 130 In this 
passage he succinctly describes how true knowledge of God inherently involves at the same time a 
change in one’s self-understanding. In his “The Christology of the New Testament” Bultmann 
writes that  
It is no longer possible to separate piety and teaching and then to understand the teaching as 
a theoretical explanation of the piety. On the contrary, the life itself is founded on faith in 
Christ, and that means it is founded on what is taught about Christ in the community. For 
the new life, dominating the historical life, is neither the mystical state of particular moments 
nor a power which is mysteriously instilled into the believer, guaranteeing him immortality. 
Nor, however, is it an idea which has been revealed, by which the nature of God, hitherto 
misjudged, would now be correctly known so that by it the human soul would be illuminated 
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and freed from delusion. The new life is a historical possibility created by the saving event and it is a 
reality wherever it is grasped in the resolve to act.131 
The linguistic content of faith that concerns the person and activity of Christ, which is passed on 
through the community of believers amidst the presence of Christ encountering them within it is 
one that is appropriated holistically and embedded within the believer’s way of life. Again the 
dependence on God’s activity is highlighted as is the necessity of God’s act of forgiveness directed 
at and appropriated by the believer enabling the believer to no longer live solely for themselves, but 
for Christ and for the benefit of others. 132 This is furthermore understood to be done within and 
amidst the concrete particularities of the existence of believers in their polyphonic modes of relation 
to one another and to the various possibilities of action confronting them in their particular 
circumstances. As Bultmann mentions, having faith in Christ does not “mean an imitative following 
of him, in the sense of allowing one’s self to be drawn into his faith in God and his way of life. The 
faith of Jesus has no place whatever in Paul’s thought. What Paul calls faith first comes into 
existence after the death and resurrection of Christ—not before. Faith is certainly following 
Christ—but by accepting his cross, not at all in the sense of imitation, but as grasping the 
forgiveness and the possibility of life created by the cross.”133 Here Bultmann importantly notes that 
the character of Christian believing is not one denoted of a slavish or rote imitation of the life of 
Christ. The following and appropriating of Christ by the believer is more one of creative emulation 
that better accounts for the novelty amidst continuity of following Christ in light of one’s 
recognition of the significance of the forgiveness and new life offered by Christ’s work on the cross. 
         Furthermore in line with how the multiform act of faith relates to the dynamic object of faith, 
in both a novel and developing ways, Bultmann, in his “Theology as Science,” has many insightful 
things to say about how it is within the very nature of faith to further develop understanding. As he 
says, “Faith thus contains undeveloped theology because it is an understanding faith, just as any 
practical human attitude toward one's fellow human beings and the world, toward one's own life and 
destiny, is sustained by an understanding that is capable of being unfolded theoretically and is in 
need of being thus unfolded. In fact, the very existence of such competing world views demands an 
explication of the self-understanding of faith.”134 This further developing character of the 
 
131 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 276. 
132 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 276. 
133 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 277. 
134 Bultmann, New Testament & Mythology and Other Basic Writings, 57. 
102 
 
understanding of faith need not be limited to mere theoretical or disengaged knowledge about 
oneself and about God. Given that faith involves the whole person and that it is holistically 
embedded within and as the believer’s particular intentional existence this development ought to be 
understood to include the believer’s way of life in its entirety. Faith is not some objectifiable thing 
but it is always and ever developing and persisting in and through the moment.  In light of what he 
has to say about faith as not being objectifiable (and the believer not being able to “stand alongside 
it” so to speak) he nevertheless writes about how faith can and should achieve a critical distance 
from itself. This holistic developing nature of faith is also necessarily accompanied by a self-critical 
dimension of analyzing itself. As he says,  
This means, however, that it belongs to the very essence of faith that it can stand outside 
itself, indeed, that it must do so. Because faith is a gift, not a work or a possession, it needs 
to stand outside of itself so that it becomes conscious of the gift as gift. It needs to reflect on 
itself, and it is in just this way that it becomes conscious of the full seriousness of what faith 
means. But this it can do only if it becomes distant from itself, by asking, Why do I believe? 
Can I, may I, believe? What happens when I believe? Theology develops just these 
questions—not, indeed, in order to assure itself that faith makes sense and is justified from 
some outside standpoint (such as that of a profane science or philosophy), thereby justifying 
faith before the forum of existence outside of faith, but rather in order to become conscious 
of the meaning of faith by placing existence outside of faith before the forum of faith.”135 
 
Precisely because faith is not some kind of work or objectified possession, according to Bultmann, it 
is necessary for faith to critically reflect upon its own nature so as to further its own understanding; 
and for Bultmann, in this passage at least, understanding the “gifted” nature of faith is primarily 
achieved through this type of reflection. In this sense along with Barth and Anselm (and others) 
faith inherently seeks and grows in understanding as a part of its very nature.  
 
In a number of places in this work Bultmann takes it upon himself to address potential 
misunderstandings of his frequent assertion that faith is a type of self-understanding. Indeed, he had 
to defend himself against Barth’s own misunderstandings of his position. As Bultmann at one point 
says to Barth in a letter written in 1952, “Your objection against the idea that an understanding of 
the NT is an understanding of the self obviously rests on a misunderstanding of the concept of self-
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understanding.”136 As he states, “From the statement that to speak of God is to speak of myself, it 
by no means follows that God is not outside the believer. (This would be the case only if faith is 
interpreted as a purely psychological event).”137 Here Bultmann is careful to emphasize that the self-
understanding of faith is not reductively subjectivist.  He goes on to more positively describe the 
hoslistic, subconscious, and dynamic aspects of nature of faith as self-understanding that variously 
permeates many aspects of the believing person by stating that, 
Such existential, personal understanding need not take place on the level of consciousness, 
and this, indeed, is rare. But such personal self-understanding, albeit unconscious, 
dominates, or exercises a powerful influence upon, all our sorrows and cares, ambitions, joys 
and anxieties. Moreover, this personal self-understanding is put to the test, is called into 
question (ist in Frage gestellt) in every situation of encounter. As my life goes on, my self-
understanding may prove inadequate or it may become clearer and deeper as the result of 
further experiences and encounters. This change may be due to radical self-examination or it 
may occur unconsciously, when, for example, my life is led out of the darkness of distress 
into the light of happiness or when the opposite experience comes to me. Entering into 
decisive encounters I may achieve a totally new self-understanding as a result of the love 
which is bestowed upon me when, for example, I marry or make a new friend. Even a little 
child unconsciously manifests such self-understanding in so far as he realizes that he is a 
child and that he therefore stands in a special relationship to his parents. His self-
understanding expresses itself in his love, trust, feeling of security, thankfulness, etc.138 
The way that Bultmann here speaks about the multiform and subconscious aspects of the self-
understanding of faith has a number of similarities with how H.H. Price speaks about belief as a 
multiform disposition. He continues to explain the self-understanding of faith by talking more about 
its embedded and embodied character. As he says,  
In my personal existence, I am isolated neither from my environment nor from my own past 
and future. When, for example, I achieve through love a new self-understanding, what takes 
place is not an isolated psychological act of coming to consciousness; my whole situation is 
transformed. In understanding myself, I understand other people and at the same time the 
whole world takes on a new character. I see it, as we say, in a new light, and so it really is a 
new world. I achieve a new insight into my past and my future. I recognize new demands 
and am open to encounters in a new manner. My past and future become more than pure 
time as it is marked on a calendar or timetable. Now it should be clear that I cannot possess 
this self-understanding as a timeless truth, a conviction accepted once and for all. For my 
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new self-understanding, by its very nature, must be renewed day by day, so that I understand 
the imperative self which is included in it.”139 
This holistically embedded and embodied self-understanding that is an implicit dimension of explicit 
faith is a key aspect that aids our understanding of why believing is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity. As Bultmann goes on to further talk about the nature of faith he states that “Faith 
includes free and complete openness to the future.”140 He later continues on by stating that, “If it is 
true that the Christian faith involves free openness to the future, then it is freedom from anxiety in 
the face of the Nothing. For this freedom nobody can decide of his own will; it can only be given, in 
faith. Faith as openness to the future is freedom from the past, because it is faith in the forgiveness 
of sins; it is freedom from the enslaving chains of the past. It is freedom from ourselves as the old 
selves, and for ourselves as the new selves. It is freedom from the illusion, grounded in sin, that we 
can establish our personal existence through our own decision. It is the free openness to the future 
which Paul acclaims in saying that ‘death is swallowed up in victory’ (I Cor. 15:54).”141 The 
obedience and self-understanding that faith consists in are the means of actualizing freedom from 
past bondage to sin and provides hope in its openness to the future in light of its continual 
acknowledgment of God’s judgment and its continual trust in God’s promises. This future oriented 
dimension is another implicit dimension that constitutes the character of explicit faith. 
 
Faith as Historical Deed 
In his What is Theology? (Theologische Enzyklopädie) we find much that is directly relevant to our 
understanding of the character of Christian believing and how the implicit dimensions of explicit 
faith might help us better understand the central significance of belief in and for Christianity. It is a 
succinct work that spends a good amount of space clearly speaking about aspects of the character of 
Christian believing that are relevant to the inquiry of this thesis. In it Bultmann states that, “Faith is 
a human possibility only in a specifically historical situation, in which a specific proclamation is 
transmitted. It is neither an a priori of the human spirit nor a universal attitude of the soul such as 
optimism or peace of mind and the like; it is not a ‘disposition’”142 or a mere attitude understood in a 
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compartmentalized, objectified, and thereby reductive way. There is much that can be developed and 
gleaned from this latter statement about faith not being a disposition. Bultmann explicitly denies that 
faith is a disposition. This is true when faith is understood to be merely a reductive disposition, but 
as will be argued and shown later, incorporating a non-reductive and multiform dispositional analysis 
of believing is helpfully consistent with how Bultmann wants to speak about the character of 
Christian believing; and doing so adds greater intelligibility to how the holistic dimensions of faith 
can be seen to hold together and ultimately contribute toward a better understanding of why belief is 
centrally significant in and for Christianity. 
  
 In many ways Bultmann sees himself as faithfully continuing the Protestant tradition with its 
emphasis on the importance of trust in the grace of God as revealed to us in the person of Jesus 
Christ. Although he does not seek to mindlessly repeat previous expressions of the nature of faith, it 
must be noted that he does not see himself as an external critic and that there are indeed points of 
continuity between Bultmann and reformation positions on the nature of faith. As Bultmann says, 
“faith is faith in the revelation of God . . . it is a faith in an historical fact. But it is such that this fact as 
objectively verifiable is not revelation. Otherwise faith would be historical knowledge or the 
uncritical acceptance of historical information, in short, fides historica.”143 In this Bultmann is merely 
in line with the Reformers and those in their wake who held that faith in the veracity of the historical 
accounts of the gospel is not sufficient to describe genuinely justifying faith. Assent to the truth of 
historical facts concerning Jesus of Nazareth, like the Protestant tradition has always held, is not 
enough to constitute genuine faith, and Bultmann lays heavy emphasis on this point. 
 
 For Bultmann, here he again emphasizes that the concept of faith is inextricably linked with 
obedience. It is not something that is prior to and enables obedience, but is itself an act of 
obedience, or an obedient way of life in light of one’s encounter with the revelation of God. For him 
faith does also still include notitia, but it is not understood in an abstract way. It is always understood 
as a type of self-knowledge where I am made aware of who I am, as a historically constituted person, 
before God. As he states, “For this reason also faith is not a knowledge of universal truths, ideas, 
etc., but the obedient acceptance of the message of the forgiveness of sins and new life in Christ,”144 
and he goes on to say that; “Faith is obedience, which means that by it I recognize myself as a sinner. . . 
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and from which only God’s deed saves me. . . . I know that of myself I can do nothing, that by my 
own power I can perform nothing to free me from sin. I rely entirely upon God’s grace.”145 In short, 
he says, “I cannot believe in God the Almighty if I will not allow him to rule in me.”146 One of the 
implicit dimensions of explicit faith is characterized by this mode of relating to God in humble 
dependence. 
 
 Bultmann proceeds to reflect on how faith is trust at the same time that it is obedience. As 
he says, “Naturally faith, which is chiefly obedience, is also trust, and is such simultaneously, since it is 
trust in forgiveness, not something in addition to it. It is trust because it is justifying trust, not a general 
trust in God.”147 But again, it is not trust itself that saves us since “trust alone does not have the power 
to transform us from sinners to righteous.”148 If it was faith would lose its intentional character and 
God would cease to be understood as real and other than us. Faith and theology would become 
nontheological. The ultimate object of faith would be faith rather than God through faith. 
 
 The emphasis on obedience and the active nature of faith leads Bultmann again to consider 
if this emphasis does not turn faith into a work, which might somehow turn it into an act seeking to 
merit or earn God’s favor and grace. This is something he denies, and he believes that it is important 
to deny. He again here does so by making a distinction between the concept of work and the 
concept of deed. As he says, “Still, safeguarding, faith as a deed against the misunderstanding of construing 
it as a work is an urgent theological task.” 149 He begins to explain this distinction when he says; 
 
A person’s deed is seen to be his when seen in its execution, that is, in its historicity, when 
seen as his conduct in decision, as the concrete possibility of his ability to be, a possibility he 
himself chooses. He is in the deed, he does not stand alongside it. Faith, however, is such a 
decision on behalf of the word of proclamation. It is a deed. And precisely for this reason it 
is not something one happens upon, something possessed, but is actual only as seized anew. 
It is not a work to be presented, not an attribute of mine, but a how, the manner-in-which of 
my historical existence—just as a human I-Thou relationship is actual only in the deed, and 
not something one happens upon or is possessed. I do not have the attribute of ‘friend,’ but 
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I am or am not a friend. Faith is therefore not optimism, nor a feeling or mood, but a deed 
of obedience.150 
 
This deed, furthermore, is a historical deed because we are historical persons. It is not an abstract 
deed, or merely a mental deed. It is a holistic deed, involving the whole person. It takes place within 
and amongst other actions that Christian performs as part of their existing in the world and is not 
simply a discrete act among other acts. As he says, “There is a deeper reason for misunderstanding 
faith’s character as deed. It occurs when the act of faith is isolated from the deed of the moment. Faith is one-
sidedly defined when understood as the obedient hearing of the word of forgiveness in Christ 
addressed to me. This cannot be believed in abstracto, only its relation to the moments of my actual 
life.”151 Along with understanding faith as obedience and as trust Bultmann also understands the 
nature of faith to involve a perpetual decision and resolve in each moment, and again this is not an 
abstract decision, not one the believer has “alongside but within other decisions.”152 As he explains, 
“The deed is not done by the existent person (as though he were behind it), as though it were 
something produced by a machine. Rather, the person is in the doing.”153 This again highlights the 
holistic and character of Christian believing as it is not isolated from or compartmentalized within 
the believer’s existence but is instead integrally embedded within it in a holistic manner. And one 
might add again that just as intentional decisions and actions need not be conscious, or present to 
mind neither must faith always be an entirely conscious phenomenon even if we agree with 
Bultmann that the obedience of faith must be an understanding obedience informed by the word 
rather than a blind obedience.154 
 
At this point Bultmann again has something interesting to say concerning traditional Protestant 
conceptions of the relationship between a believer’s faith (her multiform historical deed) and the 
work of the Holy Spirit. He mentions that “The Old Protestant dogmatics replies that the deed of 
faith is worked in us by the Holy Spirit. But what does this mean? It means nothing if the Spirit is 
conceived as a mysteriously magical power at work behind our doing, so that our doing is no longer 
ours, and our faith is no longer ours.”155 It seems that many do not appreciate this tension and hold to 
 
150 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 133. 
151 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 143. 
152 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 145. 
153 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 145. 
154 See Bultmann, What is Theology?, 156. 
155 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 142. 
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a sharp distinction between belief and action, where faith is understood as something entirely 
passive that is received apart from or behind one’s way of existing. That in a certain sense, even 
though we are entirely dependent on God’s grace it is ultimately we who believe, not God, seems to 
be an undeniable fact that is not fully reckoned with, most likely because it is assumed to be the only 
way to avoid a Pelagian position.  As Bultmann goes on to say, however, “Faith is worked by the 
Spirit (something, by the way, that Paul never says!), insofar as faith has not arisen out of our past, 
but is offered through the word. Just as I am indebted to my friend for my act of love for which he 
is the occasion (that is, through him it has become a possibility for me), so the believer is indebted 
to God for his Spirit who was at work not behind, but precisely within the free act of faith.”156  
 
 Again love is closely connected to faith and even more so with faith understood as a deed. 
As he says “Faith, therefore, is always the presupposition for this love. As our own deed, loosed 
from the agape of God, our love becomes continually uncertain and doubtful. True love exists only 
on the basis of faith:”157 However, this love is not merely directed toward God in isolation, nor to 
oneself and God together, but he affirms that “true pistis exists only when active in love”158 and that 
“our love for God is true only when it is also love for the neighbor.”159 
 
 It is along these lines that Bultmann’s thought might be drawn out fruitfully in relation to 
Kevin Hector’s recent work on faith and the conditions of mineness. In his recent work, Kevin 
Hector wants to argue that “one’s life can be recognizably one’s own even if it is not entirely due to 
one.”160 Similarly for Bultmann, “The possibility of a division here between faith and philosophy is 
actually rooted in the fact that in the deed of love the act of freedom and the reception of the gift of the other 
are really a unity. But all depends on which of the two establishes the other. Faith says that even the 
freedom to act is given. Philosophy says that my freedom enables me to receive the gift.”161 
Bultmann, however, perhaps more than Hector emphasizes that “faith nevertheless states that in the 
question about himself he must look away from himself, in order to be for the other from the 
 
156 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 143. 
157 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 136. 
158 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 137. 
159 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 137. 
160 Kevin Hector, The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of Mineness (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), x. 
161 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 97. 
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perspective of the other. It states that being a self can only be given in surrender of the self.”162 Even 
these statements further serve to qualify our understanding of Bultmann’s conception of faith as a 
historical deed. Despite all his emphasis on the agency of the believer he is not easily categorized in a 
Pelagian fashion even though he rejects the classical Protestant attempt to avert Pelagianism by 
understanding the believer’s faith as a work of the Holy Spirit. One’s faith must still be understood 




Bultmann has a lot to say about the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith that can better help 
us understand the central significance of belief in and for Christianity. His reflections on the holistic 
character of Christian believing and the implicit dimensions of explicit faith are widely present 
throughout his corpus. By showcasing this breadth this chapter has sought to address the lack of 
appreciation of the nuance of Bultmann’s understanding of the nature of faith and the consistency in 
which he held to these views throughout his career. By describing the many implicit dimensions that 
constitute explicit faith and by highlighting that the character of Christian believing cannot be 
understood in an isolated, atomistic, or objectified manner he adds intelligibility to the central 
significance of faith.163 Bultmann’s theological work on the nature of faith is rich and complex 
drawing insight from the New Testament, utilizing aspects deemed helpful from philosophical 
hermeneutics, and engaging with both Protestant and Roman Catholic theological traditions 
concerning the relationship between the fides quae creditur and the fides qua creditur.  He simultaneously 
 
162 Bultmann, What is Theology?, 97. 
163 As David Fergusson rightly points out, “Faith, rather than involving intellectual assent to a series 
of propositions, is more appropriately characterized as a radically new mode of existence. It is a new 
way of being which determines everything within human experience. It creates a new understanding 
of God together with a new understanding of the self. The one can never be understood in isolation 
from the other. . . . Faith becomes a rich theological concept which embraces all the main aspects of 
the Christian life.” (Fergusson, Rudolf Bultmann [London: Continuum, 1992], 33). As pointed out in 
this chapter, and as will be further  developed in the follower chapters, however, Bultmann’s 
hesitancy to view faith “as involving intellectual assent to a series of propositions” ought better to be 
understood as a hesitancy to understand the nature of faith as a assent to propositions in a reductive 
manner. Given that he implicitly understands faith as a way of understanding oneself in relation to 
God amidst the particularities of one’s concrete existence that can be verbalized even if it is not 
always explicitly reflected on and expressed in words by the believer he is committed to 
understanding faith to involve some level of holistic cognitive commitment to the correctness of 
verbalizable statements even when faith cannot be reduced to an abstract, objectified, and atomistic 
conception of assenting to propositions. 
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refuses to understand the character of Christian believing as a mere disposition or feeling divorced 
from the content of faith and is equally dismissive of understanding the character of Christian 
believing as an uninvolved assent to the content of faith understood as propositions or doctrines 
divorced from an obedient appropriation, which is only intelligible amidst one’s concrete situations 
in life in relation to and in an encounter with God, which is not immediately perceivable in any 
objectified manner.  
 
 Bultmann’s understanding of the implicit dimensions of explicit faith all add intelligibility to 
why believing is centrally significant as it more adequately shows the depth and breadth of human 
existence that the character of Christian believing is involved in while it retains the importance that 
the role that God (as other than and beyond our human existence) plays in shaping the human 
character of Christian believing. His reflections on the how faith relates to human perception and 
vision, how the act of faith is not a work but is characterized by a decision of humble obedience and 
historical deed, how faith consists of a holistically understood conception of self-understanding and 
development in light of future possibilities and promises, how faith even amidst the concreteness of 
bodily-historical existence is characterized by an act of desecularization and detachment from 
ultimate anxieties in the world that results in true freedom all integrate together to offer a plethora 
of implicit dimensions of explicit faith that begin to help us better understand why believing is 
centrally significant for Christianity. A Christian’s faith and the Christian faith is that through which 
the gift of the new life of redemption and restoration is not only received but is itself the rich 
manifestation of that new life coming to fruition in relation to the God who comes into contact with 
and for Christians within and for the wider context of God’s creation in all its particularities and 
intricacies. Bultmann’s understanding of the holistic character of Christian believing incorporates 
rich descriptions of theology that mere philosophy reflecting on the general phenomenon of 
believing cannot offer (but that’s not to say, nor would he say, that incorporating further 
philosophical insights would not be helpful) and he offers a more promising description of faith 
than those that neglect to adequately reflect on the intricacies of the human act of faith. By reflecting 
on the many implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing 
Bultmann helpfully sheds light on how we might better understand why believing is centrally 
significant in and for Christianity. He rejects virtually every other stock understanding of the nature 
of faith in an attempt to distinguish an understanding of the character of Christian believing that is 
less reductive (both theologically and anthropologically), and in doing so he provides fertile ground 
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in which to begin to understand the rich character of Christian believing that  make the central 
significance of Christian believing more readily apparent. 
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Chapter 3: The Character of Christian Believing Beyond Barth and Bultmann 
 
Introduction 
While the previous chapters largely set out the descriptive stage for the thesis this chapter sets out to 
begin to further evaluate the descriptions of the character of Christian believing in Barth and 
Bultmann with each other and with some recent theologians in other traditions before moving on to 
a more constructive final chapter. In general, the thesis is seeking to utilize the work of Barth and 
Bultmann in order to further articulate the implicit dimensions of explicit faith (both theological and 
anthropological) in order to better understand why believing is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity. In doing so it has sought to highlight the holistic character of Christian believing. A 
secondary aim of the thesis is to show that Barth and Bultmann’s thought on the character of 
Christian believing has ecumenical value and this chapter seeks to highlight this in order to show 
that the conceptions of the character of Christian believing offered by Barth and Bultmann 
employed toward the aim of better understanding why believing is centrally significant in and for 
Christianity is not merely confined to a Protestant understanding of the character of Christian 
believing. In choosing to ground the study in Protestant dogmatics with Barth and Bultmann it has 
sought to develop a conception of the character of Christian believing that has ecumenical import by 
showing that even denominations and traditions within Protestantism that are sometimes taken to 
have a reductively intellectualist conception of the character of Christian believing are capable of 
being understood and developed in a more nuanced and holistic manner that is more ecumenically 
attractive. More adequate descriptions of the character of Christian believing can result from putting 
Barth and Bultmann in dialogue with theologians in other traditions, but it is equally important to 
show lines of continuity. In articulating the complexity of a Protestant position and its implicit logic 
with a variety of other theologians and philosophers (which the next chapter seeks to flesh out 
further) it seeks to contribute to the mending of unnecessary divisions and, when that is not 
possible, to enable a depth of understanding that fosters informed disagreement amongst those 
coming from different ecumenical backgrounds rather than mere caricature.  
 Both Barth and Bultmann provide a theological depth of description that is lacking in more 
mere philosophical approaches to describing religious belief in general (in fact they are adamantly 
against understanding the character of Christian believing in a general way of any kind, whether that 
be a general feeling, acting, or thinking). They also both emphasize the theological dimension 
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implicitly involved in and with the character of Christian believing. For both it is of structural 
importance for understanding the character of the individual’s faith that we acknowledge the 
believer’s intentional, outward orientation to Christ and that this is a genuine interaction, 
participation (rightly understood), and ongoing encounter with God who is genuinely other than 
believers.  
 Both Barth and Bultmann are good at criticizing inadequate conceptions that reductively 
emphasize one aspect of faith to the detriment of others, but their positive constructions and 
articulations of how the various aspects of the character of Christian believing hang together call for 
more descriptive adequacy. Both of their rejections of understanding faith as a worldview and of 
understanding the propositional or cognitive/linguistic dimensions of faith as mere assent to 
doctrines or ideas about God is persuasive. Neither want to get rid of the cognitive aspect of 
Christian belief, but in strongly reacting against certain ways of understanding the cognitive aspect 
their own positive development is often underdeveloped. Their articulations of how we then go on 
to understand the linguistic dimensions of the character of Christian believing in light of these 
criticisms could benefit from further articulation. Human persons relate to and apprehend linguistic 
content in various ways and linguistic content likewise relates to its referent(s) in numerous ways. 
While the character of Christian believing might not be adequately described as mere assent to a 
“worldview” or as mere assent to specific doctrines it does involve a dimension of linguistically 
mediated apprehension of oneself, of God, and of the world. While both Barth and Bultmann retain 
a place for the linguistic content of Christian believing their articulation of how this aspect relates to 
the other aspects (and how this is distinct from bad construals of the linguistic dimensions of the 
character of Christian believing) would benefit from further description, articulation, and 
explanation. This could be accomplished by further developing their own positions in light of their 
own implicit logic and by bringing their positions into conversation with other philosophical and 
theological positions.  
 
Barth and Bultmann Compared 
It is common to focus on the differences between Barth and Bultmann when looking at their 
theologies in general. Bultmann is seen to be existentialist. Barth is seen to be dogmatic. Bultmann 
emphasizes the act of faith. Barth emphasizes the content of faith. While differences do remain 
between the two of them even when we are only looking at their various conceptions of the 
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character of Christian believing, those differences occur within the backdrop of what appears to be a 
large portion of agreement. As has been shown in the previous chapters, both of their positions on 
the nature of faith are more nuanced and intricate than they are often taken to be. The links of their 
disagreements become more apparent if we begin to analyze the implicit logic of how we understand 
the content of linguistic utterances in light of the embodied, embedded, and enacted environments 
of reception that all play a role in holistically constituting and enabling the phenomenon of 
understanding. The proximity of Barth and Bultmann is further illuminated by looking at some of 
Barth’s later writings in The Humanity of God. This links Barth into closer proximity to Bultmann than 
he himself would have perhaps liked to admit in the earlier stages of his theological development. It 
also helps to better incorporate Barth’s thought into the more holistic character of Christian 
believing that this thesis is seeking to develop in order to be able to better understand why believing 
is centrally significant in and for Christianity. 
 In his essay “Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century,” originally presented in 1957 
at the Goethegesellschaft, Karl Barth articulates his reservations with much of the 19th century focus on 
the anthropological dimension of the character of Christian believing. As he says, echoing the 
Augustinian distinction between the fides qua and the fides quae, “theologians, when they came to 
work on their proper task in and for the Church were more interested in the Christian faith than in 
the Christian message.”1 As he goes on to state, “In terms of content they were more interested in 
man’s relationship to God than in God’s dealings with man, or, to quote the well known term of 
Melanchthon, more in the beneficia Christi than in Christ Himself.”2 The way that many 19th century 
theologians focused on analyzing and describing the character of Christian believing in light of their 
contemporary situation (in conversation with a variety of contemporary discourses) was, in Barth’s 
estimation, reductive. The pursuit to better understand the character of Christian believing was 
“erroneously undertaken.”3 As he further describes, “The interest of these theologians focused on 
the believing man in his past and in his present, in his confrontation and association with Jesus 
Christ. Theological discussion with the contemporary world centred around the existence of the 
believing man, and in philosophy of religion particularly around the possibility of this existence.”4 
These theological inquiries into the character of Christian believing tended to eclipse the content of 
 
1 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God (London: Collins, 1961), 23-24. 
2 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, 24. 
3 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, 24. 
4 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, 24. 
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belief and its ultimate, divine referent. However, importantly for the purpose of this thesis, this does 
not lead Barth to reject the value, importance, or need for analysis, description, and articulation of 
the human dimensions of the character of Christian believing, but only various reductive ways of 
doing so. Neither does one’s theological engagement with philosophy need to only be done on the 
grounds of trying to justify theology. It was not problematic that these endeavors were being 
undertaken, but how they were being undertaken that was at issue. In Barth’s judgment, these 
reductive approaches need not have been reductive by the mere fact that they were focusing on the 
anthropological dimensions of the character of Christian believing, nor need it be the case for 
theology done in his present or our own. As he explains, “The prevailing interest in this direction 
would not necessarily have been erroneous had it been a matter of shift in tone and emphasis for 
serious and pertinent reasons.”5 As Barth goes on to articulate, 
There is no reason why the attempt of Christian anthropocentrism should not be made, 
indeed ought to be made. There is certainly a place for legitimate Christian thinking starting 
from below and moving up, from man who is taken hold of by God to God who takes hold 
of man. Let us interpret this attempt by the 19th-century theologians in its best light! 
Provided that it in no way claims to be exclusive and absolute, one might well understand it 
as an attempt to formulate a theology of the third article of the Apostles’ Creed, the Holy 
Spirit. If it had succeeded in this, 19th-century theology could have irrevocably stressed once 
again the fact that we cannot consider God’s commerce with man without concurrently 
considering man’s commerce with God. Theology is in reality not only the doctrine of God, 
but the doctrine of God and man. Interpreted in this light, 19th-century theology would not 
have forgotten or even suppressed, but rather stressed, the fact that man’s relation to God is 
based on God’s dealings with man, and not conversely. Starting from below, as it were, with 
Christian man, it could and should have struggled its way upward to an authentic explication 
of the Christian faith. It could and should have sought increasingly to validate the Christian 
message as God’s act and word, the ground, object, and content of faith.6 
As Eberhard Busch helps portray Barth’s mature position, he states that Barth “no longer 
understood ‘theology’ merely as a ‘doctrine of God,’ but as ‘theanthropology,’ that is, ‘as “a doctrine 
of God and man”, of the communication and the community between God and man.’”7 This thesis 
is such an attempt, to struggle “its way upward to an authentic explication of the Christian faith.” 
 
5 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, 24. One is left to speculate what, in Barth’s mind, constitute 
“serious and pertinent reasons.” The conclusion of the previous section was an attempt to articulate 
some potential “serious and pertinent reasons” for theological inquiry to incorporate philosophical 
and phenomenological material.  
6 Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, 24-25. 
7 Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1975), 424. 
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For Barth so long as we keep this interaction between God and man in mind then a focus on 
describing the anthropological dimensions of the character of Christian believing is a legitimate, and 
even valuable, undertaking. It is when this interaction of the human with the divine and the divine 
with the human is lost sight of that our descriptions of faith become inadequate and reductive.8 
Barth’s charge of much 19th century theology was that it was reductive in an overly immanent and 
anthropological way. However, later on in his essay on “The Humanity of God” (originally delivered 
as a lecture in 1956 at the meeting of the Swiss Reformed Minsters’ Association in Arau) he states, 
rather surprisingly, that theology can likewise be reductive if it attempts to focus on God without 
also focusing on the human. As he writes, “Since God in his deity is human, this [theological] culture 
must occupy itself neither with God in Himself nor with man in himself but with the man-
encountering God and the God-encountering man and with their dialogue and history, in which 
their communion takes place and comes to its fulfillment.”9 On the surface this is strikingly similar 
to Bultmann’s position and is more compatible with the desires of more phenomenologically 
minded theologians than Barth is often taken to be.  In this work Barth also seems to be qualifying 
his position in light of Bultmann’s earlier descriptions and criticisms of Barth’s position. Bultmann, 
as we can recall, at one point describes Barth position thus: 
Barth’s divergence is shown most plainly in his consistent emphasis on the truth that faith is 
not a state of consciousness. No doubt, along with faith there is also a state of consciousness—at 
least there can be. But as long as it is a state of consciousness it cannot be faith. To speak of 
the faith of men is to accept the full paradox of asserting something which cannot be 
affirmed of any visible man, something which is completely unverifiable as a spiritual 
situation and which must never be identified with any such situation. From this concept of 
faith arises the polemic against all ‘religion of experience’, against piety, sense of sin, and 
inspiration. Hence comes the utter skepticism of religion as such, since religion claims to be 
a particular area of human spiritual life in which inheres the relation of man to God. On the 
 
8 As Barth goes on to state, “Nineteenth-century theologians spoke of “faith,” and we do well to 
trust that they meant Christian faith. But their assumptions compelled them to understand faith as 
the realisation of one form of man’s spiritual life and self-awareness. The more serious they were in 
this interpretation, the more the Christian faith appeared to be a windowless monad, dependent on 
human feelings, knowledge, and will.  Like these, faith was supposed to be self-nurturing, self-
governing, and self-sufficient. A capacity for the infinite within the finite, faith had no ground, 
object, or content other than itself. It had no vis-à-vis. Faith as the Christian’s commerce with God 
could first and last be only the Christian’s commerce with himself. It could express only itself, its 
own inner dialectics, in so many words and sentences” (The Humanity of God, 26). As expressed 
elsewhere throughout this thesis, however, this need not be the case. 
9 Barth, The Humanity of God, 56. 
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contrary, the real truth is that what is confessed in faith is the calling in question of the whole 
man by God. The justified man, the new man, is believed in faith.10 
 
At this point Barth is still uneasy and unsure of how his theology relates to Bultmann’s. As Barth 
writes, “Whether the theological existentialism of Rudolf Bultmann and his followers, close to which 
we find ourselves here, carries us further towards this objectivity which is indispensable to good 
theology remains yet to be seen. It is not yet clear whether and in what sense a genuine, concrete 
dialogue, history, and communion between God and man is there envisioned, or whether it is 
concerned merely with a repristination of the theology of the believing individual who reflects on 
himself in solitude (this time on his reality and unreality) and explicates himself.”11 The previous 
exposition of Bultmann’s understanding of the character of Christian believing with his criticisms of 
overly subjectivistic and nontheological conceptions of the character of Christian believing in 
chapter two of this thesis has shown that this objectivity of God and man’s relationship to God is 
surely something that Bultmann and Barth agree on here (despite Barth’s hesitation and uncertainty). 
As Barth continues,  
The fact that to date neither the people of Israel nor the Christian community appears to 
have constitutive meaning for this theology causes one concern. And what can be the 
meaning of the ‘overcoming of the Subject-Object-Scheme,’ recently proclaimed with such 
special enthusiasm, so long as it is not made clear and guaranteed that this enterprise will not 
once more lead to the anthropocentric myth and call into question anew the intercourse 
between God and man and thus the object of theology? Certainly existentialism may have 
reminded us once again of the elements of truth in the old school by introducing once more 
the thought that one cannot speak of God without speaking of man. It is to be hoped that it 
will not lead us back into the old error that one can speak of man without first, and very 
concretely, having spoken of the living God.12 
Barth’s concerns here are legitimate, but his anxieties might not be. While Bultmann may not 
emphasize the role of the Christian community as greatly as Barth there are places in his theology 
that mention the important communal dimension of the character of Christian believing. As we can 
recall, Bultmann wrote that, “It is no longer possible to separate piety and teaching and then to 
understand the teaching as a theoretical explanation of the piety. On the contrary, the life itself is 
founded on faith in Christ, and that means it is founded on what is taught about Christ in the 
 
10 Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 50. 
11 Barth, The Humanity of God, 56. 
12 Barth, The Humanity of God, 56. 
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community.”13 When it comes to Barth’s conception of the act of faith the people of Israel’ don’t 
constitute much of the meaning either. There may be a valid point to be made when we are talking 
about the shape of their overall theologies, but when it comes to describing the human act of faith 
the Old Testament background of the people of Israel does not play a huge, explicit, part in either of 
their descriptions. Furthermore, Bultmann’s selfless acts for his Jewish friends during the wars 
mitigates any anti-Semitic charges that might be leveled against him (the respect of Bultmann’s 
Jewish friends is still evident at his grave today). This chapter is not focused on evaluating their 
overall theologies, but only those portions which pertain to their understandings of the Christian act 
of faith.14 As mentioned above, the “overcoming of the subject-object Scheme” need not necessarily 
lead to the reductive form of anthropocentrism. In fact, acknowledging this overcoming of the 
“subject-object Scheme” allows us to (as Bultmann argued) describe the reality of faith in greater 
detail and with greater phenomenological adequacy. This need not sublate the genuine intercourse 
between God and humanity that takes place in the event of reconciliation through the character of 
Christian believing. Existentialism, properly understood and non-reductively engaged with, need not 
lead us back into solipsistic narcissism.  
 In light of the dangers (which are not inevitable) Barth is right to affirm the non-private 
nature of an individual’s faith. As he later elaborates,  
For this reason there is no private Christianity. For this reason we cannot but take seriously, 
affirm, and love this community in its peculiarity. While we cannot but view critically in all 
details its assuredly human—all too human—efforts for better knowledge and better 
confession, for its meetings, its inner order, and its outward task, we must also view them as 
seriously important. For this reason, too, theology cannot be carried on in the private 
lighthouses of some sort of merely personal discoveries and opinions. It can be carried on 
only in the church—it can be put to work in all its elements only in the context of the 
questioning and answering of the Christian community and in the rigorous service of its 
commission to all men.15 
What Barth does not elaborate on here is the philosophical and phenomenological dimensions of 
intersubjectivity that go into constituting cognition and understanding, both within and without of 
 
13 Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding I, 276. 
14 From a content perspective, however, Christianity’s historical relationship to Judaism and to 
Christ’s Jewishness is an important dimension. I by no means want to come across as if I am lightly 
dismissing this. In the interest of confining my focus on their various conceptions on the human act 
of faith Barth’s charge against Bultmann is not that detrimental as he himself does not incorporate 
this into his section articulating the act of faith. 
15 Barth, The Humanity of God, 64-65. 
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the church. The non-private and social dimensions of the character of Christian believing are largely 
oriented around the relationship of the church and her believers. This is an undeniable and very 
important aspect, but the relationality of believers out-with the church plays a role that is worth 
elaborating on as well. This is not to say, however, that Barth does not acknowledge this aspect even 
if he does not go into great detail. He does acknowledge the intertwined relationality of human 
persons.  
 In Barth’s “The Gift of Freedom: Foundation of Evangelical Ethics” (originally given at a 
meeting of the Gesellschaft für Evangelische Theologie in 1953) he writes, “I, too, have heard the news 
that we can speak about God only by speaking about man. I do not contest this claim. Rightly 
interpreted, it may be an expression of the true insight that God is not without man. This means in 
our particular context that God’s own freedom must be recognised as freedom to be a partisan for 
man.”16 Here again Barth affirms the mutually constituting relationship between God and humanity 
for the understanding that comprises the character of Christian believing. However, of direct 
relevance to the preceding paragraph, he also goes on to briefly discuss and acknowledge the 
intersubjective relationality of human persons amongst themselves. He acknowledges this in the 
context of speaking about human freedom. As he states, “Human freedom is not realised in the 
solitary detachment of an individual in isolation from his fellow men. God is a se (for himself), but 
He is pro nobis (for us). For us! It is true that He who gave man freedom because He is man’s friend, 
is also pro me (for me). But I am not Man, I am only a man, and I am a man only in relation to my 
fellow men. Only in encounter and in communion with them may I receive the gift of freedom. God 
is pro me because he is pro nobis.”17 Barth here acknowledges the seeds of the important dimensions of 
human relationality but does not elaborate further. At one point Barth writes, 
Faith is the obedience of the pilgrim who has his vision and his trust set upon God’s free act 
of reconciliation. This obedience confirms and evinces the transition from sin to 
righteousness, from the flesh to the spirit, from the law to the sovereignty of the living God, 
from death to life in the small and preliminary, yet determined, steps of the daily journey. 
Love is the obedience of the witness who is summoned to announce this transition. The 
witness announces God’s victorious deed, offered to all his brothers and sisters far and nigh 
so that they might greet it as their light. This obedience in love and faith is the human 
response to the divine offer of justification, sanctification, and calling in Jesus Christ.18 
 
16 Barth, The Humanity of God, 69-70. 
17 Barth, The Humanity of God, 77-78. 
18 Barth, The Humanity of God, 82. 
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There are many aspects in this quote that illustrate similar dimensions of Barth’s understanding of 
the character of Christian believing elaborated on in chapter one of this thesis. Here Barth portrays 
the Christians faith as the ongoing journey of following Christ amidst the concrete circumstances of 
her life. This statement is loaded with phenomenological implications that could fruitfully be 
elucidated. Barth here also alludes to the intimate connection between faith and love. There are 
many other substantive points of similarity when it comes to Barth and Bultmann’s descriptions of 
the character of Christian believing (as evidenced in the first two chapters).  
 For example, they both emphasize faith as a form of humble obedience. At times Barth 
seems to question this. As he writes, “If demythologising is anywhere necessary and demanded, it is 
at this point. . . .to reject the idea that, in virtue of an inner quality of what the believing man does, 
faith is the real means which man can use to justify himself and himself to declare the divine 
pardon.”19 But as Bultmann himself states, “Faith is the attitude opposed to that urge for 
recognition—the radical abandonment of self-glorification, of the desire for recognition by one’s 
own strength and achievement. It is the knowledge that the recognition which makes him secure for 
himself and in the presence of God can only be gifted. Faith pronounces the saying ‘what hast thou 
that thou didst not receive? Now if thou didst not receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst 
not received it?’ (1 Cor. 4.7). In faith man receives justification, honour and recognition in God’s 
sight.”20 As was shown in chapter one, confession is a significant aspect that constitutes the 
character of Christian believing for Barth. Bultmann likewise says that “’Faith’ is further insured 
against such misconceptions by the fact that it is simultaneously ‘confession.’ ‘Faith’ is ‘faith’ in . . .’ That 
is, it always has reference to its object, God’s saving deed in Christ.”21 
 James D. Smart wrote The Divided Mind of Modern Theology in 1967 where he contrasts the 
early Barth and the early Bultmann. For him it is an either/or situation. Either we go with the 
existential theology of Bultmann, or we go with the dogmatic theology of Barth. This seems too 
simplistic in light of our previous discussion. As Smart writes near the end of his book, 
Shall theology be based on the word to which faith responds or shall it be based on the faith 
which responds to the word? Here two roads divide. On the first, theology is possible as a 
knowledge of God that has within it the only true knowledge of man. On the second, 
theology is possible only in the form of statements about the self-understanding of man 
 
19 Barth, CD, IV.1, 618. 
20 Bultmann, Essays: Philosophical and Theological, 171. 
21 Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Volume 1, 317. 
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which has been determined by God and it becomes difficult to prevent theology becoming 
no more than anthropology and soteriology.22 
This is a false option, and one that harbors unreckoned-with philosophical assumptions about the 
nature of understanding the Word, words, or anything or anyone at all. In the wake of those like 
Wittgenstein and others who have shown how understanding linguistic content is intimately tied up 
with our various embodied ways of existing with one another in the world this sharp dichotomy 
between ‘existential’ understanding and a proper ‘objective’ understanding breaks down. 
Furthermore, by not engaging with Barth’s later work or Bultmann’s Theologische Enzyklopädie he 
neglects to deal with the portions of Barth’s writing where he concedes the “existential” dimensions 
of theology and the portions of Bultmann’s writing where he criticizes those who lose God as the 
object of theology. Ultimately his opening question is an unhelpful question because the word is 
understood through faith, it can no more be based on the word apart from faith than it can be based on 
faith apart from the word if an aspect of understanding remains an ever-present dimension of this 
theological phenomenon.   
 Insofar as this man is not an abstract man, but a historically and sociologically concrete man, 
then the understanding of the word, which takes place through faith, must itself be holistically 
constituted. Barth at least begins to acknowledge this when he earlier says that “God concerns 
himself with, loves, and calls him as this being in his particular totality. In bringing into action his 
particular nature man, as this being, may and should praise Him and be submissive to His grace in 
thankfulness. It would not do even partially to cast suspicion upon, undervalue, or speak ill of his 
humanity, the gift of God, which characterizes him as this being. We can meet God only within the 
limits of humanity determined by Him.”23 
 With Barth we ought to agree that we need to speak very concretely about God on the basis 
of Christian revelation through the Scriptures and through the theological tradition(s) of the Church, 
but with Bultmann we ought to also agree that we need to speak very concretely about the human 
appropriation of theological knowledge in all its phenomenological complexity as it actually takes 
place in lived reality. Anything less would amount to a tacit acting as if the living God (that both 
Barth and Bultmann emphasize) was in fact not living and acting in our present concrete situations. 
 
22 James D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann 1908-1933 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), 228. 
23 Barth, The Humanity of God, 54. 
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Theology and faith construed along stereotypical idealist or stereotypical empiricist (or existentialist) 
lines is likewise a false option and an unhelpful picture that fails to be both phenomenologically and 
theologically adequate.  
Beyond Barth and Bultmann 
Bultmann’s rejection of understanding faith as a disposition warrants further explanation and critical 
comparison between how he understood dispositions as they relate to belief and how this differs 
from more contemporary dispositional accounts of believing (which are less reductive as they view 
the various faculties of the mind as mutually intertwined rather than in a more isolated manner). 
Barth and Bultmann’s rejection of conceptions of faith as mere “feeling,” as mere “assenting,” or as 
mere “willing” make more sense in a framework that viewed those aspects of human cognition in 
isolation from one another. In today’s setting where, for example, the emotions and the intellect are 
seen to be mutually conditioning and intertwined it makes less sense to strongly reject that faith and 
the character of Christian believing ought to be understood (even primarily) as any one aspect in 
isolation from others. This development need not only be made in conversation with contemporary 
philosophers and theologians but could also be made in conversation with ancient conceptions of 
the nature of Christian faith. As has been shown in the previous chapters, for both Barth and 
Bultmann Christian believing involves the whole person.24  
 
24 J.G. Hamman’s writings are something that could help shed light on this dimension, in addition to 
more contemporary research like that of Mark Wynn, Graham Ward, and others. As John Betz 
helpfully summarizes this aspect of integration in Hamman’s thought, “On the one hand, then, it is 
out of profound respect for the mystery of marriage as containing some kind of ultima ratio that 
Hamann inveighs against all forms of modern purism. In the Socractic Memorabilia he critiqued the 
puritanical separation of reason from faith; in the Aesthetica he critiqued the puritanical separation of 
reason from the senses and the passions; later he critiques the puritanical separation of reason from 
language and tradition; and here in the Essay he implicitly critiques all of these ‘acts of separation,’ 
which culminate in the separation of God from his creation, as embodying the antithesis of the 
mystery of marriage (and therein, implicitly, the mystery of Antichrist)” (John Betz, After 
Enlightenment: The Post-Secular Vision of J.G. Hamann [Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2009], 182). As 
Hamann himself more graphically states, “Presumably the senses stand in the same relation to 
understanding as the stomach does to the vessels which secrete the finer and higher fluids of the 
blood, without whose circulation and influence the stomach could not perform its office. Everything 
that is in our understanding has previously been in our senses, just as everything that is in our entire 
body has once passed through our own stomach or our parents’” (Hamann, ‘Philological ideas and 
doubts’ in Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language, tr. and ed. by Kenneth Haynes [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007], 116). 
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 Contemporary work done on the nature of dispositional accounts of believing and an 
investigation and how they might differ from prior conceptions of moral dispositions would help 
bring clarity to Bultmann’s reaction against understanding faith as a disposition, and to why we 
should move beyond this reaction in adopting dispositional accounts of believing for our 
understanding of the character of Christian believing. Much of what Bultmann says elsewhere about 
faith as a historical deed overlaps greatly with non-reductive dispositional accounts of believing, and 
the latter actually adds some descriptive intelligibility to Bultmann’s notion of faith as a historical 
deed. Not all dispositional accounts of believing equate belief with mere moral dispositions in a 
Kantian fashion, which seems to be the type of conception that Bultmann reacts against.25 
Dispositional accounts of belief as found in Erich Schwitzgebel, H.H. Price, Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and others seem to be significantly different as they are trying to explain the phenomenon of 
believing itself (primarily the notion of ‘believing-in’) with its intermittent aspects of conscious 
awareness and latent manifestation embedded in various ways of intentional/intelligent forms of 
existence. 
 Both Barth and Bultmann acknowledge that there is a dimension both of passivity/reception 
in the character of Christian believing as well as a dimension of activity/responding that makes the 
phenomenon what it is. Both acknowledge that faith is a gift received. Barth does acknowledge this 
fact, though Bultmann’s acknowledgment of this dimension is more nuanced than Barth’s. Both, 
however, could benefit from some engagement with relevant aspects of the contemporary 
philosophy of action.26 While Barth acknowledges that the Christian’s agency is involved in the event 
of reconciliation Bultmann proposes the beginning of what is a more sophisticated grammar of 
action. Faith is a verbal noun involving both action and reception or possession (although this last 
word needs to be carefully understood as faith is not a possession of some sort of objectified 
 
25 As Manfred Kuehn notes: “To believe in Jesus as the son of God who has taken up human nature 
can mean for Kant only that we should try to live in accordance with the genuine moral principles 
he revealed (R 6:62). If we believe in this way, we foster in ourselves the kind of disposition that 
makes the categorical imperative our rule of action (R 6:66). And if we do so, we may hope to be 
pleasing to God. This is what practical faith is and what believing in Jesus means. It is a purely moral 
disposition” (Manfred Kuehn “Kant’s Jesus” in Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A 
Critical Guide, ed. Gordon Michalson [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 173). 
26 The first chapter of Kevin Hector’s The Theological Project of Modernism: Faith and the Conditions of 
Mineness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) does a good job of beginning to engage with 
contemporary philosophies of action and of narrative as they could helpfully relate to our 
understanding of the nature of a Christian’s faith. 
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“thing”). Faith is an enacted state that is gifted and enabled by and through the presence of the 
giver. The possibility of faith is entirely dependent on the presence of this reality, but faith is at the 
same time something dynamically active from the believer’s perspective. We can begin to understand 
this dimension by comparing it to the notion of love between partners or between friends; and this 
is an analogy that Bultmann specifically brings up as alluded to in chapter two. Love is at once an 
active possibility intentionally related to another that is at the same time entirely dependent on one’s 
encounter with the other. In this sense love is gifted to you, but the nature of the gift consists of 
both active and passive dimensions. It is not some objectified or static thing that you receive or give 
one another. This leads to further questions concerning the ontology of beliefs and the 
phenomenology of believing. 
 What is the ontology of belief (or the phenomenology of believing)? How do I know what I 
believe? How does one recognize belief in others? Another way of phrasing the question would be, 
where is belief embedded? Is it in the private recesses of the mind (construed in an atomically 
isolated fashion), so that it is only available to introspection, or perhaps empirical scientific 
observation? Barth and Bultmann begin to answer these types of questions theologically. But their 
account could be aided by bringing others into the conversation. As Fergus Kerr rightly discusses, 
Wittgenstein critiques the way of thinking implicit in asking these latter questions for being 
unhelpfully blind to the location and manner in which the phenomenon of believing actually 
becomes intelligible to us. This also share’s similarities with Bultmann’s rejection of objectified 
conceptions of faith as some type of ‘thing’. As Kerr goes on to explain, 
Wittgenstein is saying, that, if challenged over some doctrine of faith, I should have to 
examine my conscience to decide if I believed it: ‘Do I really believe that, or am I only 
pretending to myself?’ In such cases, introspection, far from being private inspection of 
some object-like datum, would be remembering past situations, imagining possible ones, 
assessing the depth of one’s feelings and the like. In most cases, if asked whether you believe 
a thing or love someone, you do not have to go through any of this—you would say yes or 
no, unhesitatingly. In some cases, however, for instance if asked whether you (still) believed 
the gospel, you would reflect on what you (still) find it possible to do, you might imagine 
what life would be if you gave up these practices, you might eventually discover, even with 
some surprise, that, given the things that you say and do without undue strain and 
embarrassment, you count as a believer—or not: but you need not struggle to locate some 
burning faith-sensation in your head or heart.27 
 
27 Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein (London: SPCK, 1997), 148. 
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While the possibility of inner speech, inner thought, or inner sensation is not denied the privileging 
and isolating of interiority in order to explain what it means to believe (or to have faith) is challenged 
and deemed to be nonsensical. It is not that various forms of interiority do not accompany believing, 
but Wittgenstein’s argument against the possibility of a private language coupled with his 
understanding of the nature of language and thought (as always holistically embedded in our various 
forms of life with one another in the world) challenges those who would privilege placing priority on 
interiority, and it heavily challenges those who focus solely on interiority when they attempt to offer 
a conclusive ontology of belief or phenomenology of believing and assume that belief is an entity 
embedded solely “in the mind” (anyone who thinks this is possible is seen as being dishonest with 
themselves and confused about what actually enables one to analyze and understand the ontology 
and phenomenology of belief and believing). Faith and belief are not solely invisible private entities 
or acts (although there is a depth of interiority to them). Beliefs and believing are also visibly shown 
and publicly manifested (indeed, the argument is that they must be shown in order to manifest all 
their fullness because believing is inherently more than merely having thoughts or speaking words). 
As Fergus Kerr reflects, “A man lays his hand on his chest when he takes an oath, as he may clutch 
his brow when he is solving a problem. Why should such instinctive gestures be taken less seriously 
than theories that faith is an inner state, thought is in the head, love is in the will and so on? Faith, 
like thought, is often visible.”28  
 As Kerr goes on to state, “Faith, like hope and much else, is embedded in human life, ‘in all 
of the situations and reactions which constitute human life’ (RPP II, 16). But instead of simply 
saying what anyone knows and must admit, we find ourselves overcome by a myth of mental 
processes (Z 211): faith becomes something so inward and spiritual that it can never be exhibited to 
anyone else, and the believer soon finds that he too does not know whether he has it.”29 How 
common a sentiment is this in the churches, even amongst some theologians? This is a possible 
danger within Barth and in Bultmann’s thought if it is not explicitly addressed (they do not 
necessarily succumb to this way of thinking). To be sure there is a veiled or hidden dimension to 
faith (which Bultmann and Barth, for example, do well to remind us, as well as challenge us to 
uphold its distinctly theological dimension beyond its mere sociological and mere secular-
 
28 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 149. 
29 Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 150. 
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phenomenological dimensions).30 Faith is something that one needs to be transformed and sanctified 
into in order to fully see and appreciate (in large part due to the blindness that has resulted from the 
corrupting effects of sin), but the ontology and phenomenology of belief and believing even in 
specifically Christian faith need not be understood problematically in this private and interior way 
that Wittgenstein and Kerr criticize. In fact, many passages in the New Testament make more sense 
when one does not understand belief along those lines.  
 To take just one New Testament example we can look at the story of the paralytic man 
lowered through the roof by his friends because they believed that Jesus could heal his paralysis 
(Mark 2:1-12). What is of particular interest is what Mark records in the first part of verse five, “And 
when Jesus saw their faith, he said to the paralytic, ‘Son, your sins are forgiven.’” What does it mean 
for Christ to see their faith? Does he peer into their mind and see them entertaining propositions 
such as “Jesus is the Son of God,” or does he, through his divine power, observe their bio-chemical 
brain-states? Is this how Jesus sees their faith? Is that what he saw? By observing the propositions they 
are entertaining or the neurological events happening in their brains? 31 Is that what belief really is? 
Wittgenstein and those theologians that draw on his work would have us see this as a reductive, and 
therefore untrue, account of what it means to believe and what it means to have faith in Christ. The 
phenomenon of believing and the ontology of belief outstrip and exceed simple physiological or 
rational reductions. The holistic characters who believe exhibit a holistic way of believing. The faith 
of those men seeking to have their friend healed of his paralysis that Jesus saw was their holistic way 
of living toward Jesus Christ himself, for the love of their friend. What Kerr and other theologians 
influenced by Wittgenstein’s philosophy offer us is a way out of various forms of reduction and into 
a more integrated understanding of the character of Christian believing.32 
 
30 It is still true, in a certain sense, that people need the eyes to see faith, but what we mean when we 
say this is what is at issue.  
31 Others might say no, he sees the Holy Spirit at work in and behind them. But even this is not 
directly warranted from the text and it has problematic implications for our wider understanding of 
the holistic character of Christian believing. When the activity of the Holy Spirit is invoked in an 
attempt to describe the nature of faith at the expense of incorporating the embedded and embodied 
nature of believing as well as the genuine (but still dependent) agency of the believer faith itself 
becomes reductively mysterious rather than properly mysterious, reductively spiritual rather than 
properly spiritual. It becomes something loosed from actual, lived reality.   
32 Paul Johnston helpfully describes Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology as it pertains to the 
public nature of interiority. See his Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
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 Rowan Williams can also add another constructive dimension to our engagement with and 
beyond Barth and Bultmann concerning the character of Christian believing. As he says, “So far 
from signs (including language itself) being a regrettable necessity in view of our minds being sadly 
muffled up in bodies, they are intrinsic to our actual thinking and living as bodies.”33 In this sense, 
one could say that, insofar as faith involves thought done by those “living as bodies,” the usage of 
signs and of language is also intrinsic (mutually fundamental) to the character of Christian believing 
as well. After praising the value of Fergus Kerr’s work in Theology after Wittgenstein Williams goes on 
to assert: “What I think St Thomas is saying is that if we try to signify God and his work by 
resorting to abstract expressions, talking about minds and ideas in a vacuum, we dangerously forget 
what we are (flesh and blood, timebound), and create a phantom world of pseudo-objects alongside 
our own familiar one.”34 Williams is here primarily talking about the nature of a sacrament, but we 
could fruitfully apply this line of thought to our understanding of faith. If we only resort to abstract 
expressions in our description of the character of Christian believing we run the risk of making it 
into a pseudo-concept, or a pseudo-phenomenon that bares little connection to who we actually are 
as embedded and embodied persons. As Williams goes on to say, “So far, then: being human, being 
bodily and being a user of ‘signs’ are inseparable. We reflect on ourselves and ‘answer’ our individual 
and social past by doing things and making things, re-ordering what the past and present world has 
given us into a new statement of meaning, self-interpretation and world-interpretation.”35 With this 
understanding, what it means to believe in Christ includes the recreation of our past and present 
world in both how we choose to live in it and in how we begin to perceive and understand it and 
ourselves through our reliance and dependence on the continual grace offered to us in Christ.  
 As Bultmann emphasizes the historicity of our being, here we also find this emphasis in 
Williams. More so than Bultmann, however, Williams recognizes that historicity and linguisticality 
are equally fundamental to who we are as persons. As Williams says (engaging with Cornelius Ernst),  
The difficulty, recognized by Ernst, is to hold on to the conviction that sign-making is a 
material and historical practice, without making it seem like an arbitrary imposing of form on 
passive stuff ‘out there’; and to counter this we need, of course, the kind of philosophical 
framework which reminds us that the world is never neutral and passive in a simple sense, 
but already, primitively, known and thought in signs (in language and meaningful action). 
Symbolic forms are not just lying around, nor are they thought up as arbitrary glosses on 
 
33 Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000), 200. 
34 Williams, On Christian Theology, 200-201. 
35 Williams, On Christian Theology, 201. 
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straightforward experience of the world; they are what we live through as humans—as 
beings capable of recalling and re-moulding what is given us, taking it forward and so re-
moulding ourselves, the horizons of our understanding and our hope.36 
For Williams, despite this emphasis on human agency, faith is still something that is created and 
graciously gifted to us by God through the Spirit. And again, like Barth and Bultmann, Christian 
faith is not merely concerned with assent to a general or abstract form of theism. As he says, 
Spirit may be a mode of interpreting the world’s Godlessness to the world, it is Spirit which 
takes us out of infantile transcendentalism, uncriticized theism, into the faith of Jesus 
crucified. The face of Spirit is—as Vladimir Lossky memorably expressed it—the assembly 
of redeemed human faces in their infinite diversity. Human persons grown to the fullness of 
their particular identities, but sharing in the common divine gift of reconciled life in faith, 
these are the Spirit’s manifestation. The Son is manifest in a single paradigmatic figure, the 
Spirit is manifest in the ‘translatability’ of that into the contingent diversity of history.37 
Here the believer’s relation to Christ in faith through the power of the Spirit shares a common 
element that is at the same time and in another way manifest in the particularities of each individual 
person, since trusting in Christ is not something that is done abstractly but amidst the particular 
situations of one’s life, with the particular relationships one has, and with the particular gifts and 
desires that God has given. The object of faith is concrete, and so is the believer’s mode of relating 
to the object (or in this case Subject). The significance of embodiment as it is intertwined with the 
historical and linguistic constitution of human beings is another aspect that is underplayed in both 
Barth and Bultmann (even if they are not against it, rightly understood). Williams, too, writes of the 
gifted and created nature of faith. As he says, 
In the costly gift of his chosen and beloved to the risk of rejection and death, God uncovers 
the scope of his commitment in a way that alters the whole quality of human trust and 
commitment to him: he creates faith. And he creates a community of faith called, exactly as 
Israel is called, to show his nature in their life by following out the logic of Torah itself. 
Every act must speak of God, but not in such a way as to suggest a satisfying of divine 
demands, an adequacy of response to God’s creative act. What we do is now to be a sign, 
above all, of a gift given for the deepening of solidarity—or, in Paul’s language, ethics is 
about ‘the building up of the body of Christ’. If our acts with one another speak of mutual 
gift and given-ness, they are signs of the radical self-gift which initiates the Church.38 
 
36 Williams, On Christian Theology, 201. 
37 Williams, On Christian Theology, 125. 
38 Williams, On Christian Theology, 204. 
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Again though, this creation of faith is not the creation of a static substance that is given to us (nor 
merely a neurological event in our brain or a proposition presented to our conscious mind), but it is 
more akin to a new kind of capacity (even if it cannot be reduced to a capacity). It is the creation and 
demonstration of a new way of being in relationship with God, with ourselves, and with one another 
that is entirely dependent on God’s first “self-gift” to us in the person, incarnation, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ that is continually offered to us in the Spirit. In this relationship we do 
not just proclaim words or think thoughts that signify Christ, we seek to show Christ in our holistic 
way of existing in relationship to Christ in the Spirit in the world even as we hope for a world to 
come or for the ultimate restoration of this one. 
 Perhaps one of the most significant insights that theologians can draw from Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language (in general, but also relevant to our topic of concern) is that the practice of 
theology is not simply about naming objects correctly (even when it is robustly intellectual or 
academic) and neither is the character of Christian believing adequately understood as mere correct 
thinking, isolated from the other holistic dimensions of human existence. Faith is not something that 
is simply parallel to life, it is a particular way of living it that incorporates the whole person. Williams 
notes that, “There is indeed at the heart of all Christian theology, as Wittgenstein said about the 
Gospels, a story with an imperative attached. But the question is, what makes us able to learn to 
recognize such an imperative, let alone respond to it?”39 As he goes on to write, “Wittgenstein was – 
famously – prompted to rethink his philosophy of language by the challenge to describe what was 
the ‘logical form’ of a particular Italian gesture of abuse. Analysing what was going on in such a 
context required more than a view that treated propositions as picturing the logical shape of a state 
of affairs: ordinary language, stripped to its bare descriptive skeleton, turns out to be only a part of a 
far larger and more variegated pattern of activity.”40 Upholding that a theological understanding of 
the nature of faith is cognitive, doctrinal, or propositional in an isolated and abstract way no longer 
makes as much sense. Neither, however, does a total abandonment of the propositional and 
doctrinal dimension. This line of thinking forces theologians to think of the cognitive, doctrinal, and 
propositional as embedded in the historical, practical, and lived reality of Christian believers. 
However, what is not often adequately realized by those advocating a focus on “lived religion” is 
 
39 Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language (London: Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2014), 3. 
40 Williams, The Edge of Words, 3-4. 
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that the doctrinal and propositional dimensions of religion are part of its phenomenological reality 
(and crude reactions against that doctrinal and propositional dimension unwittingly perpetuate the 
binary opposition that they seek to overcome). A further challenge is to not reduce God and the 
knowledge of God that is an aspect of the character of Christian believing into a purely 
ethnographic observation (blind to the effects of sin) and thereby lose the normative dimension of a 
theology that exists by being a reception of a corrective (and enabling) address by a God who is 
other than ourselves and who is encountered not merely as savior but simultaneously as Lord. 
Normative judgments, too, are part of the phenomenal reality of lived religion (and they comprise an 
aspect of the character of Christian believing). Wittgenstein and Williams here help encourage us to 
avoid this potential pitfall. Both Barth and Bultmann’s exhortation that we ought to understand faith 
as obedience to Christ shares similarities and overlapping points of contact with this imperative 
dimension.  
 Cornelius Ernst highlights this dimension as well. For him, faith is that reception and 
response to God “which is the way of surrendering to the purpose” 41 of God that carries ethical as 
well as intellectual claims. As he explains, 
But because the claim is a response of surrender to a free purpose, it posits human freedom 
as a paradigm case; what looks like a single choice turns out to provide the whole context for 
choice. The will of God—his purpose first, its normative character second—becomes the 
context within which human choices are assessed in light of the crucial instance of human 
decision as a fidelity of communion with God. There is, I think, nothing very strange about 
treating the claim-character of the response of faith like this; the claim would be one of 
Searle’s illocutionary acts, like questioning, asking, promising. But illocutionary acts imply 
contexts of meaning, and I am proposing that the context of the claim of faith is as much 
ethical as it is assertoric. The ethical order enters constitutively into the theological order 
posited by the claim ‘Jesus is the Christ’.42 
Here Ernst, like Wittgenstein, Kerr, and Williams (and Barth and Bultmann), is emphasizing that the 
ethical is closely integrated with the intellectual just as the assertive form of language is closely 
connected with the imperative form.43 God’s purpose provides teleological normativity for the 
multiform and holistic character of Christian believing to participate in. 
 
41 Cornelius Ernst O.P., Multiple Echo: Explorations in Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 
2006), 51. 
42 Ernst, Multiple Echo, 51-52. 
43 Ernst also speaks about the unity of faith and its relationship to the tradition(s) of the church as it 
relates to the content of faith: As he says, “Reception of the Church’s continuing tradition of 
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That being said, Ernst, similar to Bultmann and Barth, is concerned that we don’t reduce faith to a 
mere psychological, sociological, or historical phenomenon, but that we recognize that it is also a 
supernatural reception and enacted response of an understanding of oneself in light of God’s 
message. As he says,  
Now this faith is not merely the immanent life, in part explicit and in part implicit, of a 
historic community and a culture in which men creatively bring their own meaning to light. 
The unifying sense of the whole world of meaning accessible in faith is transcendental 
disclosure of this meaning to and for men: intrinsically, communication to men of meaning 
as gift. In the traditional theological terminology, this is the dimension of the theological 
world of meaning which is called revelation or gospel. The meanings entertained and 
exchanged in this community inform the community—not only in its language but also in its 
conduct, its institutions, its rites, its art and music—in such a way that, while remaining 
human meanings . . ., they are in principle capable of unification not in any human meaning, 
but only in an ultimate meaning, the Meaning of meaning, God.44 
This certainly has parallels to other theologians who are influenced by Wittgenstein’s insights, but it 
could also have some interesting parallels to Barth and Bultmann’s understanding that true 
knowledge of God is only ever ascertained in faith (the fides qua and fides quae) where the inherent 
dimension of obedience and trust in faith is understood concretely within the believer’s historical 
context. Ernst is also critical of those theologies that reduce our understanding of Christian truth to 
mere assent. As he says, “Perhaps it is only in the formal system of modern mathematics and logic 
 
theology is a matter of faith. This is not of course to say that every proposition in every theological 
system is an object of faith; but faith is a presupposition of insight into the meaning of these diverse 
theologies, of understanding that they are unified in the object or the realm of their concern; very 
simply, that they are trying to talk about the same things. This is a point of some importance now 
that we are more ready to admit the existence of plurality and even profound discontinuities within 
the single continuing tradition. It is no longer seriously possible to offer an anonymous handbook, 
however large, and call it simply ‘Catholic Theology’; it was not long ago that even Karl Barth, with 
some justification, seemed to suppose that this was so. Communion, ordinary or extraordinary, in 
the Church in faith, offers access to a universe of meaning, not open to those who reject this 
communion. So the Church as a continuing historical institution, and its active spiritual communion 
of faith together form the double a priori of theological meaning. This ecclesiality of faith is of course 
realized in different degrees, while in all degrees tending by an inner impulse to the union of 
communion; and the continuing validity of the expression ‘Catholic Theology’ is due to the self-
defining activity of the Church from time to time in excluding theological articulations of faith 
declared not to be Catholic: the positive unity of Catholic theology is not itself capable of exhaustive 
theological articulation but is the one reality of God, Christ, the Church” (Multiple Echo, 78). 
44 Ernst, Multiple Echo, 78-79. Furthermore, for Ernst “theology as ‘science’ and autonomous 
discipline can only reflect upon this lived meaning by being itself an instance of lived meaning” 
(Multiple Echo, 79). This too bears similarities to both Barth and Bultmann  
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that truth is reduced to the display of the internal consistency of axioms and postulates; . . . At any 
rate, both the Yes-No character of statements and their claim to ‘significance’, to depth of truth, are 
prominently and actively present in theological statements.”45 Similarly, when it comes to how 
theologians ought to think of appropriating various historical methodologies Ernst states that, 
“Faith is not mediated by the historical method, though of course faith can and must use the 
historical method when it is appropriate. Faith is communion with God and the heavenly realities 
declared by the Church.”46 Here, like Barth and Bultmann, Ernst emphasizes a strong theological 
realism. As he elsewhere explains further concerning the relationship between faith and the nature of 
grace,  
Now if Jesus were only a man who lived in Palestine many centuries ago, we would have to 
try to understand him in many of these ways, though we could only expect to meet him 
through the reports of those who knew him. But in fact those who tell us about him claim 
that we may meet him in some other way; that although he lived long ago in the past, he is 
present personally to those who turn to him in a movement which is called faith, and which 
he himself makes possible. This new kind of meeting is a new kind of understanding, and a 
new kind of meaning, which extends the whole range of meaning and understanding of each 
other we had before and modifies it pervasively. Those who turn to Jesus in faith become 
aware of new possibilities of meeting other people and understanding them. We may think 
of it as a new dimension of the world of meaning. It is neither (in the first place) ‘objective’ 
nor ‘subjective’, but modifies the whole process of human meaning: it modifies our 
understanding of meaning itself and of its possible boundaries; it modifies our sense of ‘man’ 
and ‘God’. It is within this enlarged world of meaning, given in the experience of Jesus 
Christ in faith, that we wish to locate grace.”47 
 
45 Ernst, Multiple Echo, 79-80. 
46 Ernst, Multiple Echo, 121. Here in talking about “realities” Ernst is specifically talking about 
communion with Mary (although he thinks the statement quoted applies to more than that), 
something Bultmann would surely not agree with. 
47 Ernst, The Theology of Grace (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1973), 69. Earlier he states that: “In 
fact we understand each other in an enormous variety of ways: simply leaving each other room to 
pass in the street (this is already a highly sophisticated activity, contrasted in our practice with the 
alternative of pushing each other into the gutter); transacting business with each other in virtue of 
roles which we adopt for the purpose; explaining each other to ourselves, to others or to each other, 
in terms of more or less sophisticated sociological or psychological stereotypes; appreciating each 
other in terms of historical or literary traditions; a silent communion of love which by way of words, 
gestures, a shared life, has gone beyond words into a breathing stillness” (68-69). He later goes on to 
discuss the relationship between faith and reason, where like Barth and Anselm he sees reason to be 
an inherent part of faith itself, not something that is antithetical to it or something that merely 
comes after faith. As he says, “It would obviously be absurd to pretend that reason only became 
active after the assent of faith, since faith itself demands even that minimum of reason which 
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This emphasis on the contemporaneity of Christ, if we can call it that, also bears resemblances to 
Kierkegaard48 and Bultmann. Furthermore, Christian faith for Ernst is both simple and complex and 
it cannot be understood in an entirely objective or subjective fashion, again bearing resemblances to 
both Kierkegaard and Bultmann. Faith is comprised of aspects that we share in common with other 
believers, but it also has dimensions that are unique to each individual believer. As he explains,  
It is simple in the sense that it emerges in the utterly elementary gesture in which we can 
open our hearts to Jesus and touch him with the finger of faith. It is complex in the sense 
that it has an indefinitely wide range of particular public occasions and embodiments, 
notably participation in the Eucharist and reading or hearing the Scriptures, and also, less 
clearly but at least sometimes no less powerfully, in meetings and sharings with other human 
beings and even in the world of non-human nature as in Hopkins’s poem, ‘The Windhover.’ 
It is important to recognize that this experience of Jesus Christ in faith involves us in going 
beyond the distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ ways of talking which has become 
deeply ingrained in our tacit understanding of ourselves and the world. There are many ways 
in which philosophers and others have tried to go beyond this distinction, conventionally 
described as ‘Cartesian’, even in non-religious and non-theological areas of understanding. 
To try to go beyond the distinction is not to deny that the distinction can and even must be 
made, but it is to deny that the distinction is as primary and fundamental as it has sometimes 
seemed to be. For our purposes here it will be sufficient to try to show that our experience 
of ourselves and the world is not in fact adequately analysed in terms of a distinction 
between ‘objective’ and subjective’ understanding; and consequently that our experience and 
understanding of Jesus Christ in faith is still less adequately analysed in such terms.49 
This desire to move beyond subjective and objective polarities in our thinking is something that 
Kierkegaard and Bultmann (and Barth) also emphasize; while they all could be seen to be developing 
lines of thought that stretch back to Calvin’s dictum regarding the inseparability and mutually 
conditioning nature of knowledge of God and knowledge of self (this is particularly evident in Barth 
in The Humanity of God). 
 Both Barth and Bultmann acknowledge the social dimension of the character of Christian 
believing. But what they do not do is offer a detailed description of how social relations inter-
subjectively contribute to the formation of individual cognition. This is something that could be 
helpfully brought into conversation with contemporary philosophy of mind and embodied 
 
consists in the capacity to hear and to hear discriminatingly, to take part in a communication” (The 
Theology of Grace, 133). 
48 See Kierkegaard’s Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard's Writings, XX, translated by Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 9. 
49 Ernst, The Theology of Grace, 66-67.  
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cognition. This also touches on the relationship between the private and public dimensions (or the 
interior and exterior dimensions) of the ontology of beliefs and the phenomenology of believing. 
This is something that Ludwig Wittgenstein (and other philosophers and theologians engaged with 
his work) bring further descriptive clarity to. A closer look at the philosophical dimensions of the 
intersubjective constitution of individuals helps alleviate charges of reductive individualism when 
focusing on a description of the character of Christian believing. Someone like H. Richard Niebuhr50 
or even Dietrich Bonhoeffer with their focus on the sociality of the self could add further 
theological articulation and clarification to add to Bultmann and Barth’s descriptions of the character 
of Christian believing.  
 The close interconnection between the various holistic dimensions found within the 
character of Christian believing need not only look for contemporary support. According to Teresa 
Morgan’s recent work Roman Faith and Christian Faith, the ancient context substantiates this claim as 
well. Her focus on the earliest Christian understandings of the nature of faith in their historical 
context offers a helpful contrast to our focus on more recent thinkers. While I don’t believe many 
would want to say that the taxonomy of fides qua and fides quae encapsulates all that it means to have 
faith or to believe, Morgan points out that it was first Augustine who introduced the taxonomy and 
that it has gone on to be influential for theologians ever since. 51 Morgan, however, only chooses to 
look at the very early mentalities toward pistis and fides. As she notes at the outset of her study, 
“Trust and belief, too, are intimately related. It is possible in theory, but in practice almost 
impossible, to separate the roles of emotion, cognition, action, and relationality in trust.”52 When it 
comes to understanding the believer’s agency in faith Morgan helpfully notes that, “Pistis and fides 
are, in linguistic terms, ‘action nominals’, nouns derived from verbs which abandon distinctions of 
transitivity to encompass both active and passive meanings of the verb. We might assume that active 
 
50 As Niebuhr states, “Faith, as we have seen, is not something which exists in a person. It is an 
interpersonal relation; nor does it exist simply between two persons save insofar as they have a cause 
which transcends them” (H. Richard Niebuhr, ed. Richard R. Niebuhr, Faith on Earth: An Inquiry into 
the Structure of Human Faith [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], 109). 
51 Teresa Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early 
Churches (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 11. When we look at where Augustine first 
introduces the taxonomy we see that it is very much understood to be an activity that takes place in 
the mind, in more of an isolated or compartmentalized manner.  
52 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 22. 
135 
 
and passive meanings cannot be in play at the same time, but in practice they often are.”53 This 
emphasis on the holistic nature of Christian believing combined with the active and passive 
dimensions of faith embedded in relationship with God and with others shares points of contact 
both with Bultmann and Barth, as well as lends support to affirming the holistic character of 
Christian believing. 
 In one of her later chapters Morgan talks about the interior dimensions of faith. As she says, 
“So far, we have seen pistis and fides and their cognates described as virtues, acts of cognition, and 
emotions, and we have seen that the virtuous, cognitive, and emotional aspects of the lexica are not 
always easy to distinguish in individual passages. We can conclude that, alongside their ubiquitous 
relationality, pistis and fides have a complex and significant interiority. The relationship between 
different aspects of that interiority, regrettably, remains all but impossible to map for the great 
majority of passages.”54 She goes on to note that for many places in the New Testament the 
interiority of faith remains implicit rather than explicit and the articulation of the interiority of faith 
never really seems to be a priority for the New Testament authors.55 As she notes when engaging 
with 1 Corinthians, “Whatever pistis means . . . it seems likely again to be a matter of activity and 
relationality. In most of these passages the interiority of pistis, whether cognitive, ethical, or 
emotional, is not, at least, Paul’s primary concern.”56 The concept of interiority, however, is nowhere 
near as defined as those that Wittgenstein is reacting against. As such, since Wittgenstein and those 
theologians who are influenced by him do not flat out deny an interior dimension to faith Morgan’s 
work here can be seen as complimentary rather than in opposition to them. 
 Morgan does a complementary job at describing the social and communal dimensions of the 
character of Christian believing that Bultmann and Barth allude to in various portions of their work. 
Morgan shows the inherently social and interpersonal dimension of individual faith. As she says 
when engaging with the letter of James she notes, “Pistis here [in James 2] is strongly relational, with 
affective overtones. God chose the poor of this world to be ‘rich in pistis’ (2.5), and told them to 
love one another as they were loved: this is the ‘royal law’ of God’s kingdom (2.8). Pistis is therefore 
 
53 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 31. She goes on to give an example of this by talking of 
how the Roman magistrate was simultaneously seen to be trustworthy and trusting in many things 
(e.g. the law, the gods, the people to allow him to govern, his virtue, etc.). 
54 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 460-461. 
55 See Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 467. 
56 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 466. 
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a relationship which brings a certain status and membership of a community. As such, it cannot be a 
wholly interior quality: it must at least involve activity and interpersonal interaction.”57 Morgan here 
points out that the relationality of faith is not only between human and divine, but simultaneously 
interpersonal as well. It includes a depth of interiority, but that interiority is also inherently 
connected with external relationships of activity with other persons. As she elaborates further, 
But Graeco-Roman, Jewish, and Christian sources alike take frustratingly little interest in 
exploring the nature and internal relationships of pistis/fides as an emotion, and act of 
cognition, and a virtue, and virtually never distinguish between interiority, relationality, and 
action in portraying its role in society. The message seems clear: interiority, relationality, and 
action are inseparable wherever pistis/fides operates. There are many emotions one can 
practise on a desert island, and at least a few virtues (wisdom, temperance, self-control). 
Cognition is by no means constrained by the absence of company. But pistis/fides (along with 
justice, mercy, and a few others) is one of those qualities that can only be practised today 
socially: it is inherently relational and characteristically expressed in action towards other 
human beings (or, occasionally, animals). As such, though they acknowledge its interiority, 
neither Christian nor other writers of the early principate make it the focus of their interest.58 
This analysis lends credence to J.G. Hamann’s criticism of Kant and other enlightenment thinkers 
for being “separation artists” and to Wittgenstein and others who emphasize the important role of 
relationality and human activity in the world. Although Barth and Bultmann (and others) do not 
succumb to this separation, Morgan also laments the strong separation between ethics and 
systematic theology. As noted above there is a close relationship between assertive and imperative 
language, between ethical and intellectual dimensions that are tied up in the nature of faith itself. As 
Morgan notes, “Despite its traditional identification as one of the three ‘theological virtues’, the 
ethical aspects of pistis tend to be overlooked both in the studies of pistis and in studies of ethics in 
the New Testament, where pistis is usually treated as one of the foundations of Christian life rather 
than as a moral issue on par, for instance, with chastity or the swearing of oaths.”59 The key for 
systematic theology is to integrate it with these other dimensions and the foundation that Barth and 
Bultmann have laid in the previous two chapters go a long way to integrating these aspects by 
emphasizing the inherent dimension of obedience in faith, and in their various attempts to 
understand faith as an holistically embedded phenomenon. 
 
57 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 469. 
58 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 472.  




 Interestingly, according to Morgan, the early Christian understandings of pistis and fides share 
a lot in common with their surrounding context, but it is mostly the content of pistis and fides that 
causes them to uniquely stand out in their cultures. This statement is of course made from a non-
theological perspective (not taking into considerations the implicit theological dimensions that are 
believed and perceived to be taking place in the event faith in light of revelation). As Morgan says, 
Despite the many ways in which early Christian mentalités and praxeis relate to the worlds in 
which the cult arose and remain engaged with it, the communities and ways of thinking 
which we have seen emerging from this study, in those aspects shaped by pistis, are already in 
some ways rather different from those around them. They are distinctive less because their 
understanding of the concept and praxis of pistis and related concepts in itself is distinctive 
(though occasionally it is), than because they focus pistis on god, the Lordship of Jesus 
Christ, and the salvation offered to the faithful by God through Christ. They are distinctive 
also because the shape of the divine-human and intra-human relationship and community 
that are formed by pistis (in various slightly different shapes in different churches) is not 
quite like that of any other community of which we know in the first century. By the 
combination of ways in which they understand and practise pistis, Christian communities (in 
their various forms) are already, by the end of the first century or the beginning of the 
second, in many ways unique. At the same time, at this point they, and their understanding 
of pistis/fides, are still close to the beginning of a journey which continues to this day.60 
This way of thinking does two things. First, it gives credence to Barth’s emphasis on the importance 
of the unique message and content of faith. Second, it contributes to justifying the necessity (or at 
the very least the legitimacy) of a philosophical and phenomenological investigation within a wider 
theological investigation into the character of Christian believing. In order to have the most 
adequate theological understanding of the character of Christian believing as it actually takes place in 
the world both more abstractly dogmatic and phenomenological/philosophical perspectives will 
need to be incorporated. Failing to do so risks becoming both theological and phenomenological 
inadequate and in doing risks failing to take seriously the reality of God and the reality of the 
character of Christian believing in the present situation (problematically reducing God on the one 
hand and faith on the other). Insofar as theology is about God and the human relation to God a 
theological inquiry into the nature of faith ought to be phenomenologically as well as theologically 
adequate, availing itself of any philosophical and sociological insights that are deemed helpful. This 
is not a succumbing of theology to philosophy (theology becoming ‘untheological’ if you will) but is 
itself theology being properly theological; taking seriously the fact that God is real and that this is in 
 
60 Morgan, Roman Faith and Christian Faith, 509. 
138 
 
fact the world and environment created by God for fellowship with humanity. Sharp distinctions 
between theology and philosophy are indeed untheological. Such a sharp distinction operates with 
implicit and unreflective assumptions about how human understanding takes place (as it is tied to 
natural language and the various forms of our existence with others in the world). Theology and 
philosophy are distinct disciplines, but they cannot be sharply separated, but even more so human 
persons cannot be neatly separated into philosophical and theological inquirers. Humans inquire 
theologically through the particularity of their embodied form of existence and through the concepts 
that their language enables. Insofar as the character of Christian believing is the hallmark of that 
interaction between God and humanity then an investigation into the nature of faith must be both 
theologically and phenomenologically adequate if we are to take God and the reality of our 
relationship to God seriously and not treat it as a mere idea. In other words, our theological 
reflections on the nature of faith and on the character of Christian believing need to adequately 




Both Barth and Bultmann reject understanding faith merely as acceptance of a Christian worldview. 
Again, as Bultmann states,  
In a worldview, which means in a theory about the world as a totality—about its formation, its 
progression, and its meaning—human beings seek to secure themselves by conceiving their 
existence on the basis of the world understood in thought. It therefore does not matter 
whether the worldview is based on rational principles, empirical observation, dogmatic 
tradition, or value judgments, experiences, and the like. It is essential that a worldview 
proceeds in general propositions that are true when disregarding my concrete existence in 
the here and now, since this existence can only be understood on the basis of the 
worldview.61 
And as Barth states, 
But it is not the business of Holy Scripture or of Christian faith, with which we have to 
occupy ourselves here, to represent a definite world-picture. The Christian faith is bound 
neither to an old nor to a modern world-picture. The Christian Confession has in course of 
 
61 Rudolf Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope” translated by David Congdon in 




the centuries passed through more than one world-picture. And its representatives were 
always ill-advised when they believed that this or that world-picture was an adequate 
expression for what the Church, apart from creation, has to think. Christian faith is 
fundamentally free in regard to all world-pictures, that is, to all attempts to regard what exists 
by the measure and with the means of the dominant science of the time. As Christians we 
must not let ourselves be taken captive either by an ancient picture of this nature or one 
newly arisen and beginning to be dominant. And above all we must not combine the 
Church’s business with this or that Weltanschauung. For Weltanschauung is very near ‘religion’. 
But by the decisive content of the Bible, Jesus Christ, we are by no means enjoined to adopt 
a Weltanschauung for our own. We Christians are once for all dispensed from attempting, by 
starting from ourselves, to understand what exists, or to reach the cause of things and with 
or without God to reach a general view. So my advice would be, that if you are faced with 
any such general view, you should bracket it, even if it should be called a Christian 
Weltanschauung.62 
However, Bultmann’s understanding of faith as self-understanding embedded in historical deed in 
the context of encountering Christ in the kerygma, in the world, commits him to understanding faith 
as a way of viewing the world. Barth, too, in affirming the cognitive dimensions of the character of 
Christian believing cannot help but be committed to understanding faith as a way of viewing oneself 
and the world in relation to and through one’s apprehension of revelation in Christ even if this is 
distinguished (but still related) to various worldviews. As Bultmann goes on to add, “in contrast to 
this, Christian faith claims that this interpretation of human existence overlooks precisely its actual 
reality. For this existence in the world is always insecure, and indeed because human beings stand 
under the claim of God, who calls them out of the world. If this claim is heard and affirmed, the 
person gains a security that is never a worldly phenomenon but rather is only grasped and known in 
reflection on concrete existence, which is addressed in the here and now by God.”63 Faith for both 
Barth and Bultmann still involves a particular way of viewing the world, oneself, and God’s action in 
the world as God encounters the believer. As Barth elsewhere states,  
The knowledge received in enlightening and empowering by the Holy Ghost will never be 
closed but always open. Yet it is the objective side which is really decisive. As we have seen, 
we do not have to perceive immanent qualities and determinations of creaturely occurrence, 
but divine actions by which it is continually given afresh its function, telos and character. In 
the freedom of faith man follows the way and movement of the divine providence which is 
free in a very different sense. What God has done to-day, and revealed to man as His action, 
He will do again to-morrow, but He will perhaps do it quite differently, and reveal it to man 
in a very different form. That to-morrow as to-day He will give creaturely occurrence its 
 
62 Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (London: SCM, 1949), 59-60. 
63 Bultmann, “The Christian Meaning of Faith, Love, Hope,” 846. 
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function, telos and character is the faithfulness of God on which we can and should count, 
the constant element for which the believer will look even in respect of to-morrow. But what 
he cannot say is how God will do it. His world-view as his understanding of creaturely 
occurrence and the divine providence reigning in and over it will always be that which 
corresponds to the present measure of his faith and knowledge, to the insight given him by 
God to-day.64 
Faith as a “way of viewing the world” is a holistic and ontological notion of being and believing in 
Christ within the particularities of one’s lived context, culture, language, relationships, etc. There is a 
subtle difference between “worldview” and “way of viewing the world,” but it is an important one 
that Barth and Bultmann could have taken more time to work out in greater detail (even though 
their understanding of faith pushes this way). A “way of viewing the world,” as I am using the 
phrase, is a more holistic or involved notion, whereas assent to a worldview is abstracted and 
relegated to the intellect, understood in an objectified manner. A “way of viewing the world” has 
more phenomenological undertones, whereas “worldview” has more of an idealist connotation that 
is largely understood in a way that is distanced and isolated from a living relationship to God, who is 
encountering the believer in her present concrete reality. 
          The complex character of Christian believing played a central role in Bultmann’s theology. 
Forty years after Bultmann’s death, the same might be said of Graham Ward in the first volume of 
his systematic theology. The reflexive relationship between the holistic characters who believe and the 
multidimensional character of believing (or of faith in Christ, which is inherently constituted by some 
sort of actual relationship to the divine in the particularity and concreteness of the created world), is 
a central axiom for Bultmann and Ward (and an important one for Barth also, even if the 
phenomenal complexity is underplayed). Ward, however, seems to offer an additionally nuanced 
position drawing out more aspects of this reflexive relationship.  
          As Ward mentions, “If theology is a proclamation of life in Christ, as that life issues from the 
double-helix of Scripture and the Church, then the oxygen and blood which sustains that life is faith 
seeking understanding.”65 As he continues, “There is no life in Christ—where my breathing is also 
the breathing of the Spirit of God within me—without participation by faith in Christ; and that 
 
64 Barth, Church Dogmatics III.3 (§§ 48-51) (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), 56. As he goes on to state, 
“He will not, of course, believe in this partial world-view. But as he believes only in God the Lord, 
he will have enough light to make some such partial view of world-occurrence-the part which meets 
his own requirements -indispensable” (CD III.3, 57). 
65 Graham Ward, How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 224. 
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participation ‘seeks’; and what it seeks is to understand what it is to be more deeply hidden with 
Christ in God.”66 However, like Bultmann’s criticism of abstract and over-intellectualized 
understandings of the nature of trust (which are also consonant with insights from Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy), the understanding which faith seeks is not isolated or abstracted contemplation of 
“what it is to be more deeply hidden with Christ in God.” It is inherently engaged in our way of 
being in the world. It is inherently theological, but in remaining inherently theological it is also 
inherently embedded and embodied in our understanding and existing in the actual world that we 
understand and exist in. As Ward goes on to mention, “concepts like faith, understanding and their 
conjunction have a history, just as they have a language and a grammar from which they emerge. We 
might call these the historical and philological contexts of the concepts. But as concepts I wish to 
emphasis that we are naming actions and processes. . . . faith can be a substantive when we talk 
about ‘the Faith’ as the contents of what the Christian Church believes (summed up in one of the 
Creeds or the Articles of the Faith). But neither faith nor understanding here are substantives in this 
way. They are governed by the verb ‘seeking’; they are active and engaged, physically, emotionally, 
intellectually, and socially.”67 Bultmann himself does not do as much with the concept of “faith 
seeking understanding” (Barth does), but what he attempts to do with the notion of trust combined 
with self-understanding and historical deed shows parallels with Ward’s project to provide a more 
holistic description of what it means to seek understanding in faith in an embedded and embodied 
manner. 
          Drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty Ward states, “’Perceptual faith’ is the seeing of 
meaningful form (what has been referred to as Merleau-Ponty’s ‘gestalt ontology’) through 
intentional expectation and projection. If it is a ‘faith’ in an invisible logos that opens horizons of 
meaning within phusis, it is not then some intellectual assent to the unknown that denies material 
reality. It is a ‘faith’ that is co-posited with perception itself.”68 Points of contact can be discerned 
between this way of thinking about perceptual faith and Barth’s way of speaking about perceiving 
 
66 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 224. 
67 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 224. 
68 Ward, How the Light Gets In, 229. Ward here is aware of the problems of assuming ‘pure’ notions of 
descriptive perception or ‘experience.’ As he states, “how is it possible to achieve a pure description 
that is not already interpreted by the very concepts called forth by the intuition? To be fair, Merleau-
Ponty was aware of this fact from the beginning: the ‘elementary even [of intuition] is already 
invested with meaning’ and concludes that perception must be ‘understood as interpretation’,” 
(Ward, How the Light Gets In, 233).  
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divine action in the world. Perceptual faith is a way of seeing the invisible within the visible. Of 
holistically experiencing the transcendent within the immanent. The ‘conviction of things not seen’ 
in Hebrews 11:1 is thus not so much a conviction about a world of Platonic forms, but more so a 
conviction of the invisible workings of the Father in Christ through the Spirit in the created world. 
This conviction, while not necessarily barring an eschatological world to come, is embedded and 
embodied in our particular ways of existing in relation to Christ. The symbolic, narratival, and 
doctrinal are closely intertwined with the somatic, active, and lived reality of particular believers 
diachronically and synchronically participating analogically69 in the activity and life of God in and for 
creation with and for one another.70 Perceptual faith involves seeing the world and one’s place in it 
as God’s creation with the mind of Christ which simultaneously involves a holistic way of being in 
the world since the character of Christian believing is more than disinterested intellectual assent. 
This involves creative discernment to see the particularity of one’s life in a way that Christ would 
have you see it, and it simultaneously involves enacting one’s life in a way that Christ would have 
you live it. Faith is a living, dependent, and transforming (or creatively conforming) relationship. In 
this sense Ward would have us see faith as prayer and as love and as hope, where none of those 
concepts could be adequately understood as mere knowledge, assent, or trust in abstraction from an 
actual relationship with the divine in the actual created world that we live in.  
          In the end, perceptual faith in Christ dynamically affects how one views the world, but unlike 
mere assent to a world view it affects and involves the whole character of Christian believing; 
embedded, embodied and all. In this sense it better accounts for the wholly self-involving nature of 
the character of Christian believing. This type of articulation of the holistic character of Christian 
believing is what is needed to better appreciate why believing is centrally significant for Christianity.
 
69 Like Barth, Bultmann, and Kierkegaard, amidst this way of thinking Ward still affirms the 
ontological difference between God and creation. Hence, why participation is understood 
analogically. However, given Ward’s affirmation of a certain form of panentheism coupled with his 
stronger appreciation for created materiality, his understanding of the relationship between God and 
the created material universes is capable of a much thicker description than Bultmann and Barth 
70 This also makes sense of Barth’s notion of perceiving the ‘true’ church in its ‘third dimension’ 
where an understanding of the church can’t be reduced either to merely sociological and historical 
dimensions, nor can it be reduced to an entirely ethereal dimension. Its true theological dimension is 
somehow invisible within the visible, perceptible to those with faith.   
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Chapter 4: A Non-Reductive Dispositional Approach to the Character of Christian Believing 
 
Introduction 
Hans-Georg Gadamer once wrote, “The gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a merely 
historical document, but to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect.”1 Along with 
Barth and Bultmann the Reformers also adamantly differentiated between genuine faith and mere 
belief in the historicity of the gospel accounts. One of the main ways Protestants have articulated 
this difference is by distinguishing fiducia from assensus and notitia (all of which are understood to be 
aspects of genuine faith) where fiducia, typically understood as trust, most fully accounts for how the 
gospel is understood “in such a way that it exercises its saving effect,” and is as such characteristic of 
genuine faith. The central aim of this chapter is to show how a dispositional description of believing 
helpfully articulates and more intelligibly differentiates the integral aspect of fiducia in genuine faith 
and that it also more intelligible make sense of how the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith 
and the holistic character of Christian believe as described in Barth and Bultmann can be better seen 
to hold together. It does so by holistically accounting for the dynamic implicit and explicit 
dimensions intrinsic to the concept of faith itself as an embodied concept that accounts for the rich 
complex of aspects that constitute the character of Christian believing. In doing so it more 
intelligibly distinguishes genuine faith (fiducia) from mere intellectual assent (assensus) and adds 
intelligibility to how faith normatively relates to living in the world by better articulating the 
relationship between belief and intentional existence. In describing the character of Christian 
believing as a multiform and non-reductive disposition it not only does not succumb to Barth and 
Bultmann’s criticisms but it enhances the intelligibility of their rich and dynamic descriptions of the 
nature of a Christian’s faith. It also seeks to further show how we might go about understanding the 
intellectual or cognitive content of faith in a manner that is not reductively intellectualist but is at the 
same time not entirely anti-intellectual or fully non-cognitive either. 
 
1 Hans Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Continuum, 2006), 307. The above quotation 
is part of Gadamer’s argument that application is an integral element of understanding itself, rather 
than something that takes place only after understanding has occurred. Furthermore, under 
Gadamer’s notion of understanding even “historical faith” inevitably consists of a certain type of 
inherent application even if it is distinguishable from the application involved in “genuine faith.” 
Unlike Paul Ricoeur, however, I realize that Gadamer did not see himself as a Christian. As he states 
elsewhere: “Anyway, I have no religious faith at all. I always say that with a certain amount of regret” 
(Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 25). 
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A few preliminary clarifications are in order. First, at the outset it should be recognized that 
this chapter is not (nor is this thesis) focused on articulating the relationship between divine action 
and human action, although it assumes that genuine faith never takes place in isolation from divine 
action and the grace of divine presence. As Kevin Hector has pointed out, there is “a seeming 
paradox at the heart of Christian belief: according to the New Testament’s claims about the new 
covenant, that which is strictly external to one and due solely to God’s grace, namely, the possibility 
of following Christ, must become one’s own possibility and therefore recognizable as due to one.”2 
This chapter is not an attempt to sort out that paradox directly. Rather, the concern of this chapter 
is to further articulate latter half of that paradox as it is primarily focused on the relationship 
between a Christian’s belief and the Christian's embedded and embodied intentional existence and it 
seeks to articulate that relationship through further theological and philosophical conceptual analysis 
of the character of Christian believing.3 Second, it should be noted that since the goal is a 
 
2 Kevin Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 260. 
3 In this sense this project should be seen primarily as a subset of theological anthropology 
concerned with an aspect of soteriology (concerning both individual and cosmic redemption and 
restoration). It takes for granted that faith occurs in an ontological and personal encounter with the 
living God through the Holy Spirit in the midst of our concrete existence; and that it is sustained by 
that relationship and union with Christ. Moreover, it assumes that this encounter is substantially 
different than any of our human encounters by virtue of the fact that the Holy Spirit does not 
remain external to Christian believers, but in some mysterious sense is understood to indwell 
Christian believers (see William P. Alston, “The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit,” in Divine Nature and 
Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989], 239-252). The 
fact that God is not an object among objects or a self among selves further problematizes any 
simplistic analogy with human relations. Since a Christian’s believing is inherently reliant on God, 
regardless of how integral the believer’s personal agency is to the concept of faith it can still be 
understood to depend on God’s grace because the believer’s faith is never manifested in isolation 
(i.e. it is always a response to the call of God and in an encounter with God who remains free), it is 
grace not because God mechanically operates the believer, but because the believer is operating (in a 
reliant, responsive, yet genuine way) in the presence of God. Nor is it the believer’s act of faith the 
ultimate object of trust. As Wolfhart Pannenberg helpfully states: “If we regard faith itself as 
guaranteeing the truth and reality of its contents, then we declare it to be in fact the sustaining basis 
of its contents. But that entails a radical perversion of its nature. The nature of faith is to rely on 
God as other than itself and thus to have the basis of its existence outside itself” (Pannenberg, 
Systematic Theology Vol. 3, 153). Faith as an act is not directed upon itself as a faith in the act of faith, 
but as faith in Christ. It is this supernatural encounter with the contemporaneous Christ and its 
particular content that distinguishes Christian faith from other forms of faith and belief and only as 
such is it sui generis. In other respects, Christian faith can, indeed, inevitably must, be described 
analogously to how we describe the phenomenon of human belief in general. As Louis Berkhof 
writes: “As a psychological phenomenon faith in the religious sense does not differ from faith in 
general” (Berkhof, Reformed Dogmatics Volume II [Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1932], 94). Similarly Charles Hodge writes: “What is the psychological nature of the act or 
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description of Christian believing it is not concerned with justifying Christian belief in God and, as 
such, doesn’t deal with arguments in the philosophy of religion concerning the hiddenness of God 
and arguments from nonbelief such as are found in the work of J.L. Schellenberg.4 Third, as should 
be apparent from the previous chapters that faith is a gift from God is not disputed, rather the 
nature or dynamic character of that gift is what is at issue. There is a common enough tendency 
among some Protestants, concerning the believer’s action and agency, to articulate the nature of that 
gift in an entirely passive way. That is disputed, for reasons that I hope have begun to become clear 
in the previous chapters and will hopefully become even more clear below.5 Fourth and finally, faith 
 
state of the mind which we designate faith, or belief? In this aspect the discussion concerns the 
philosopher as much as the theologian” (Systematic Theology Volume 3 [Peabody: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 1873, 2008], 42). 
4 See J.L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
5 Perhaps surprisingly, the Reformed theologian John M. Frame explicitly states, “Faith, after all, is 
something we do. We are the ones who believe, not God” (Frame, Salvation Belongs to the Lord 
[Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing Company, 2006], 192). Berkhof also points out that “when the Bible 
speaks of faith, it generally refers to faith as action,” and “that faith is an activity of man as a whole” 
(Reformed Dogmatics Volume II, 97). Calvin, however, articulates his understanding thus: “We shall now 
have a full definition of faith if we say that it is a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favor toward 
us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ, and revealed to our minds, and sealed on our 
hearts, by the Holy Spirit” (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960] Bk. 3, Ch. 2, §7, 475). For all its merit, Calvin’s description of the believer’s faith tends to lend 
itself to be understood as an implantation and passive reception of some “thing” in the mind that 
nevertheless involves the affections of the heart. The way that he speaks about faith as “the principle 
and cause of that action” (Ibid., §31, 475) tends to portray faith as the subject of the believer’s action 
as opposed to the believer, who has faith, being the subject of his or her action. Akin to viewing 
“the will” as acting on the agent causing intentional action, rather than seeing the agent with a will as 
the subject of his or her action as opposed to what Frame and Berkhof state above. Perhaps here we 
are misled by a metaphor based on physical causality rather than one more appropriate to personal 
agencies. A dispositional account of faith must avoid this as well. As Dallas High states: “My 
attempt to display the active force of the verb ‘to believe’ and its cognates is to take exception to 
those accounts which view ‘believing’ (generally discussed in terms of the substantive, ‘belief’) as a 
mere behavioral or mental disposition to act in a certain way or which look upon ‘faith’ as 
something utterly given to a passive recipient. Of course this is not to deny dispositions, even 
religious ones . . . but it is to reverse the whole course of our conceptualization of them, i.e. that they 
are not a function of causal dependence but are, among other things, intentional placings by human 
beings. Dispositional accounts of ‘believing’ not only do injustice to the active force of language in 
general, and ‘believing’ in particular, but vitiate the very concept of ‘person,’ since only ‘you’ and ‘I’ 
can be the subject of ‘believing’” (High, Language Persons and Belief [New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967], 156-157). This understanding of a disposition is along the lines of what Barth and 
Bultmann criticize, but a dispositional account of believing need not succumb to this criticism as it 
need not be so reductively understood. 
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is not a simple concept. It is expressed in a variety of ways and in a variety of situations within 
Scripture and it should come as no surprise, then, that there have been a variety of approaches to 
understanding it throughout the history of Christian theology.6 A comprehensive description of the 
implicit dimensions of explicit faith is not attempted here but only that which is helpful in 
illustrating both the intelligibility of a complex holistic concept of the character of Christian 
believing and the central significance of belief in and for Christianity.  It aims to take a closer look at 
how a dispositional description of belief can more helpfully describe how the integral aspect of 
fiducia in classical Protestant understandings of the nature of faith is inherently more, although not 
less, than cognitive as beliefs are understood to be inherently embedded in one’s concrete activity in 
the world (though not reducible to it), and to more helpfully describe how faith relates to a believer’s 
transforming intentional existence in a manner that is neither theologically or anthropologically 
reductive. 
 
  Faith is not a static concept. It is not something that can be fully understood apart from 
articulating our involvement or activity in it. This is demonstrated by the fact that fides quae creditur 
(the faith which is believed) cannot be separated from fides qua creditur (the faith by which it is 
believed).7 In other words, to intelligibly speak about belief one must both speak about the content 
of that belief8 as well as the act or disposition of believing that content––the content and the act can 
be distinguished, but not separated.9 Hence, to speak of belief we cannot avoid speaking about the 
believer doing something. Faith, therefore, cannot be understood as some entirely passive thing that 
 
6 For a helpful survey of this variety, both in Scripture and in the history of Christian theology (both 
Protestant and Roman Catholic), see Avery Dulles’ The Assurance of Things Hoped For: A Theology of 
Christian Faith. Dulles himself suggests seven models as heuristic aids for understanding the various 
emphases throughout the history of Christian theology. 
7 Francis Turretin, for example, asserts that faith is sometimes “taken objectively for the faith ‘which 
is believed’ or the doctrine of the gospel” and other times “is taken subjectively and habitually for 
the faith ‘by which it is believed,’ which is again distinguished by some into the faith ‘by which we 
believe God’ or ‘by which we believe in God’ . . . so that to believe God is to believe that God is; to 
believe in God is to have faith in God speaking; and to believe in God is to place confidence in 
him” (Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, Vol. 2 [Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 1994], 559). 
8 A belief is always understood amid our concrete activity in the world in light of other held beliefs 
and part of understanding the content of a belief is understanding how that belief is normatively 
related to other beliefs, as will be further explained below. Furthermore, when we speak of faith in 
God we are not only speaking about faith in his existence but also in his particular disposition and 
action towards and for us. 
9 However, one must also distinguish between the conscious entertainment of a belief and a latent 
possession of a belief, as is discussed more below. 
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is given that then manifests in action, but must in some way be understood to include the believer’s 
agency inherently. 
  Protestants have traditionally, since the time of Reformed Scholasticism, described genuine 
faith as consisting of at least three elements: notitia, assensus, and fiducia.10 Notitia is best understood as 
cognitive content.11 For someone to have notitia is simply for someone to be aware of some sort of 
information; without specifying a particular propositional attitude regarding it. Given one’s 
awareness of the content of the gospel one could: enjoy it, hate it, believe it, desire it, declare it, 
doubt it, command it, dismiss it, ridicule it, or fear it etc. Assensus is best understood as commitment 
to the truth of notitia. This means that someone not only is aware of particular content but is also 
committed to the correctness of that content. However, you can assent to the truth of some 
particular content without properly submitting yourself to that content. The demons mentioned in 
the second chapter of the Epistle of James are a classic example: they believe “and shudder.” Fiducia, 
on the other hand, is best understood as trust, appropriation, or confident submission to the content 
that is believed to be true. This means that someone allows the content that is believed to be true to 
play a normative role in guiding one’s thought, behavior, and perception. As should be apparent, 
according to this understanding, you cannot have fiducia without assensus and notitia. You can have 
assensus without fiducia, but not without notitia and you can have notitia without either assensus or 
fiducia. If all of these are not present in one’s conception of the nature of faith (at least latently) you 
do not have genuine faith.  
  Furthermore, faith is a holistic concept. The believer is involved cognitively, emotionally, 
volitionally and physically. It cannot be fully recognized as assent to an abstract idea or proposition, 
as a content-less feeling, nor as just any type of action, bodily movement, or linguistic utterance. Any 
of these taken by themselves results in a reductive conception of faith. As such faith is not a concept 
that can be adequately recognized in the abstract. Faith is an inherently embodied concept. As will 
 
10 Francis Turretin expands these three basic acts of faith into seven direct acts and one reflex act: 
act of knowledge, theoretical assent, fiducial and practical assent, act of refuge, act of reception and 
union, reflex act, and act of confidence and consolation (see his Institutes of Elenctic Theology Vol. 2, 
560-564). 
11 Notitia is often translated as “knowledge,” but knowledge is commonly understood as “justified 
true belief,” although this understanding of knowledge is debated (see Edmund L. Gettier, "Is 
Justified True Belief Knowledge?" Analysis 23, [1963], 121–23), so in order to better distinguish 
notitia from assensus it is more helpful to think about notitia along the lines of one’s awareness of 
content without specifying one’s relationship to that content as holding it to be justifiably true. 
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be argued further, fiducia becomes more intelligibly distinguished from assensus only when we look at 
a believer’s concrete activity or existence in the world. In order to move beyond assensus in 
recognizing what fiducia is we have to look at it in light of our concrete activity in the world and our 
concrete relations with others, and a dispositional analysis of believing helps do that. 
 
A Non-Reductive Dispositional Account of Christian Believing 
What is a disposition? In one sense, “a disposition is a property (such as solubility, fragility, elasticity) 
whose instantiation entails that the thing which has the property would change, or bring about some 
change, under certain conditions,”12 but we are not concerned with understanding a disposition 
along the lines of natural causation (understood in a deterministic and impersonal fashion). In 
another sense a disposition is understood to be “a person’s inherent qualities of mind and 
character.”13 Here we are concerned with dispositions of persons, which are analogous to, but 
different than dispositions of mere physical substances. A major difference being that in the case of 
physical substances, ceteris paribus, the relation between the disposition and its manifestation 
necessarily follows, while in the case of personal dispositions the relationship between the 
disposition and its manifestation is not a necessary one––this is complicated by the fact that persons 
have multiple dispositions that can come into tension.14 This importantly acknowledges the fact that 
we don’t always act in accord with our professed beliefs and, furthermore, that we are never only 
dealing with one belief. We deal with a complex of related beliefs, which we hold to with various 
degrees of commitment (which also fluctuate between being implicitly and explicitly expressed). 
Beliefs also have various degrees of prescriptive weight based on the particular activities that we are 
engaged in and value.15 
 
12 D.M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin, U. T. Place, and Tim Crane, Dispositions: A Debate (London: 
Routledge, 2002), 1. 
13 Angus Stevenson and Christine A. Lindberg, New Oxford American Dictionary  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), s.v. “disposition.” 
14 See H. H. Price, Belief: The Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of Aberdeen in 1960 (London: 
Allen & Unwin LTD, 1969), 261-262. I am indebted to the work Anthony C. Thiselton for pointing 
me toward H.H. Price and to dispositional accounts of belief. See his The Hermeneutics of Doctrine 
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2007), 19-42, where he is primarily concerned to 
show how a dispositional account of belief helps us understand the dynamics of doctrinal formation.  
15 For a related, but slightly different, discussion on the relationship between holding true beliefs and 
not using them see Kevin Hector, Theology without Metaphysics, 218-219. The point I am referring to 
here is that the prescriptive weight of beliefs are integrally tied to our activities in the world. While it 
must be the case that some of your taken-true beliefs retain value across multiple contexts and in 
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  What, then, is a dispositional description of belief? In its simplest form a dispositional 
account of belief asserts that to believe something means to be disposed to “act as if p were true.” 
As H.H. Price states, “When we say of someone ‘he believes the proposition p’ it is held that we are 
making a dispositional statement about him, and that this is equivalent to a series of conditional 
statements describing what he would be likely to say or do or feel if such and such circumstances 
 
various activities (and in various ways and for various reasons some are more or less voluntarily 
held) it is also true that the value of some taken-true beliefs are context and activity specific. One’s 
purposeful activity regulates what beliefs are valuable and this occurs on the macro and micro level 
such as when one considers the purpose of life in general or when one considers the purpose of a 
specific skill or recreational game. One’s macro belief’s about the purpose of life can filter down into 
and guide one’s choice of micro activities, but the importance of certain beliefs are drastically 
contingent on the activity that one is engaged in. For example when I am engaged in playing a 
game––whether it is a physical sport like soccer, baseball, golf, snowboarding etc., or some strategic 
board game such as chess––certain beliefs, that are otherwise trivial, rise in importance because of 
the purpose of my activity. Likewise, some of my macro beliefs coupled with specific desires will 
condition the activities I choose to engage in (which in turn will throw a combination of involuntary 
beliefs at me and allow me the opportunity to develop voluntary beliefs as well). In the context of a 
game, then, a soccer player’s belief that a pass on the ground will work better than a pass in the air, a 
pitcher’s belief that a curveball will be more effective than a change-up, a golfer’s belief that due to a 
moderate tailwind he should choose to hit the ball with his 8-iron instead of his 7-iron, a 
snowboarder’s belief that 10-21 degree wax will work better today than will the usual 18-28 degree 
wax, or a chess players belief that a certain strategy will work well against this particular opponent all 
gain significance relative to the purposeful activity. Apart from involvement in such activities certain 
beliefs lose their significance. We not only believe in states of affairs, but also in the propriety of 
actions. 
     William Alston, however, denies that beliefs can be voluntary and instead chooses to distinguish 
“belief” from “acceptance” (see Alston, “Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith” in Jeff Jordan and 
Daniel Howard-Snyder Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today [Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1996], 3-28). However, the success and necessity of such a clear cut distinction is 
contested (see Hamid Vahid, “Alston on Belief and Acceptance in Religious Faith,” The Heythrop 
Journal 50, no. 1: 23-30). While it may be true that beliefs are not under my “direct voluntary 
control” if that is taken to mean that I can’t just believe absolutely anything I arbitrarily choose to 
believe apart from any outside constraints pushing back on me, then after that anti-solipsistic 
statement is affirmed it does seem to be the case that there are many ways in which our voluntary 
action can genuinely determine what we believe, thereby giving us some control over what we 
believe. Alston affirms this possibility to a degree when he states: “In some cases I can perform 
voluntary acts that will have some effect on what I believe on certain matters, by, for example, 
selectively exposing myself to pro or con considerations; but that is a long way from being able to 
exercise effective, much less immediate, voluntary control” (“Belief, Acceptance, and Religious 
Faith,” 7). Even in cases when belief is understood to be strongly involuntary we are still actively 
involved in believing it and it seems that Alston here undervalues the significance that purposeful 
voluntary action plays in belief formation. At any rate, debating the intricacies of the 
voluntary/involuntary nature of belief is beyond the scope of this present chapter. 
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were to arise.”16 However, this does not mean that beliefs can be quickly and easily discerned by 
observing behavior without a more extensive understanding of the particular person and her 
situation. Price would have us understand belief as a “complex and multiform disposition”17 where 
the agent’s purpose for acting needs to be taken into account in order to accurately understand 
whether the agent was indeed acting in accord with her beliefs. Price uses an example of someone 
who believes “coal gas and air form an explosive mixture,” proceeds to enter a room, smells the coal 
gas, and lights a match. Depending on the agent’s purpose, she either did not truly believe the 
mixture was explosive or she wanted to commit suicide, or collect insurance money, or disliked the 
architecture for whatever reason, etc.18 The main point to be grasped is that correctly reading off 
what someone believes from what they do is not necessarily straightforward and, therefore, cannot 
be reduced merely to a cursory observation of behavior. We must also be able to account for what 
Price terms as “losing one’s head.”19 Sometimes in moments of high stress or “emotion-arousing 
situations” people act contrary to what they profess to believe and of course people can act in 
disingenuous ways.20 But even when people do act in disingenuous ways, or not according to their 
professed beliefs, their behavior is often recognizable as such once a greater knowledge of the 
situation is obtained without needing to appeal to a mysterious inner realm that only the 
disingenuous person has access too.21 In fact, when we do recognize someone as disingenuous it is 
 
16 Price, Belief, 20. 
17 Price, Belief, 299. Thinking about beliefs as complex and multiform dispositions, as well as 
recognizing the need for understanding the situation and intentions of the agent is crucial because 
“the very same action can be described in two mutually incompatible ways: either as an example of 
acting as if a proposition p were true, or as an example of acting as if p were false” (Belief, 263). Again 
this is important for understanding faith dispositionally in that it restrains our understanding of faith 
from falling into a naïve reductionism into simple behaviorism. 
18 See Price, Belief, 259-260. 
19 See Price, Belief, 260-263. 
20 See Price, Belief, 262, 
21 In this one need not deny the existence of the inner, only the necessity of access to it to discern 
disingenuous behavior such as lying or acting as if one believed. For a conversation of this see Paul 
Johnston, Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner (New York: Routledge, 1993), 31-32. As Price states: 
“Beliefs which are never in fact acted upon might perfectly well exist, if the Acting-as-if Analysis is 
correct. The difficulty is that there would be no way of discovering that they exist. Neither the 
believer himself, nor others, could possibly find out that he does believe some propositions (very 
many, perhaps) in this purely theoretical way. It is all very well for him to say to others, or even 
privately to himself, ‘I believe that p.’ But this, according to the Acting-as-if Analysis, is very weak 
evidence for the hypothesis that he does believe it. We must have deeds, not words; and so must he, 
if he is to find out what his own beliefs are” (Price, Belief, 265). He goes on to state, though, that in 
cases of theoretical beliefs where the agent has limited or no opportunity to manifest a belief in 
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always because of public observation, investigation, conversation, and never because we gain access 
to the private recesses of the disingenuous person’s mind. Even though our observations are fallible, 
due to our often limited understanding of the person and the situation, they are not fallible because 
we don’t have access to the inner psychology of the person.22 Why should we not think about beliefs 
along the same lines? For a number of legitimate reasons Price rejects simple observations of actions 
as an infallible indicator of a person’s beliefs23––knowledge of the person, his or her intentions, and 
of the situation are needed to correctly discern what a person believes, and this is not always easily 
perceived. It does not make sense to say that a person always and with no exception acts in perfect 
accord with their beliefs––understanding a person’s integrity, other relevant beliefs, desires and 
motivations (all of which might come into tension) in a particular circumstance complicate our 
ascribing beliefs to a particular person, but we often correctly do so. 
  For the purposes of this thesis there are two hallmarks of a dispositional description of belief 
worth noting: latency in regard to conscious states; and what I will call holistic inferential 
manifestation. Both will be important for refining a dispositional understanding of faith that is more 
intelligibly able to account for how the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic 
character of Christian believing could hold together. 
  It is commonplace to think that believing something consists of having some sort 
representation in the mind––whether that be a proposition or an image, or perhaps even a feeling––
but representations tend to be individually separate and distinct occurrences that are at once present 
to consciousness and then gone from it (not to mention that their transitions and relations to one 
another are more or less left unexplained). Belief, however, is an ongoing phenomenon despite 
 
action the agent could manifest it in various other ways besides overt action should the agent 
encounter the proper circumstances. As alluded to above, in a similar vein in regards to holding a 
true belief with little to no manifestation, but in a slightly different context discussing the 
adjudicatory relationships between different beliefs, Kevin Hector states: “it is not uncommon for 
one to take another’s assertion to be true, yet never use it to judge other beliefs –– indeed, to take it 
to be true knowing well that one will never so use it” (Theology Without Metaphysics, 222). Such beliefs 
will not be strongly committed to because they are not relevantly applicable to one’s activities in the 
world––or one’s valued activities.  
22 On this issue current work being done by various neuroscientists on mirror neurons could be 
explored further. 
23 See Price, Belief, 260. 
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intermittent conscious attention.24 Ludwig Wittgenstein helpfully distinguishes dispositions from 
states of consciousness in the following way:  
 
I want to talk about a “state of consciousness”, and to use this expression to refer to the 
seeing of a certain picture, the hearing of a tone, a sensation of pain or of taste, etc. I want to 
say that believing, understanding, knowing, intending, and others, are not states of 
consciousness. If for the moment I call these latter “dispositions”, then an important 
difference between dispositions and states of consciousness consists in the fact that a 
disposition is not interrupted by a break in consciousness or a shift in attention. (And that of 
course is not a causal remark.) Really one hardly ever says that one has believed or 
understood something “uninterruptedly “since yesterday. An interruption of belief would be 
a period of unbelief, not, e.g., the withdrawal of attention from what one believes, or, e.g., 
sleep.25 
Price speaks of two general ways to go about analyzing belief: the traditional occurrence analysis and 
the dispositional analysis. He understands the traditional occurrence analysis of belief to be 
“primarily an analysis of assenting,”26 where the notion of entertaining a proposition is central. As he 
goes on to say, “Assenting to a proposition is, of course, something more than just entertaining it. 
But entertaining it is an essential precondition for assenting to it––or for rejecting it either, or for 
questioning it, or for taking up any other mental attitude about it.”27 The occurrence analysis of 
belief, according to Price, is primarily concerned with analyzing belief when it is explicitly and 
actively entertained in a person’s consciousness. 
  In the dispositional analysis of belief, however, the analysis of believing is not reduced to 
active assenting. Belief acquisition and loss of belief are occurrences as are manifestations of belief, 
but having a belief is understood as a disposition with the capacity for variable occurrent 
manifestations.28 These various types of manifestations are explained below.  
  The phrase “holistic inferential manifestation” is meant to account for the fact that a 
person’s believing-disposition manifests in reliable behavioral, phenomenal, and cognitive ways.29  
 
24 See Eric Schwitzgebel, “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief,” Nous 36:2 (2002), 249. 
25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Volume II (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1980), 9-10. Beliefs under a dispositional analysis have duration as well, but are not as 
neatly individuated as they are in the occurrence analysis and generally have a much longer duration 
as they are not limited to conscious entertainment. 
26 Price, Belief, 190. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Price, Belief, 363.  
29 See Eric Schwitzgebel, “A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief,” 252. 
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Price suggests that we think of belief as a “multiform disposition” where overt action is only one 
possible manifestation of belief. As he states,  
 
It should now be clear that if ‘A believes that p’ is a dispositional statement about A, the 
disposition we attribute to him is a multiform disposition, which is manifested or actualized 
in many different ways: not only in his actions, not only in his actions and his inactions, but 
also in emotional states such as hope and fear; in feelings of doubt, surprise and confidence; 
and finally in his inferences, both those in which a belief just ‘spreads itself’ from a 
proposition to some of its consequences (certain or probable), and those in which the 
inference is a self-conscious and self-critical intellectual operation.30  
The dispositional descriptions of belief that we are drawing on share affinities with inferential 
approaches to understanding conceptual content. According to an inferential approach to 
conceptual content, as articulated by Robert Brandom,31 grasping a concept consists of having 
“practical mastery over the inferences it is involved in––to know, in the practical sense of being able to 
distinguish, what follows from the applicability of a concept, and what it follows from.”32 Since 
beliefs, according to the dispositional account being drawn upon here are inherently conceptual, 
how we understand conceptual content is important. Price talks about the inferential nature of belief 
when he speaks of the “extension of belief” and of “relying” on a proposition. As he says, “A 
proposition is relied upon when it is available to us as a premiss for inferences, whether theoretical 
or practical.”33 When we believe or assent to a proposition it is done, if only tacitly, in light of other 
beliefs. This pushes us towards thinking of a “web of beliefs” and towards a type of holism. As he 
says, “we shall certainly have to say that this ‘spreading’ of belief from a proposition to its 
consequences is one of the most important ways in which such a disposition is occurrently 
manifested.”34  
  However, we are not only talking about how many different beliefs are inextricably and 
normatively linked and dependent on one another, but we are also talking about how believing a 
single proposition necessarily explodes out into relevant consequences and potential implications in 
 
30 Price, Belief, 294. 
31 Brandom himself draws on, among others, Wilfrid Sellars who was a student of H.H. Price for a 
time. See Willem deVries, "Wilfrid Sellars", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/sellars/> 
32 Robert Brandom, Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, & Discursive Commitment (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), 89. 




various circumstances.  Not all of these inferences will be made with the same degree of 
commitment, but believing a proposition is more than just having an awareness of it, and a 
distinctive difference between being aware of a proposition and believing it is knowing how it ought 
to be used or understanding its implications––hence its affinities with an inferential approach to 
understanding conceptual content. It is similar to Wittgenstein explaining understanding as 
“knowing how to go on,”35 in that when we believe in something it impacts more than our 
knowledge of its existence. It is inevitably used and applied in some sort of dispositional way (albeit, 
one that is not a mere “differential responsive disposition,”36 i.e. one that is more than a result of 
mindless conditioning or programming and rote behavior, but one that understands why what one is 
doing accords with what one believes and is able to give reasons if asked as well as understand, to a 
certain degree, its normative extensibility). Importantly, this inferential nature of belief can be both 
latent and present to consciousness and can be intelligibly manifested in intentional action even 
when the linguistic statement or statements  is not consciously entertained and can be 
normatively/inferentially expressed in a variety of intelligible ways that go beyond the explicit 
contemplation and verbal communication of propositional relations.37 This pushes us toward a more 
embodied understanding of faith and of Christian believing itself; rather than understanding beliefs, 
in a rationalistic fashion, as something entirely distinct that merely accompany particular ways of 
acting and being in and with others in the world. 
  Even when we merely want to talk about assenting to propositions, “when we believe a 
proposition, our belief does extend itself to at least some of the consequences of the proposition. 
We need beliefs because we need guidance not only in our actions but in our thoughts also.”38 
Hence, in a very significant sense beliefs are not merely descriptive, but prescriptive as well––and 
not only prescriptive for thought. As Price also says, “What spreads itself or extends itself from the 
proposition believed to its consequences, or at least its obvious consequences, is the whole complex 
disposition which we call ‘believing,’ and this includes the disposition to have the feelings we have 
 
35 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Revised 4th edition (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd, 2009), 65-67. 
36 See Brandom, Making it Explicit, 85-89.  
37 Here I am  thinking about Wittgenstein’s discussion on the nature of intentional action and his 
rejection of the need to view ‘intentions’ as necessary psychic antecedents, or as concurrent, entities 
of action. See Philosophical Investigations, 176, and Michael Scott “The Context of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Action,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 36, no. 4 (October 1998), 595-617.  
38 Price, Belief, 291. 
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discussed.”39 Hence, this pushes us toward an inherent holistically normative way of understanding 
faith as a way of being in the world and a way of relating to other persons, to God, and to ourselves. 
  What then is the upshot of all this for articulating an understanding of the nature of faith? 
More specifically how does this help us better articulate the necessary aspect of fiducia in genuine 
faith and in doing so help us better distinguish genuine faith from mere intellectual assent and more 
intelligibly understand how one’s having faith is normatively manifested in our lives? How does this 
further articulation of fiducia help us better understand how the various implicit dimensions of 
explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing might hold together? First, while the 
traditional description of faith as a mental act consisting of notitia, assensus, and fiducia can still be held 
to be an accurate way of describing faith, a dispositional description of belief, in forcing us to 
account for the latent dimension of having faith, requires us to explicitly acknowledge that faith 
itself is more than having a mental occurrence––of any kind––thereby forcing us to move away 
from a rationalist reductionism and towards a more holistic and embodied understanding of faith. In 
other words, faith is not merely a type of mental belief or assent to cognitive content that merely 
accompanies a specific way of living and being in the world (which could theoretically remain 
separate) although it is not less than cognitive. Faith is itself a particular type of description of such 
living and being and as such cannot be thought to be some mental “thing” antecedent or separable 
from concrete lived existence.  
 
  To be sure, having faith involves awareness of specific cognitive content concerning Jesus 
Christ as well as a particular orientation towards that cognitive content––such as affirming it to be 
true, authoritative, and beneficial in some sense for one’s life––but having this particular conscious 
state cannot capture what it means to have faith in Christ because, for one reason, we are never 
continuously in such a conscious cognitive state.40 If we understand faith to be a multiform 
disposition its constancy is accounted for in the various ways we are disposed to act, perceive, and 
be in the world and this faith is manifested in more ways than in explicit thoughts or audible 
proclamations depending on the various circumstances the believer is encountering. This point 
warrants further explanation. 
 
39 Ibid. 
40 Not that faith ever was, in the best of the theological tradition, reduced to merely having certain 
thoughts, but in acknowledging the latent dimension one is steered away from such an error. 
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  If faith is understood as a multiform disposition, then the believer’s manifestation of faith 
need not always include conscious entertainment of propositions––although in relevant situations it 
most certainly will include these. Faith can be equally manifested in various actions and in multiform 
reactions, and not only in verbal actions––whether spoken or thought. Furthermore, when faith is 
manifested in various actions it need not necessarily be preceded or accompanied by the conscious 
entertainment of the cognitive content relevant to the gospel––but subsequent questioning of and 
reflection on that faithful action could make the implicit intentionality explicit. In other words, faith 
manifested in action need not be explained as such by appeal to antecedent or accompanying 
conscious reflection on the propositions of the gospel. If faith was only understood cognitively 
along the lines of mental acts, then we might be forced to think this way. However, if faith is 
understood as a holistic and multiform disposition, as a way of being, then antecedent or 
accompanying conscious states about the content of the gospel need not be appealed to in order to 
explain faith manifested in intentional action. A believer’s manifestation of faith in action can be 
understood apart from conscious entertainment when this action is intentionally in accord with what 
is believed. In order for us to understand faithful action one could recognize the action to be such 
and upon questioning the particular believer about the particular action we would find that she is 
able to give reasons why this particular action was a normative extension in accord with faith in 
Christ, but she need not have had particular propositions present to mind while acting in faith––
faith would be understood to be implicit in the action and made verbally explicit when it was later 
reflected on. So, then, accounting for the insight regarding conscious latency from dispositional 
descriptions of belief into the traditional Protestant analysis of faith forces us to think about faith 
beyond conscious entertainment and in doing so differentiates genuine faith from mere intellectual 
assent by affirming that faith is manifest in what we do, and in who we are, and not just in what we 
consciously think or how we consciously feel. Hence, there is an inherently public nature to the 
concept of faith (but not necessarily one that does not also include initially hidden dimensions to the 
untrained eye) that can’t be accounted for within the hiddenness of the mind,41 nor can the believer’s 
agency in faith be understood in an entirely passive way even if it must still be understood in a non-
autonomous42 and a non-meritorious way. 
 
41 Again, this line of thinking is influenced by and indebted to Wittgenstein’s argument against 
private language and his discussions on intentional action. 
42 By non-autonomous, among other things, I mean theologically understood faith never occurs or 
takes place outside of an ontological encounter with and in the gracious presence of God. 
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  Second, understanding faith as a complex and holistic disposition to act as if p were true in 
relevant circumstances makes greater sense of the transition from having a belief to acting on a 
belief than does a view that understands belief solely along the lines of a mental act or as a kind of 
mental entity, which leaves the transition from the belief to its manifestation more or less 
unexplained. A dispositional account of faith makes the concept of faith’s inherent interaction with 
the concrete activity and identity of the believer in the world more intelligible as beliefs are that 
which the believer is inherently disposed to manifest in a multiform manner and are that which are 
concretely constituted by this interaction within the believers concrete situation and their polyphonic 
experience within it.  
  Charles Spurgeon has an insightful illustration worth quoting in its entirety along these lines 
of the enacted and holistically manifested character of Christian believing. It is from his sermon on 
James 2:17, entitled “Fruitless Faith.” Although he tends to view the action as a proof or pointer to 
faith, this illustration nicely points out the necessary embedded nature of faith in particular concrete 
contexts of activity. As he narrates: 
There is a vessel drifting. She will soon be on the shore, but a pilot is come on board; he is 
standing on the deck, and he says to the captain and crew, "I promise and undertake that, if 
you will solely and alone trust me, I will save thy vessel. Do you promise it; do you believe in 
me?" They believe in him; they say they believe the pilot can save the vessel, and they trust 
the vessel implicitly to his care. Now listen to him. "Now," says he, "you at that helm there!" 
He does not stir. "At the helm there! Can't you hear?" He does not stir! He does not stir! 
"Well, but, Jack, haven't you confidence in the pilot?" "Oh! yes. Oh! yes, I have faith in him," 
he says; "he will save the vessel if I have faith in him." "Don't you hear the pilot, as he says 
have faith in him, and you won't touch the helm?" "Now, you aloft there! Reef that sail." He 
does not stir, but lets the wind still blow into the sail and drift the vessel on to the coast. 
"Now then, some of you; look alive, and reef that sail!" But he does not stir! "Why, captain, 
what shall I do? These fellows won't stir or move a peg." But "Oh!" says the captain; "I have 
every confidence in you, pilot. I believe you will save the vessel." "Then why don't you 
attend to the tiller, and all that?" "Oh! no," says he; "I have great confidence in you. I don't 
mean to do anything." Now when that ship goes down amid the boiling surges, and each 
man sinks to his doom, I will ask you, had they faith in the pilot? Hadn't they a mimicking, 
mocking sort of faith, and only that? For if they had been really anxious to have the vessel 
rescued, and have trusted in the pilot, it would be the pilot that had saved them, and they 
could never have been saved without him. They would have proved their faith by their 
works. Their faith would have been made perfect, and the vessel would have been secured.43 
 
43 Charles Spurgeon, “Fruitless Faith” A Sermon (No. 3434) Published on Thursday, November 




As a spiritual parable this illustrates the distinction between fiducia and mere assensus. Fiducia 
necessarily involves one’s concrete activity in the world as one submits and appropriates oneself to 
Christ after being encountered by him. However, if we approach this illustration hermeneutically, 
coupled with a dispositional understanding of faith, which is dependent on concrete circumstances 
for particular manifestations, then we are also able to illustrate the context dependent nature of faith 
embedded in action, and, therefore, an element of dependence on particular circumstances of 
activity for recognizing instances of genuine faith. While on one level there is a legitimate abstract 
understanding of what faith entails at another level we cannot fully recognize what faith is apart 
from it being appropriated in concrete circumstances and practices––and this is vitally important if 
an essential part of genuine faith is appropriating it in our lives, as traditional articulations of fiducia 
have affirmed. In a certain sense, then, the fullness of fiducia cannot be told, but must be shown. In 
Spurgeon’s illustration above genuine faith would have been manifested in manning the helm and 
taking in the sail and in the feelings that accompanied that action in those circumstances. Those 
would not need to be understood as effects of antecedent or accompanying cognitively conscious 
states but would genuinely be a proper manifestation of faith as intentional actions performed in 
accord with one’s faith in the pilot. Such a person would have the disposition of faith in Christ and 
it would have been manifested in those actions in that particular circumstance. 
  In contrast compare one of J. Gresham Machen’s commentary concerning the faith of the 
centurion found in Matthew 8:5-13, he says this; 
the centurion is presented as one who had faith; and faith, as distinguished from the effects 
of faith, consists not in doing something but in receiving something. Faith may result in 
action, and certainly true faith in Jesus always will result in action; but faith itself is not doing 
but receiving.44 
Now in this context it is perfectly legitimate for Machen, in light of the end goal of the healing of 
the paralyzed servant, to point out that the centurion’s faith was not the direct act that healed the 
servant, nor was the centurion’s own action the object of trust, but it does not make sense to sharply 
contrast “receiving” with “doing;” if for no other reason that the fact that believing involves some 
sort of activity on part of the believer. The centurion’s faith was manifested in his requesting Jesus to 
heal his servant and also in his trusting that Jesus could and did heal his servant by the power of his 
 




word.45 Instead of saying that “faith itself is not doing” it would be more accurate to distinguish the 
believer’s “doings” of faith from the “doings” of the one in whom that faith is in, and Barth and 
Bultmann do a much better job at describing the nuances of human agency in the act of faith. In this 
passage Jesus did not seek out a centurion, who was passively sitting at home, and declare that he 
was going to heal his servant. Instead, becoming aware of Christ’s presence the centurion 
encountered Christ and manifested his faith in his actions of approaching, requesting, and trusting––
particular actions of which displayed an inherent realization that the centurion was unable to heal his 
servant himself. Those actions were an integral part of the centurion’s faith, not merely a distinct 
effect of it. At the same time, he genuinely performed actions to procure the healing of his servant, 
but the type of actions he performed were of such a kind that he recognized that he himself was 
incapable of achieving his desired end. Such actions might be understood as actions done with non-
meritorious intent or motivation,46 or more simply, actions done in humility as Barth and Bultmann 
would describe. Furthermore, in this case worries about autonomous faith are dissolved because the 
agent’s actions are directed at and in the presence of Christ––who remains free to act as he chooses, 
in accord with his character and wisdom.  
  This dispositional account of believing also better accounts for the similarity and differences 
found within the Christian faith and between various individual’s appropriation of that faith. How a 
university professor, a stay at home parent, a professional athlete, a foreign missionary, a person in 
business, a politician, a student, an artist, etc., manifests genuine faith will both significantly resemble 
and differ from one another since one’s recognition and exhibition of genuine faith is dependent on 
one’s concrete circumstances of activity, identity, and gifting in the world. Even though the fiducial 
aspect can be understood and spoken about abstractly and generally its particular form cannot be 
recognized as such apart from the particular circumstances of activity in the world. The preceding 
was meant to articulate that a believer’s faith cannot be fully described occurrently, nor can it be 
fully recognized abstractly as its recognition is partly dependent on the various circumstances in 
which the particular believer is encountered with since genuine faith itself is inherently an embodied 
concept. Understanding faith dispositionally better equips us to account for this similarity and 
 
45 Although neither should his faith be reduced to those specific activities. If such were the case, 
then, when those activities ceased so would his faith. Hence the reason why faith needs to be 
understood dispositionally as an overarching description of a particular way of life.  
46 Here my understanding is in general agreement with Paul K. Moser. See his The Severity of God 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 144-159. 
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difference. It also forces us to since we are not only concerned with assent to certain propositions. If 
one asks how to recognize genuine faith speaking about it is not enough since genuine faith is more 
than cognitive when the cognitive is understood in an abstract manner removed from our living in 
the world; it is an embodied phenomenon and as such must be witnessed and encountered in the 
midst of the particularities of life.  
 
  This approach to understanding faith also makes greater sense of how faith normatively 
extends into the entirety of one’s life. It better accounts for how the implicit dimensions of explicit 
faith and the holistic character of Christian believing hold together. It is better able to account for 
the phenomenon of growing and maturing in faith by giving it a fuller description than that of a 
greater acquisition of knowledge or as an intensification of conviction (understood in a merely pious 
or emotional fashion). Furthermore, it understands this transformation to be publicly manifested 
thereby adding greater intelligibility to how Christian’s are holistic witnesses to the object of their 
faith, Jesus Christ, without being reductively nontheological.47 
 
  A primary objection to understanding faith dispositionally is the reality that people do not 
always act according to what they profess to believe. As alluded to earlier, however, the relationship 
between a belief and its manifestation is not an immutable one and, furthermore, persons possess 
multiple dispositions that often come into tension––as well as multiple beliefs that have to be 
adjudicated and related to one another.48 Christians do not have perfect faith, and, regretfully, 
sometimes Christians do not act in accord with their faith in Christ, but again, Christians are not 
ultimately trusting in their faith. They are ultimately trusting in Christ for their salvation. So 
admitting this fallible relation between belief-dispositions and their manifestation doesn’t necessarily 
curb the cash value of incorporating insights from dispositional analyses of belief in order to 
understand faith dispositionally in order to better understand how the implicit dimensions of explicit 
faith and the holistic character of believing hold together in in doing so more articulately show why 
believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. In cases where one truly did believe but acted 
contrary to one’s professed belief that belief-disposition would eventually manifest in contrition and 
repentance. Understanding that we hold to beliefs in various degrees also helps mitigate the force of 
 
47 See 2 Thessalonians 1:3. 
48 Furthermore, this is made more intelligible by the fact that faith is something that grows and is not 
fully realized all at once.  
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this criticism.49 As Eric Schwitzgebel states, “If to believe is to possess a multi-track disposition or a 
broad-track disposition or (as I myself prefer to put it) a cluster of dispositions (which can include 
cognitive and phenomenal dispositions as well as behavioral ones), then there will be inbetweenish 
cases in which the relevant disposition or dispositions are only partly possessed.”50 All a multiform 
dispositional account of belief, or of faith, needs to affirm is that we normally behave, react, and 
think in accord with the truth of what we believe in appropriate ways in the appropriate 
circumstances, ceteris paribus. 51 
 
  Another concern, coming from a particular Protestant perspective, has to do with 
dispositional development in relation to being justified as opposed to sanctified. This chapter has 
not been concerned with articulating the nature of justification even though the concept of faith is 
closely tied to that topic. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer at one point states, “Because we are justified by 
faith, faith and obedience have to be distinguished. But their division must never destroy their unity, 
which lies in the reality that faith exists only in obedience, is never without obedience. Faith is only 
faith in deeds of obedience.”52 While the dispositional account here has not been understood merely 
as a disposition to have faith, but rather that we think about faith itself dispositionally, this particular 
view of faith as a disposition need not necessarily be seen as predicating justification as being 
contingent on this cultivated disposition in an objectified or autonomous manner. The descriptions 
that Barth and Bultmann provided of the various implicit dimensions of humility and dependence 
that are characteristic of the Christian’s and the Christian faith should mitigate that anxiety. Again, 
this faith is still faith in Christ and in his doing what the Christian could not do and in being what 
the Christian could not be on her own. Furthermore, this is not a reductive or objectified disposition 
in the believer so Bultmann’s rejection of understanding faith as a disposition is not relevant and this 
 
49 Refer to the discussion in footnote 15 for a more detailed reflection on the degrees of believing. 
50 Eric Schwitzgebel,. “Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or The Gulf Between Occurrent 
Judgment and Dispositional Belief,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 91 (2010), 535. 
51 See Ibid., 541. 
52 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Discipleship (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 64. As he says towards the 
end of that book: “The fears we have about doing good works as a pretext to justify our evil works 
is a notion which certainly is foreign to scripture. Scripture never sets faith over against the good 
work which hinders and destroys faith. Grace and deeds belong together. There is no faith without 
the good work, just as there is no good work without faith” (Bonhoeffer, Discipleship, 277-278). 
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way of understanding the nature of believing adds more intelligibility to Bultmann’s polyphonic 
conception of the holistic character of Christian believing. 
  It may be that this understanding of faith has interesting implications for the Protestant 
debates regarding the nature of justification, but this dispositional account of faith was primarily 
employed here to better articulate how faith relates to a believer’s intentional way of being in the 
world in order to better understand how the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the 
holistic character of Christian believing might be seen to hold together and in doing so to better 
understand why belief is centrally significant in and for Christianity. It was not directly concerned to 
jump into debates on justification. However, this account of faith may challenge those 
understandings of the nature of faith that are liable to understand the dichotomy between faith and 
works as being synonymous with a dichotomy between belief and action. This may will complicate 
some’s understanding of what we mean when we say that Christians are saved by grace through faith 
and not by works, but it is a complication that is necessary in order better understand the central 
significance of belief in and for Christianity. Especially when we wish to better understand the 
coherence between the divinely stated purpose of humans being creating in order to do good works 
and the central significance that believing holds in and for Christianity.  
 
The Non-Reductively Social and Linguistic Character of Christian Believing 
Both Barth and Bultmann affirm the sociality of faith and the linguistically mediated cognitive aspect 
of the character of Christian believing while they at the same time criticize certain ways of 
understanding these aspects. Accounts of the propositional, cognitive, and linguistic dimension of 
Christian belief are reductive if, on the one hand, they neglect to account for the horizontal 
prepredicative factors that give propositional statements their sense, or if, on the other hand, they 
focus entirely on horizontal prepredicative factors to the neglect of adequately understanding them 
“vertically”  in the context of a human divine encounter within the believer’s concrete created 
reality.53 Belief as this multiform disposition manifests itself in various ways in various levels of 
conscious reflection and expression and in different forms of embodied intentional action. It is from 
the perspective of this holistic and multiform dispositional account of believing that this further 
 
53 While the linguistic dimension involved in the character of Christian believing goes beyond that of 
relating to statements it is statements that we will focus on. 
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inquiring into the cognitive, propositional, and linguistic dimension of Christian belief needs to be 
undertaken. Christian belief is more than abstractly cognitive, but Christian belief is also intimately 
tied up with understanding mediated in language, in the world, with others, and with the God who 
addresses humans. As Eberhard Jüngel states, “Faith is understood here as the relation of man who 
responds to the God who addresses him, a relation which is made possible by the event of the God 
who speaks and which is existentially called into being.” 54  Language and sociality, as has been 
evidenced throughout this thesis, are closely linked to one another. As Jüngel also states, “the ego 
within the horizon of language is always understood as a subject which is defined by sociality. 
Whoever calls man a being distinguished by its language has also understood him as the ego within a 
lingual and living community.”55 How we understand language and its sociality is important for 
properly understanding cognitive dimension of believing that is not merely reductive in its formality 
and abstraction. 
 Andrew Inkpin’s recent work on the phenomenology of language is helpful for 
understanding how we might understand the cognitive and linguistic dimensions of Christian belief 
in a non-reductive manner. In Disclosing the World Inkpin initially engages with the Heidegger of Being 
and Time in order to focus on the disclosive function of language in order to set up a broadly 
Heideggerian framework for his unified account of a phenomenology of language, where he engages 
with Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein to complement inadequacies that he sees in Heidegger’s 
account concerning a further articulation of the pragmatic and presentational sense of language. He 
ends his book by suggesting how his phenomenological account challenges the formal semantics 
that dominate much post-Fregean analytic philosophy of language, how this account suggests that 
the choice between idealism or realism is a false option, and how his philosophical account of the 
phenomenology of language is complimentary to work currently being done in 4e cognitive 
science.56 All these aspects contribute to an understanding of the holistic character of Christian 
believing that helps us better understand why believing is not an isolated phenomenon and, as such, 
 
54 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 163. 
55 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 174. 
56 While I am aiming to be exegetically faithful to Inkpin’s work in the portions that I do engage with 
my ultimate concern is not with Inkpin’s philosophical positions as such, but with its potential 
profitability for a theological understanding of the propositional, cognitive, and linguistic dimension 
of the character of Christian belief. In doing so I am actually emulating Inkpin’s own mode of 
engagement with Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein: seeking to faithfully depict their 
thought, but ultimately concerned with what they can offer for his (or my) own project. 
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better understand why it is centrally significant in and for Christianity. It furthermore helps continue 
to promote the cognitive and linguistic dimensions of the character of Christian believing that is not 
intellectually reductive. 
 
 Language is a phenomenon of created reality and, especially in the Reformed Christian 
tradition, belief is integrally tied up with awareness of linguistic content. At the same time, however, 
a Christian conception of belief as it is manifested through faith in Christ is something more than an 
awareness of linguistic content on its own, even more than mere assent to the truth of that content. 
Faith is tied up in a wholly self-involving changed and changing way of life in relation to Christ, in 
relation to oneself, and in relation to others in the world. Andrew Inkpin’s discussion of how we 
grasp the content of statements helps offer us a more intelligible account of the relationship between 
the cognitive and linguistic aspects of Christian belief and of intentional Christian existence in light 
of a “God who addresses us” (to refer back to Jüngel).  
 
 As Inkpin states, Heidegger has a “distinctive emphasis on the ‘derivative’ nature of 
predication and the possibility of prepredicative language use” and that this prepredicative level of 
meaning consists of “factors that are functionally and structurally presupposed in propositional 
content, but which remain irreducible”57 to propositional content as such, abstractly understood. 
These other factors are presented in bodily gestures and in our relations with one another and 
pragmatically in our various activities in the world. To illustrate this point Inkpin refers to 
Heidegger’s discussion of the declarative statement, “The hammer is heavy.” In an entirely formal or 
abstract way the meaning of this declarative sentence could be grasped as primarily describing a 
property of the hammer. But in order to fully grasp the sense of this statement requires awareness of 
both its presentational and pragmatic sense as it is manifested in its concrete situation of utterance. 
The utterance, “The hammer is heavy” might be an expression of concern, trepidation of having to 
lift it, or fear of being hit by it. The concrete context of utterance as it is manifested constitutes the 
sense of the propositional content. As Inkpin goes on to state,  
 
In other words, what looks homogeneous at the level of propositional content may be 
eliding important differences in the way entities are understood. This raises the possibility 
that there might be several different kinds of content-constitution process[es] that underlie 
 




meaningful sentences. But whether there are several such processes or just one, the core idea 
is that prepredicative factors are to effect the constitution of propositional content.58 
 
Language here is understood to be more than an isolated or abstracted formal system of signs, but 
one that is significantly embedded and embodied in human forms of life. Abstract propositional 
content is constituted in this way, and it is insufficiently understood apart from this larger awareness 
of how it is actually manifested in the world. Inkpin describes his approach to the philosophy of 
language as “language-in-the-world.” As he goes on to state,  
 
The point Heidegger is making is that any theory of signs focusing exclusively on formal and 
relational properties will yield no insight into the phenomenal basis from which its 
abstractions proceed, and in this sense will tell us nothing about what it is actually to be or to 
function as a sign. . . . The point of his antiformalism is rather to insist that an abstract 
formal conception of whatever kind of relationship—be it semiotic, syntactic, or semantic—
can provide only an uninformative schematism. To be revealingly informative such a conception must be 
complemented by an account of what it is for those kinds of relationship to be realized in actual phenomenon 
[emphasis mine].59 
The same can be said about the character of Christian believing and the argument of this thesis is 
that it should be. Any account of the nature of Christian belief that remains at an isolated formal 
level of abstraction (especially concerning the linguistic and propositional dimensions) fails to give a 
satisfactory account of the nature of Christian faith as it is realized in actual Christian existence. In 
order to give an adequate account of the phenomenon of Christian believing one must move beyond 
formal description as the character of Christian belief is itself more than abstract assent to formally 
presented theological statements. The sense of the propositional content of Christian belief is 
dependent on its holistic appropriation and manifestation in concrete circumstances.60 These ways of 
understanding the nature of belief and of faith highlight the holistic transformative potentiality of 
belief and by highlighting how believing is constitutionally embedded within and among the 
particularities of lived existence they begin to help us better understand why faith and belief are 
centrally significant in and for Christianity as believing is significantly and broadly interacting in and 
through the particularities of the lived realities of believing persons. 
 
58 Disclosing the World, 59. 
59 Disclosing the World, 56. 
60 This also potentially adds intelligibility to Barth and Bultmann’s distinction between knowledge 
about God and knowledge of God, as well as further articulate the significant distinction between 
Barth’s use of kennen with its connotations of knowledge by acquaintance rather than wissen with its 
connotations of theoretical or formal knowledge; which is consistent with many of the Apostle 




 This line of thinking brings attention to a different approach to understanding how the 
cognitive and linguistic content of faith can be more holistically understood in a way that Barth and 
Bultmann do not sufficiently incorporate into their thinking about the cognitive content of faith. 
This line of thinking also more intelligibly shows why even the cognitive and linguistic aspects of the 
character of Christian believing are centrally significant as they are constitutionally tied to the 
believers’ pragmatic and existential realm of existence in the world. In other words the thought of 
faith is not merely abstracted and disengaged from the believer’s lived reality, but neither can 
cognitive and linguistic elements of the character of Christian believing be entirely disregarded from 
our conception in the favor of some form of reductively dispositional and non-cognitive conception 
of believing since those linguistic and cognitive elements that are normatively related are part of the phenomenological 
reality of the believer’s existence as well. It would be phenomenologically inaccurate and unfaithful (let 
alone theologically inconsistent) to not continue to include an appreciation for the normative 
cognitive dimension of the character of Christian believing even while we promote a more 
holistically embedded and embodied understanding of the character of Christian believing that 
exhibits multiple implicit and latent dimensions that are holistically embedded and embodied within 




A dispositional analysis of believing does not succumb to the criticisms that Barth and Bultmann 
have of viewing Christian faith as a mere disposition. It also adds greater clarity to our understanding 
of how the various implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian 
believing that they mention might hold together. A non-reductive dispositional analysis of believing 
not only helps us understand how the complexity of faith can be understood to hold together, but 
they also bring greater intelligibility to how Christian belief relates to transformed and transforming 
Christian existence in a non-reductive manner. Furthermore, a dispositional analysis of Christian 
believing more intelligibly describes why genuine faith is always accompanied by good works and it 
makes greater sense of why it makes sense for the, on the one hand, the purpose of our being 
created to be the doing of good works and, on the other hand, the central significance of believing 
in and for Christianity.  
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By incorporating non-reductive accounts of the linguistic and social dimensions of the 
cognitive content of faith it can be more clearly seen how belief in and for Christianity is not simply 
an abstracted, disengaged, reductively intellectualistic phenomenon. In doing so it helps us better 
appreciate and understand the significance of declaring that an individual’s faith is wholly self-
involving in a non-individualistic manner. It also enables us to be in a better position to avoid 
reductive rejections of the cognitive dimensions of belief while at the same time not be required to 
affirm reductively intellectualist conceptions of the cognitive dimensions of the character of 
Christian believing in an abstract and disengaged manner. In doing so the central significance of 
belief in and for Christianity can be better appreciated by recognizing the scope in which belief 
extends into the various multitude of dimensions of being human: (both individually and in relation 
to others) within the concrete realities of human existence in creation in light of the Creator who 
enables and sustains it all. Given the various contexts for the possibility of intellectual growth in 
understanding in the various spheres of human existence it would be reductive not to retain a proper 
place for the cognitive and conceptual content of the character of Christian believing that reflects 
the God-given capacity for human reflection in and through language amidst our concrete 
circumstances and activities in the world.
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Conclusion: The Holistic Character of Christian Believing and the Central Significance of 
Faith 
 
“The many facets of faith in the Old and New Testament make it a forgone conclusion that the 
concept of faith in Christian theology will be rich, dynamic, and controverted.”1 
“The main theological point is that I am human in that I let someone else be there for me. That can also be 
called trust, and with regard to the ‘someone else’ who as God has promised himself to us, we must 
call this trust in God. This is precisely what is meant when we speak of faith.”2 
 
The question of this thesis has been, why is belief centrally significant in and for Christianity? In 
order to answer this question it has been the argument of this thesis that by attending to the implicit 
dimensions of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing the central significance 
of belief in and for Christianity becomes more intelligible. This question is further intensified when 
it is asked in an age and time that often acts as if what one believes does not matter and is at best a 
matter of personal taste and private opinion or when others act as if simplistic assenting to certain 
abstract propositions alone is sufficient to account for the character of Christian believing even if it 
is not sufficient to account for the character of the Christian life (nor by itself does an isolated and 
abstract conception of trust help alleviate the issue). The implicit assumption within both these ways 
of understanding belief is that believing is in some sense isolated or abstracted from the entirety of 
our identities, relationships with others, and activities in the world. Such sensibilities, however, 
exhibit a reductively simplistic understanding of what it means to believe and of how faith and 
believing “exist” in human persons or how human persons “exist” in and through their believing. 
This thesis has sought to show that by attending to the implicit dimensions of explicit faith and the 
holistic character of Christian believing the central significance of belief for Christianity (and 
believing in general) becomes more intelligible. Put succinctly, belief is centrally significant because 
belief is not merely belief (as it is commonly understood). Believing in Christ is embedded, 
embodied, and enmeshed into every aspect of the believer’s human existence both individually and 
relationally. 
 
     The overarching aim of this study has been to investigate the nature of a Christian’s faith and the 
Christian to better understand why believing is centrally significant in and for Christianity. In doing 
 
1 Avery Dulles, S.J., The Assurance of Things Hoped For (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18. 
2 Eberhard Jüngel, God as the Mystery of the World, 180. 
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so, with the help of Barth and Bultmann, it sought to provide a non-reductive account of the 
character of Christian believing that more intelligibly accounts for why “faith” is the central 
component through which human restoration is actualized (or through which the process of 
actualization is initiated) in reconciliation with God, oneself, and with others. The study was 
grounded in an exposition and critical engagement with the work of Rudolf Bultmann and Karl 
Barth concerning the self-involving nature of faith in Christ. It proceeded to develop an account of 
the character of Christian believing in conversation with other theologians and, as deemed useful, 
with philosophers (in both the so-called analytic and continental traditions) in order to further work 
out under-developed insights implicit in their respective accounts and to redress aspects of their 
accounts that ought to be corrected in light of other theological commitments. In doing so it 
furthermore sought to offer an approach to better understanding how the many implicit dimensions 
of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing might hold together and explain its 
dynamic informative, normative, and transformative potential for the Christian believer. 
 
     In the process it also aimed to: (a) contribute to the current interest in reassessing Bultmann 
within Barth studies, (b) evaluate Barth’s continued significance in light of criticisms from more 
phenomenologically/hermeneutically minded theologians, (c) to redress reductive accounts of faith 
(whether they be overly “privatized” or too hastily “publicized,” one-sidedly ethnographic or 
myopically dogmatic) that lead to unnecessary disputes and reductive accounts of the task of 
theology and the Christian life generally, (d) provide a contemporary description of the character of 
Christian believing with ecumenical import that adequately accounts for its implicit complexity and 
pervasive normativity (as a phenomenon that takes place embedded and embodied in the world, yet 
in relation to God who is other than the world and other than us) while retaining a rich theological 
(dogmatic) description.3 
 
3 Given that among the various denominations and traditions of Christianity Protestants are 
commonly seen to have an overly intellectualized conception of what it means to believe showing 
that two of the most prominent Protestant thinkers of the 20th century are more nuanced therefore 
provides value for ecumenical dialogue. Furthermore, by showing the points of commonality 
between Barth and Bultmann those Lutheran or Reformed Christians that continue to be influenced 
by them can see further common ground in which to carry on their discussions. By showing points 
of commonality between Barth and Bultmann and thinkers in other traditions, both modern and 
ancient, the thesis also shows valuable common ground in which to have more fruitful ecumenical 
dialogue on the nature of faith with those coming from a Roman Catholic or Anglo-Catholic 
background that are typically more readily used to speaking about the character of Christian 




     Putting Rudolf Bultmann in conversation with Karl Barth was deemed to be advantageous for a 
number of reasons. Beyond frequently being touted as the two most influential Protestant 
theologians of the twentieth century (rightly or wrongly), stereotypically, they both emphasize 
opposing aspects of Augustine’s taxonomy of belief to the detriment of the other. Bultmann 
supposedly emphasizes the fides qua creditur (the faith by which it is believed, act/disposition, 
believing). Barth supposedly emphasizes the fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed, content, 
what or who is believed-in). In reality both are more nuanced than they are often taken to be, and 
both share a number of similarities (both in their affirmations and in their criticisms of other 
positions) when compared to the wider theological tradition. Both, in their respective ways, offer 
rich descriptions of faith that grounded the thesis theologically. 
 
 Given the centrality of faith and its pervasive normativity for both the institutional practice 
of theology (in both church and academy) and for the Christian way of life in general, our 
understanding of the character of Christian believing will inevitably affect not only various doctrinal 
discussions (or lack thereof), but it will also affect how we understand theology’s relationship to 
other academic disciplines and sources of knowledge and it adds greater intelligibility to the 
necessary integration of theology’s various subdisciplines. If theology is about God, how God relates 
to us, and everything else as it relates to God, and if knowledge of God and knowledge of self are 
mutually intertwined (which they are), then how we understand the character of Christian believing 
(the mode of access to God) will affect not only the content of belief, but also how we go about 
pursuing, appropriating, and promoting that content in the various activities and relationships we are 
involved with in our concrete situations in the world. A non-reductive conception of the 
propositional, cognitive, and linguistic aspect of Christian belief suggests that Christian theology in 
the academy ought to try and walk a third way between “purely” abstract theological reflection and 
mere ethnographic or sociological description. A way that is thoroughly interdisciplinary, but one 
that remains distinctly theological. Understanding propositional content is an aspect of faith, but the 
understanding of theological propositions in faith cannot be obtained in a purely formal manner. A 
full understanding of the content of theological propositions requires an understanding of how 
those propositions have been and are currently being embedded and embodied in the lived reality of 
Christian believers in the church and in the world, where prepredicative factors contribute to the 
constitution of the meaning of the propositional content of the character of Christian believing. This 
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is not something that can be observed simply, but it is something that requires theological 
discernment. Theology as a discipline within the academy, therefore, ought to seek to avoid overly 
disengaged, abstracted, and isolated engagements with dogma, but it ought to equally avoid a 
complete abandonment of engagement with dogma in favor of a reductively ethnographic or 
sociological approach that loses the force of the normative aspect of the linguistic content revealed 
by God in Christ and passed on through the faith of Christian believers and the texts that make up 
the Christian tradition(s). Barth and Bultmann are vitally helpful here with their unwavering 
emphasis on the importance of the theological object of faith in Jesus Christ in a non-reductive 
manner. Theology as a discipline ought to seek and promote the full understanding of theological 
propositions that make up a Christian’s and the Christian faith, which requires both an engagement 
with the dogmatic content of the tradition and with the present phenomenological and 
hermeneutical manifestation of that content amidst believing Christians in the particularities of their 
world today. Neither abstract and isolated dogmatic reflection nor mere ethnographic description 
will do. 
  As was articulated, faith (and belief) are not static concepts. They cannot be fully understood 
apart from articulating our involvement or activity in them. This was demonstrated by the fact that 
the fides quae creditur (the faith which is believed) cannot be separated from the fides qua creditur (the 
faith by which it is believed). In other words, to intelligibly speak about belief one must both speak 
about the content of that belief as well as the act or disposition of believing that content––the 
content and the act can be distinguished, but not separated (they both co-constitute each other and 
together they contribute to what it means to believe). To speak of belief we cannot avoid speaking 
about the believer doing something at the same time that we cannot avoid speaking about the 
believer receiving and being dependent on many things. Faith, therefore, cannot only be understood 
as some entirely passive thing (in the mind) that is given that then manifests in action, but it must be 
understood to include the believer’s dependent agency inherently from the get-go. Neither can faith, 
when it is understood to be wholly self-involving be sufficiently accounted for in an entirely 
abstracted and disengaged manner. Faith is embedded, embodied, and enacted in believers (it is not 
an objectified entity). Hence, the content as well as the act/disposition of faith is inherently 
dependent on concrete circumstances of manifestation (for both its actualization as well as its 
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intelligibility).4 In this sense faith is a holistic concept. The believer is involved cognitively, 
emotionally, volitionally, and physically. It cannot be fully recognized as assent to an abstract idea, 
statement, or proposition, as a content-less feeling, or as just any type of action, bodily movement, 
or linguistic utterance. Any of these taken by themselves results in a reductive conception of faith. 
As such, faith is not a phenomenon that can be adequately recognized in the abstract or isolated 
from the lived realities that at the very least constitute part of its content as well as its manners of 
manifestation (nor is Christian faith something that can be responsibly understood apart from some 
sort of ‘real’ relation to God). Acknowledging this holism makes greater sense of the central 
significance of belief in and for Christianity. 
 
We believe-that many things are true and that other things are false. We believe that some 
statements correctly orient us to, and in, reality and that others fail to do so. We believe-that some 
courses of action are right, good, and beneficial and that others are wrong, corrupting, and harmful. 
We believe-that some things are right for us and that some things are right for all. We believe-in 
various causes, other persons, sometimes in ourselves, and sometimes in God (not only that God 
‘exists’ or is ‘real’ or that God has revealed and reveals Godself to us in various and specific ways, 
but we also believe in various divine acts of promise, warning, demand or command to and for us). 
Both the object of belief as well as the act/disposition of believing can be dynamic. At the same 
time, we also disbelieve-that and disbelieve-in a variety of intentional objects, whether those be 
states of affairs, other persons, causes, God, etc. We believe strongly in some things and weakly in 
others. The stronger the belief the greater the informative, normative, and transformative potential 
for shaping who we are, what we do, how we think, and how we relate to and perceive others, 
ourselves, our concrete situation and that which transcends our concrete situations. Believing-in and 
believing-that are related but distinct aspects of how we believe; and disbelieving some things is an 
unavoidable aspect of believing yet other things. Beliefs do not exist in isolation from other beliefs 
and believing does not take place abstracted from our concrete intentional existence in the world 
with others (even when this involves instances of more abstract and theoretical reflection and 
articulation ‘pre-predicative’ and intersubjective factors play a role in both constituting and enabling 
our grasp of the sense of even formal statements and objects of belief and they continue to do so 
even when we incorporate divine and transcendent dimensions, such as divine grace and revelation, 
 




into our understanding of the character of Christian believing, as theologians ought to do). Believing 
is pervasive and it is holistically normative.  
 
 Within the history of theological reflection we can find various discussions over implicit and 
explicit faith and we can also find the occasional caricatures or extreme versions of both. This thesis, 
however, has been focused on a non-reductive account of the character of Christian believing that 
reflects the implicit dimensions that accompany explicit Christian faith, which make Christian faith 
what it is and distinguish it from a mere awareness or even a mere assent to the explicit content of 
faith. There are various ways to relate to and appropriate the content of faith and these are what 
make up the implicit human dimensions of explicit faith.  
 
 The ‘holistic character of Christian believing,’ then, is a double reference to the reflexive 
relationship between the multifaceted characters who believe and to the multidimensional character 
of believing. It gestures toward the supposition that one’s understanding of (theological) 
anthropology significantly affects how one understands the phenomenon of Christian believing 
(since if we follow Barth, Bultmann, and others, Christian faith is wholly self-involving, variously 
incorporating all that makes us human). It is assumed that a Christian’s faith and the Christian faith 
are not encapsulated by or isolated as mere intellectual assent (as we are more than disinterested or 
disengaged thinkers), but neither is it assumed that faith is devoid of affirming (and variously relating 
to) a web of statements stemming from Christ and his message, which are inter-subjectively 
encountered in texts and in the community of relations that make up the church in the world.  In 
both a Christian’s faith and in the Christian faith various statements are reflected on and 
appropriated, various statements are commended and denounced, various statements are embodied 
and enacted, various statements are imbibed in various ways. The question is, how ought we to 
understand the relationship between the statements believed and the peculiar mode of believing that 
is pervasively a Christian’s and the Christian faith? When we understand the mode of believing in a 
holistic manner the central significance of faith becomes more intelligible. 
 
 The character of Christian believing is intentional, and this intentionality is variously 
mediated through language as we are embedded and embodied in the world. It is directed outward. 
Christian faith is in Christ. This intentionality has multiple dimensions to it as well. Faith is ‘aimed’ at 
Christ cognitively and it is participated in Christ “ontologically.” Now by this I mean nothing more 
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than that Christian faith is inherently constituted by an actual relationship to and encounter with the 
divine (as other than us and as other than creation, lest it be un-theological) in the particularity and 
concreteness of the actual, created world. This relationship is not merely to ideas, doctrines, or 
propositions nor can we properly reduce the intentionality of faith to merely historical and 
sociological elements of human existence. The intentional dimension of the character of Christian 
believing is dependent on some sort of actual encounter with the divine. The “implicit dimensions 
of explicit faith” refer not only to the theological dynamics involved in faith as a holistic relation to 
God, but also to the variegated ways in which persons relate to what and/or who is believed in 
(implicitly and explicitly, fluctuating through various levels of conscious awareness and different 
forms of holistically embodied manifestation). There is implicitly more going on in the believer’s 
explicit reflection and confession and implicitly more than explicit reflection or audible expression. 
Reflective awareness (concerning the content and object of faith) is not a continuous phenomenon, 
but Christian believing is.  
 
 Reductive accounts of the nature of faith (whether they focus overwhelmingly on its 
propositional nature in an isolated and therefore unsophisticated manner, or those that hastily 
discharge the propositional altogether) lead to unsatisfactory answers (and to unnecessary debates), 
as they tend to reductively isolate aspects of human existence and of Christian faith to the detriment 
of others, whether that be some isolated form of thinking, feeling, or acting. In failing to 
satisfactorily grapple with the holistic character of Christian believing in its implicit and explicit 
complexity we fail to satisfactorily describe faith’s relationship to the variegated purpose of our 
being created, and in failing to do so we fail to satisfactorily reflect the importance of the dynamic 
gift of faith in Christ in all its intricacy.  
 
 Faith, pistis, fides, is simultaneously something that you have and something that you do. It is 
simultaneously something that you receive and something that you offer (both ‘vertically’ and 
‘horizontally’). Faith is something that is simultaneously unique to each individual and something 
that is shared in common amongst Christians.5 A Christian’s faith is part of the Christian Faith and 
both a Christian’s and the Christian faith exhibit diachronic and synchronic novelty amidst 
 
5 There are certain aspects of commonality with other religions too, but the focus of this thesis has 
been on Christianity as the character of Christian believing is fundamentally constituted and 
conditioned by that in whom the Christian believes in. 
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continuity. Faith is not some thing you have or some thing that you receive that can be adequately 
accounted for in isolation or abstraction, but it is only ever received and manifested in one’s 
intentional way of existing in light of encountering God in the world. When the implicit dimensions 
of explicit faith and the holistic character of Christian believing are acknowledged and reflected on 
the central significance of belief (why it is faith that is so closely tied to our reception and 
appropriation of salvation) in and for Christianity becomes more intelligible because it is easier to 
see that faith is not simply something  necessary to receive salvation and redemption but is itself the 
beginning and continuing actualization of redemption, reconciliation, restoration, salvation, and new 
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